Matching Items (6)
Filtering by

Clear all filters

149900-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
In spite of the existence of successful humble CEOs, the current strategic leadership literature has little understanding regarding what humility is and how humble CEOs influence organizational effectiveness by creating a context to motivate managers. After applying the self-concept framework to integrate the humility literature, I proposed four mechanisms through

In spite of the existence of successful humble CEOs, the current strategic leadership literature has little understanding regarding what humility is and how humble CEOs influence organizational effectiveness by creating a context to motivate managers. After applying the self-concept framework to integrate the humility literature, I proposed four mechanisms through which CEO humility were related to middle manager ambidextrous behaviors and job performance: CEO empowering leadership, empowering organizational climate, top management team integration and heterogeneity. After developing and validating a humility scale in China, I collected survey data from a sample of 63 organizations with 63 CEOs, 327 top management team members and 645 middle managers to test the research model. Except for top management team heterogeneity, the other three CEO-middle manager mediating mechanisms received moderate support. Specifically, I found that humble CEOs were empowering leaders; their empowering leadership behaviors were positively associated with top management team integration and empowering organizational climate, which in turn correlated positively with middle manager ambidexterity and job performance.
ContributorsOu, Yi (Author) / Tsui, Anne S. (Thesis advisor) / Kinicki, Angelo J. (Committee member) / Waldman, David A. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
150740-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
149964-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
ABSTRACT This multi-case study research, using qualitative and quantitative methods, examines, compares, and validates the traits, behaviors, and formulas for success utilized by four experienced, long-term, exemplary executives who lead nonprofit organizations (NPOs) that serve homeless and "at risk" populations. Service longevity is a measure of success in this study

ABSTRACT This multi-case study research, using qualitative and quantitative methods, examines, compares, and validates the traits, behaviors, and formulas for success utilized by four experienced, long-term, exemplary executives who lead nonprofit organizations (NPOs) that serve homeless and "at risk" populations. Service longevity is a measure of success in this study and each leader subject must have served a minimum of five years at their NPO to participate, though most have been leading their respective NPOs far longer. An NPO leader affects not only an organization but individual constituents and the entire community. Each leader subject is considered successful by numerous constituents and the community. Anyone is at risk for homelessness and its effects on the entire community are boundless. Traits and formulas for success are measured using three surveys: Kouzes & Posner's 360 LPI and Most Admired Characteristics surveys and Cialdini's Influence IQ Test. Additional data sources are personal interviews, organizational 990s, annual reports, and other financial and programmatic data. The instruments for data analysis are a Likert 7 Point Importance Scale used for the program and organizational evaluations by NPO professional outside raters and the Strategic Plan. Analytic tools are the Pearson Product Moment Correlations, the organization's 990s, a 3 year annual report comparison, and participant observation. This study measures the leaders against the ideal. One common theme among all the leaders is consistency, one of Cialdini's Six Principles of Influence; ii
ContributorsOstrom, Martha (Author) / Cayer, N. Joseph (Thesis advisor) / Cialdini, Robert B. (Committee member) / Schlacter, John L (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
153823-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
This paper examines whether CEOs with general managerial skills are better at achieving the goals of external communication. Using the General Ability Index developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) to measure CEOs' general managerial skills, I find that firms with generalist CEOs are more likely to obtain the desired

This paper examines whether CEOs with general managerial skills are better at achieving the goals of external communication. Using the General Ability Index developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) to measure CEOs' general managerial skills, I find that firms with generalist CEOs are more likely to obtain the desired outcomes of communication, including the smaller difference between analyst forecasts and management guidance, less dispersion in analyst forecasts, higher analyst following, and higher institutional ownership, after controlling for CEO talent and the impact of Regulation FD. Moreover, I provide direct evidence that general managerial skills are more important to external communication under poor information environments. I also investigate the characteristics of analysts who follow firms with generalists, and my findings suggest the private interaction with analysts is an important communication channel for generalists. Finally, I find that generalists are able to attract dedicated investors and gain long-term capital for their firms. Overall, I provide evidence on the growing importance of general managerial skills in external communication. This paper offers new insights into why CEOs with general skills are paid at a premium over those with specific skills, as documented in previous studies.
ContributorsYeh, Eugenia (Author) / Hillegeist, Steve (Thesis advisor) / Brown, Jennifer (Committee member) / Custodio, Claudia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
156514-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families

By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into wealthy families, as measured by a variety of proxies for firm performance. There is no evidence of higher risk-taking by the CEOs from low social status backgrounds. Further, CEOs from less privileged families perform better in firms with high R&D spending but they underperform CEOs from wealthy families when firms operate in a more uncertain environment. Taken together, my results show that endowed family wealth of a CEO is useful in identifying his or her managerial ability.
ContributorsDu, Fangfang (Author) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Wang, Jessie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
154367-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who do not exhibit such behavior and interprets the investment and

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who do not exhibit such behavior and interprets the investment and financing decisions by overconfident or optimistic CEOs as inferior. This paper argues that it may be rational to exhibit behavior interpreted as optimistic and that the determinants of a CEO’s perceived optimism are important. Further, this paper shows that CEOs whose apparent optimism results from above average industry-adjusted CEO performance in prior years make investment and financing decisions which are actually similar, and sometimes superior to, those of unbiased CEOs.
ContributorsWalton, Richard (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Lindsey, Laura (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016