Matching Items (5)

154367-Thumbnail Image.png

Optimism, attribution and corporate investment policy

Description

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who do not exhibit such behavior and interprets the investment and financing decisions by overconfident or optimistic CEOs as inferior. This paper argues that it may be rational to exhibit behavior interpreted as optimistic and that the determinants of a CEO’s perceived optimism are important. Further, this paper shows that CEOs whose apparent optimism results from above average industry-adjusted CEO performance in prior years make investment and financing decisions which are actually similar, and sometimes superior to, those of unbiased CEOs.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
2016

149964-Thumbnail Image.png

A multi-case study of four nonprofit leaders who serve "at risk" and homeless populations and their for success

Description

ABSTRACT This multi-case study research, using qualitative and quantitative methods, examines, compares, and validates the traits, behaviors, and formulas for success utilized by four experienced, long-term, exemplary executives who lead nonprofit organizations (NPOs) that serve homeless and "at risk" populations.

ABSTRACT This multi-case study research, using qualitative and quantitative methods, examines, compares, and validates the traits, behaviors, and formulas for success utilized by four experienced, long-term, exemplary executives who lead nonprofit organizations (NPOs) that serve homeless and "at risk" populations. Service longevity is a measure of success in this study and each leader subject must have served a minimum of five years at their NPO to participate, though most have been leading their respective NPOs far longer. An NPO leader affects not only an organization but individual constituents and the entire community. Each leader subject is considered successful by numerous constituents and the community. Anyone is at risk for homelessness and its effects on the entire community are boundless. Traits and formulas for success are measured using three surveys: Kouzes & Posner's 360 LPI and Most Admired Characteristics surveys and Cialdini's Influence IQ Test. Additional data sources are personal interviews, organizational 990s, annual reports, and other financial and programmatic data. The instruments for data analysis are a Likert 7 Point Importance Scale used for the program and organizational evaluations by NPO professional outside raters and the Strategic Plan. Analytic tools are the Pearson Product Moment Correlations, the organization's 990s, a 3 year annual report comparison, and participant observation. This study measures the leaders against the ideal. One common theme among all the leaders is consistency, one of Cialdini's Six Principles of Influence; ii

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
2011

149900-Thumbnail Image.png

CEO humility and its relationship with middle manager behaviors and performance: examining the CEO-middle manager interface

Description

In spite of the existence of successful humble CEOs, the current strategic leadership literature has little understanding regarding what humility is and how humble CEOs influence organizational effectiveness by creating a context to motivate managers. After applying the self-concept framework

In spite of the existence of successful humble CEOs, the current strategic leadership literature has little understanding regarding what humility is and how humble CEOs influence organizational effectiveness by creating a context to motivate managers. After applying the self-concept framework to integrate the humility literature, I proposed four mechanisms through which CEO humility were related to middle manager ambidextrous behaviors and job performance: CEO empowering leadership, empowering organizational climate, top management team integration and heterogeneity. After developing and validating a humility scale in China, I collected survey data from a sample of 63 organizations with 63 CEOs, 327 top management team members and 645 middle managers to test the research model. Except for top management team heterogeneity, the other three CEO-middle manager mediating mechanisms received moderate support. Specifically, I found that humble CEOs were empowering leaders; their empowering leadership behaviors were positively associated with top management team integration and empowering organizational climate, which in turn correlated positively with middle manager ambidexterity and job performance.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
2011

150740-Thumbnail Image.png

Mutual monitoring and corporate governance

Description

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
2012

153823-Thumbnail Image.png

General managerial skills and external communication

Description

This paper examines whether CEOs with general managerial skills are better at achieving the goals of external communication. Using the General Ability Index developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) to measure CEOs' general managerial skills, I find that firms

This paper examines whether CEOs with general managerial skills are better at achieving the goals of external communication. Using the General Ability Index developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) to measure CEOs' general managerial skills, I find that firms with generalist CEOs are more likely to obtain the desired outcomes of communication, including the smaller difference between analyst forecasts and management guidance, less dispersion in analyst forecasts, higher analyst following, and higher institutional ownership, after controlling for CEO talent and the impact of Regulation FD. Moreover, I provide direct evidence that general managerial skills are more important to external communication under poor information environments. I also investigate the characteristics of analysts who follow firms with generalists, and my findings suggest the private interaction with analysts is an important communication channel for generalists. Finally, I find that generalists are able to attract dedicated investors and gain long-term capital for their firms. Overall, I provide evidence on the growing importance of general managerial skills in external communication. This paper offers new insights into why CEOs with general skills are paid at a premium over those with specific skills, as documented in previous studies.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
2015