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Responding to the allegedly biased research reports issued by large investment banks, the Global Research Analyst Settlement and related regulations went to great lengths to weaken the conflicts of interest faced by investment bank analysts. In this paper, I investigate the effects of these changes on small and large investor

Responding to the allegedly biased research reports issued by large investment banks, the Global Research Analyst Settlement and related regulations went to great lengths to weaken the conflicts of interest faced by investment bank analysts. In this paper, I investigate the effects of these changes on small and large investor confidence and on trading profitability. Specifically, I examine abnormal trading volumes generated by small and large investors in response to security analyst recommendations and the resulting abnormal market returns generated. I find an overall increase in investor confidence in the post-regulation period relative to the pre-regulation period consistent with a reduction in existing conflicts of interest. The change in confidence observed is particularly striking for small traders. I also find that small trader profitability has increased in the post-regulation period relative to the pre-regulation period whereas that for large traders has decreased. These results are consistent with the Securities and Exchange Commission's primary mission to protect small investors and maintain the integrity of the securities markets.
ContributorsDong, Xiaobo (Author) / Mikhail, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Hugon, Artur J (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
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Description
During the past decade, the Chinese bond market has been rapidly developing. The percentage of bond to total social funding is constantly increasing. The structure and behavior of investors are crucial to the construction of China’s bond market. Due to specific credit risks, bond market regulation usually involves in rules

During the past decade, the Chinese bond market has been rapidly developing. The percentage of bond to total social funding is constantly increasing. The structure and behavior of investors are crucial to the construction of China’s bond market. Due to specific credit risks, bond market regulation usually involves in rules to control investor adequancy. It is heatedly discussed among academia and regulators about whether individual investors are adequate to directly participate in bond trading. This paper focuses on the comparison between individual and institutional bond investors, especially their returns and risks. Based on the comparison, this paper provides constructive suggestions for China’s bond market development and the bond market investor structure.
ContributorsLiu, Shaotong (Author) / Gu, Bin (Thesis advisor) / Zhu, Ning (Thesis advisor) / Yan, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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Description
Shareholder Activism is a mechanism by which investors who hold a significant but

non-majority percentage of a company’s stock, exercise their voting rights, participate in

corporate governance and influence operational decisions of target companies. The

purpose is improve corporate governance, increase firm performance and boost share

-holders’ returns. Existing studies of shareholder activism, based

Shareholder Activism is a mechanism by which investors who hold a significant but

non-majority percentage of a company’s stock, exercise their voting rights, participate in

corporate governance and influence operational decisions of target companies. The

purpose is improve corporate governance, increase firm performance and boost share

-holders’ returns. Existing studies of shareholder activism, based largely in mature

capital markets like the US, come to different conclusions regarding its impact on firm

performance.

In this paper, I collect data on shareholder activism events in the China A Share

market between 2006 and 2016. The sample includes 60 companies targeted by 42

activist investors over this period. I find that institutional investors, typically industrial

capital and private funds, playing an increasingly important role in corporate governance

of Chinese listed companies through activism. The disclosure of the holdings of activists

results in large gains in the target firm. I also find subsequent improvements in long

-term operational performance of target firms. Activist investors in China focus on

smaller targets and those characterized by higher agency costs and lower operating

performance. Activists appear to be largely concerned with improvements in business

strategy and M&A activity. Non-hostile behavior is more likely to be related to successful

activism in China. In addition to statistical evidence, I present case studies of the

“BaoWan dispute” and the activist investment of Butterfly Capital in two firms,

“Guonong” and “Xiuqiang”. The case studies highlight the mechanism employed by these

firms to influence performance.

I conclude with policy recommendations and direction for further research.
ContributorsXie, Fenghua (Author) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Yan, Hong (Thesis advisor) / Lee, Peggy (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017