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- Genre: Doctoral Dissertation
Description
Gender and sex are often conflated. Our laws, policies, and even science establish sex and gender as intrinsically linked and dimorphic in nature. This dissertation examines the relationship between sex and gender and the repercussions of this linked dimorphism in the realms of law, politics, and science. Chapter One identifies the legal climate for changing one's sexual identity post-surgical reassignment. It pays particular attention to the ability of postsurgical transsexuals to marry in their acquired sex. Chapter Two considers the process for identifying the sex of athletes for the purposes of participation in sex-segregated athletic events, specifically the role of testing and standards for categorization. Chapter Three explores the process of identifying and assigning the sex of intersex children. Chapter Four examines the process of prenatal sex selection and its ethical implications. Chapter Four also offers an anticipatory governance framework to address these implications.
ContributorsParsi, John (Author) / Crittenden, Jack (Thesis advisor) / Guston, David H. (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
ABSTRACT Whole genome sequencing (WGS) and whole exome sequencing (WES) are two comprehensive genomic tests which use next-generation sequencing technology to sequence most of the 3.2 billion base pairs in a human genome (WGS) or many of the estimated 22,000 protein-coding genes in the genome (WES). The promises offered from WGS/WES are: to identify suspected yet unidentified genetic diseases, to characterize the genomic mutations in a tumor to identify targeted therapeutic agents and, to predict future diseases with the hope of promoting disease prevention strategies and/or offering early treatment. Promises notwithstanding, sequencing a human genome presents several interrelated challenges: how to adequately analyze, interpret, store, reanalyze and apply an unprecedented amount of genomic data (with uncertain clinical utility) to patient care? In addition, genomic data has the potential to become integral for improving the medical care of an individual and their family, years after a genome is sequenced. Current informed consent protocols do not adequately address the unique challenges and complexities inherent to the process of WGS/WES. This dissertation constructs a novel informed consent process for individuals considering WGS/WES, capable of fulfilling both legal and ethical requirements of medical consent while addressing the intricacies of WGS/WES, ultimately resulting in a more effective consenting experience. To better understand components of an effective consenting experience, the first part of this dissertation traces the historical origin of the informed consent process to identify the motivations, rationales and institutional commitments that sustain our current consenting protocols for genetic testing. After understanding the underlying commitments that shape our current informed consent protocols, I discuss the effectiveness of the informed consent process from an ethical and legal standpoint. I illustrate how WGS/WES introduces new complexities to the informed consent process and assess whether informed consent protocols proposed for WGS/WES address these complexities. The last section of this dissertation describes a novel informed consent process for WGS/WES, constructed from the original ethical intent of informed consent, analysis of existing informed consent protocols, and my own observations as a genetic counselor for what constitutes an effective consenting experience.
ContributorsHunt, Katherine (Author) / Hurlbut, J. Benjamin (Thesis advisor) / Robert, Jason S. (Thesis advisor) / Maienschein, Jane (Committee member) / Northfelt, Donald W. (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Ellison, Karin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
The 1973 Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade was a significant event in the story of fetal personhood—the story of whether embryos and fetuses are legal persons. Roe legalized abortion care in the United States (US). However, the story of fetal personhood began long before the 1970s. People have been talking about embryos, fetuses, and their status in science, the law, and society for centuries. I studied the history of fetal personhood in the United States, tracing its origins from Ancient Rome and Medieval England to its first appearance in a US courtroom in 1884 and then to the Supreme Court’s decision in 1973.
But this isn’t a history of events—of names and dates and typical details. This is a history of words. In the twenty-first century, words used to discuss embryos and fetuses are split. Some people use humanizing language like “unborn children” and “human life.” Others use technical words like “embryos” and “fetuses.” I studied what words people used historically. I charted how words moved from science to the public to the law, and how they impacted court rulings on fetal personhood.
The use of certain words nudged courts to grant additional rights to embryos and fetuses. In the 1960s, writers began describing the science of development, using words like “unborn child” and humanizing descriptions to make embryos and fetuses seem like people already born. That helped build an idea of embryos and fetuses as having “life” before birth. When people began asking courts to legalize abortion care in the 1970s, attorneys on the opposite side argued that embryos and fetuses were “human life,” and that that “life” began at conception.
In those cases, “life” was biologically defined as when sperm fertilized egg, but it was on that biological definition “life” that judges improperly rested their legal rulings that embryos and fetuses were “potential human life” states had a duty to protect. It wasn’t legal personhood, but it was a legal status that let states pass laws restricting abortion care and punishing pregnant people for their behavior, trends that threaten people’s lives and autonomy in the twenty-first century.
But this isn’t a history of events—of names and dates and typical details. This is a history of words. In the twenty-first century, words used to discuss embryos and fetuses are split. Some people use humanizing language like “unborn children” and “human life.” Others use technical words like “embryos” and “fetuses.” I studied what words people used historically. I charted how words moved from science to the public to the law, and how they impacted court rulings on fetal personhood.
The use of certain words nudged courts to grant additional rights to embryos and fetuses. In the 1960s, writers began describing the science of development, using words like “unborn child” and humanizing descriptions to make embryos and fetuses seem like people already born. That helped build an idea of embryos and fetuses as having “life” before birth. When people began asking courts to legalize abortion care in the 1970s, attorneys on the opposite side argued that embryos and fetuses were “human life,” and that that “life” began at conception.
In those cases, “life” was biologically defined as when sperm fertilized egg, but it was on that biological definition “life” that judges improperly rested their legal rulings that embryos and fetuses were “potential human life” states had a duty to protect. It wasn’t legal personhood, but it was a legal status that let states pass laws restricting abortion care and punishing pregnant people for their behavior, trends that threaten people’s lives and autonomy in the twenty-first century.
ContributorsAbboud, Carolina (Author) / Maienschein, Jane (Thesis advisor) / Justice, George (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Pyne, Stephen (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
Description
This dissertation engages with the philosophical, psychological, and scientific literature on two important topics: empathy and human enhancement. My two broad goals are to clarify the role of empathy in ascriptions of responsibility and to consider how enhanced empathy might alter those ascriptions.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
ContributorsGurney, David (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis advisor) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Tsosie, Rebecca (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016