Matching Items (2)
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- Creators: Manelli, Alejandro
Description
This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mechanisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information. An equal-cost sharing mechanism which maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms is proved to be optimal. Under the equal-cost sharing mechanism, when the built cost is low, the public good is provided whenever one of the agents is willing to fund it at half cost; when the cost is high, the public good is provided only if both agents are willing to fund it. Thirdly, I analyze the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations. If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that absent any friction positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations into a finite number of classes, then randomly matched within these classes. The focus of this essay is the performance of coarse matching schemes with a finite number of classes. The main results of this essay are the following ones. First, assuming a multiplicative match payoff function, I derive a lower bound on the performance of n-class coarse matching under mild conditions on the distributions of agents' characteristics. Second, I prove that this result generalizes to a large class of match payoff functions. Third, I show that these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly pricing problem with incomplete information, as well as to a cost-sharing problem with incomplete information. In these problems, standard models predict that optimal contracts sort types completely. The third result implies that a monopolist can capture a large fraction of the second-best profits by offering pooling contracts with a small number of qualities.
ContributorsShao, Ran (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
In this paper, I study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the
following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market
over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A
form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can
manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In
such a setting, a natural question arises: Is it possible to analyze a dynamic many-to-one
matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one
market? First, I provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second,
I show that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchings are "inferior"
to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, I extend the model to allow agents on one side
to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension, I provide
a rationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the United States (US)
medical residency matching market compared to the US college-admissions system.
Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) are designed to improve the welfare of the poor.
Group lending with joint liability is the standard contract used by these institutions.
Such a contract performs two roles: it affects the composition of the groups that form,
and determines the properties of risk-sharing among their members. Even though the
literature suggests that groups consist of members with similar characteristics, there
is evidence also of groups with heterogeneous agents. The underlying reason is that
the literature lacked the risk-sharing behavior of the agents within a group. This
paper develops a model of group lending where agents form groups, obtain capital
from the MFI, and share risks among themselves. First, I show that joint liability
introduces inefficiency for risk-averse agents. Moreover, the composition of the groups
is not always homogeneous once risk-sharing is on the table.
following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market
over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A
form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can
manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In
such a setting, a natural question arises: Is it possible to analyze a dynamic many-to-one
matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one
market? First, I provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second,
I show that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchings are "inferior"
to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, I extend the model to allow agents on one side
to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension, I provide
a rationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the United States (US)
medical residency matching market compared to the US college-admissions system.
Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) are designed to improve the welfare of the poor.
Group lending with joint liability is the standard contract used by these institutions.
Such a contract performs two roles: it affects the composition of the groups that form,
and determines the properties of risk-sharing among their members. Even though the
literature suggests that groups consist of members with similar characteristics, there
is evidence also of groups with heterogeneous agents. The underlying reason is that
the literature lacked the risk-sharing behavior of the agents within a group. This
paper develops a model of group lending where agents form groups, obtain capital
from the MFI, and share risks among themselves. First, I show that joint liability
introduces inefficiency for risk-averse agents. Moreover, the composition of the groups
is not always homogeneous once risk-sharing is on the table.
ContributorsAltinok, Ahmet (Author) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020