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Responding to the allegedly biased research reports issued by large investment banks, the Global Research Analyst Settlement and related regulations went to great lengths to weaken the conflicts of interest faced by investment bank analysts. In this paper, I investigate the effects of these changes on small and large investor

Responding to the allegedly biased research reports issued by large investment banks, the Global Research Analyst Settlement and related regulations went to great lengths to weaken the conflicts of interest faced by investment bank analysts. In this paper, I investigate the effects of these changes on small and large investor confidence and on trading profitability. Specifically, I examine abnormal trading volumes generated by small and large investors in response to security analyst recommendations and the resulting abnormal market returns generated. I find an overall increase in investor confidence in the post-regulation period relative to the pre-regulation period consistent with a reduction in existing conflicts of interest. The change in confidence observed is particularly striking for small traders. I also find that small trader profitability has increased in the post-regulation period relative to the pre-regulation period whereas that for large traders has decreased. These results are consistent with the Securities and Exchange Commission's primary mission to protect small investors and maintain the integrity of the securities markets.
ContributorsDong, Xiaobo (Author) / Mikhail, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Hugon, Artur J (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
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Description
During the past decade, the Chinese bond market has been rapidly developing. The percentage of bond to total social funding is constantly increasing. The structure and behavior of investors are crucial to the construction of China’s bond market. Due to specific credit risks, bond market regulation usually involves in rules

During the past decade, the Chinese bond market has been rapidly developing. The percentage of bond to total social funding is constantly increasing. The structure and behavior of investors are crucial to the construction of China’s bond market. Due to specific credit risks, bond market regulation usually involves in rules to control investor adequancy. It is heatedly discussed among academia and regulators about whether individual investors are adequate to directly participate in bond trading. This paper focuses on the comparison between individual and institutional bond investors, especially their returns and risks. Based on the comparison, this paper provides constructive suggestions for China’s bond market development and the bond market investor structure.
ContributorsLiu, Shaotong (Author) / Gu, Bin (Thesis advisor) / Zhu, Ning (Thesis advisor) / Yan, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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Description
Based on multiple case studies of the transactions in China by private equity funds, this paper attempts to explore the value-creation capabilities of private equity funds at the transaction/deal level.

Previous studies on financial performance of PE funds utilized data collected from publically traded companies in European/US markets. By

Based on multiple case studies of the transactions in China by private equity funds, this paper attempts to explore the value-creation capabilities of private equity funds at the transaction/deal level.

Previous studies on financial performance of PE funds utilized data collected from publically traded companies in European/US markets. By measuring financial performance of both “pre- and post-transactions,” these studies researched two questions: 1) Do buyout funds create value? 2) If they do, what are the sources of value creation? In general, studies conclude that private equity/buyout funds do create value at both the deal level and investor level. They also identified four possible sources of such value creation: 1) undervaluation, 2) leverage effect, 3) better governance, and 4) operational improvement.

However, relatively little is known about the process of value creation. In this study, I attempt to fill that gap, revealing the “secret recipe” of value creation.

By carefully looking into the process of value creation, this study suggests five propositions covering capabilities at 1) deal selection/screening, 2) deal structuring, 3) operational improvement, 4) investment exit, and 5) Top Management Team (TMT). These capabilities at private equity/buyout funds are critical factors for value creation. In a thorough review of the value-creation process, this paper hopes to:

1) Share real-life experiences and lessons learned on private equity transactions in China as a developing economy.

2) Reveal the process of deal/transaction to observe measures taken place within deal/transaction for value creation.

3) Show how well-executed strategies and capabilities in deal selection/screening, deal structuring, operational improvement, and investment exit can still create value for private equity firms without financial leverage.

4) Share the experience of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) reform participated in by private equity firms in China. This could provide valuable information for policy makers in China.
ContributorsYe, Youming (Author) / Lee, Peggy (Thesis advisor) / Zhu, Ning (Thesis advisor) / Wahal, Sunil (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016