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Responding to the allegedly biased research reports issued by large investment banks, the Global Research Analyst Settlement and related regulations went to great lengths to weaken the conflicts of interest faced by investment bank analysts. In this paper, I investigate the effects of these changes on small and large investor

Responding to the allegedly biased research reports issued by large investment banks, the Global Research Analyst Settlement and related regulations went to great lengths to weaken the conflicts of interest faced by investment bank analysts. In this paper, I investigate the effects of these changes on small and large investor confidence and on trading profitability. Specifically, I examine abnormal trading volumes generated by small and large investors in response to security analyst recommendations and the resulting abnormal market returns generated. I find an overall increase in investor confidence in the post-regulation period relative to the pre-regulation period consistent with a reduction in existing conflicts of interest. The change in confidence observed is particularly striking for small traders. I also find that small trader profitability has increased in the post-regulation period relative to the pre-regulation period whereas that for large traders has decreased. These results are consistent with the Securities and Exchange Commission's primary mission to protect small investors and maintain the integrity of the securities markets.
ContributorsDong, Xiaobo (Author) / Mikhail, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Hugon, Artur J (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
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Description
State-owned Enterprises (SOE) in China were described as Government Business Enterprises (GBE) in planned economy time. Not only as investor and owner, but also manager, government at that time was an all-powerful role in GBE. All factors of production, such as money, raw materials, production, sell, human affairs, were all

State-owned Enterprises (SOE) in China were described as Government Business Enterprises (GBE) in planned economy time. Not only as investor and owner, but also manager, government at that time was an all-powerful role in GBE. All factors of production, such as money, raw materials, production, sell, human affairs, were all decided by administrative orders. After reform and opening up, especially since 90s of last century, some related laws, including The Companies Act, were gradually promulgated and carried out, State-owned Enterprises have been found fairly like modern enterprises in appearance, but observe carefully, you will find that with the growing up of the market mechanism, Non-market mechanism still exists stubbornly during the whole company's actual operation.

This study focus on two cases of State-owned Enterprises, which are administrated by myself. Trying to find out the difference in business efficiency and group cohesiveness, this study examines the effects of the market mechanism and non-market mechanism, which are respectively operated as a pivotal figure in the two companies. Under the background of the social transformation and State-owned Enterprises’ deepen reform, for stimulating the vitality and efficiency of companies, this study tries to find an optimization management model for State-owned Enterprises.
ContributorsShi, Lei (Author) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Thesis advisor) / Chang, Chun (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015