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I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large,

I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large, limited substitutability between the factors of production may call for fixed capital investment. Hence, firms with lower substitutability are more likely to invest in both factors together and have larger sensitivities of fixed capital investment to cash flow. By building a frictionless capital markets model that allows firms to optimize over fixed capital and inventories as substitutable factors, I establish the significance of the substitutability channel in explaining cross-sectional differences in cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, incorporating variable capital into firms' investment decisions helps explain the sharp decrease in cash flow sensitivities over the past decades. Empirical evidence confirms the model's predictions.
ContributorsKim, Kirak (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Description
This dissertation provides an analysis of the effects of public secondary equity offerings by private equity sponsors at portfolio firms that have become publicly traded entities via initial public offerings. Such secondary offerings were rare prior to 2000, but in recent years have become an increasingly common form of financial

This dissertation provides an analysis of the effects of public secondary equity offerings by private equity sponsors at portfolio firms that have become publicly traded entities via initial public offerings. Such secondary offerings were rare prior to 2000, but in recent years have become an increasingly common form of financial activity. A large sample of these offerings is analyzed within the framework of corporate finance theory, taking into account that they allow a private equity sponsor to sell off a large, controlling block of common stock to dispersed investors. This work provides a basis to draw conclusions about the effects of these secondary offerings on shareholder wealth and the implications for the firm's subsequent operating performance (profitability). The results show that that there is a significant decline in portfolio firm value at announcements of secondary offerings by private equity, and that such offerings are not a precursor of future underperformance. Instead, there is greater share liquidity and higher industry-adjusted performance after these secondary offerings. Moreover, the proportion of portfolio firms that subsequently become bankrupt is significantly less than that of benchmark firms. There is no evidence of an effect of the size of the secondary offering on the magnitude of the change in share price, but the reputation of private equity sponsors has a significant effect on the share price reaction. Overall, the evidence from these secondary equity offerings suggests that private equity successfully prepares portfolio firms for exit from private equity control, implying that the market can expect that the stand-alone public firm will operate effectively after the change in ownership structure associated with the exit of private equity.
ContributorsDong, Qi (Author) / Sushka, Marie E. (Thesis advisor) / Slovin, Myron B. (Thesis advisor) / Stein, Luke C.D. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Description
This paper examines dealers' inventory holding periods and the associated price markups on corporate bonds from 2003 to 2010. Changes in these measures explain a large part of the time series variation in aggregate corporate bond prices. In the cross-section, holding periods and markups overshadow extant liquidity measures and have

This paper examines dealers' inventory holding periods and the associated price markups on corporate bonds from 2003 to 2010. Changes in these measures explain a large part of the time series variation in aggregate corporate bond prices. In the cross-section, holding periods and markups overshadow extant liquidity measures and have significant explanatory power for individual bond prices. Both measures shed light on the credit spread puzzle: changes in credit spread are positively correlated with changes in holding periods and markups, and a large portion of credit spread changes is explained by them. The economic effects of holding periods and markups are particularly sharp during crisis periods.
ContributorsQian, Zhiyi (Author) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Mehra, Rajnish (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
In this dissertation, I examine the source of some of the anomalous capital market outcomes that have been documented for firms with high accruals. Chapter 2 develops and implements a methodology that decomposes a firm's discretionary accruals into a firm-specific and an industry-specific component. I use this decomposition to investigate

In this dissertation, I examine the source of some of the anomalous capital market outcomes that have been documented for firms with high accruals. Chapter 2 develops and implements a methodology that decomposes a firm's discretionary accruals into a firm-specific and an industry-specific component. I use this decomposition to investigate which component drives the subsequent negative returns associated with firms with high discretionary accruals. My results suggest that these abnormal returns are driven by the firm-specific component of discretionary accruals. Moreover, although industry-specific discretionary accruals do not directly contribute towards this anomaly, I find that it is precisely when industry-specific discretionary accruals are high that firms with high firm-specific discretionary accruals subsequently earn these negative returns. While consistent with irrational mispricing or a rational risk premium associated with high discretionary accruals, these findings also support a transactions-cost based explanation for the accruals anomaly whereby search costs associated with distinguishing between value-relevant and manipulative discretionary accruals can induce investors to overlook potential earnings manipulation. Chapter 3 extends the decomposition to examine the role of firm-specific and industry-specific discretionary accruals in explaining the subsequent market underperformance and negative analysts' forecast errors documented for firms issuing equity. I examine the post-issue market returns and analysts' forecast errors for a sample of seasoned equity issues between 1975 and 2004 and find that offering-year firm-specific discretionary accruals can partially explain these anomalous capital market outcomes. Nonetheless, I find this predictive power of firm-specific accruals to be more pronounced for issues that occur during 1975 - 1989 compared to issues taking place between 1990 and 2004. Additionally, I find no evidence that investors and analysts are more overoptimistic about the prospects of issuers that have both high firm-specific and industry-specific discretionary accruals (compared to firms with high discretionary accruals in general). The results indicate no role for industry-specific discretionary accruals in explaining overoptimistic expectations from seasoned equity issues and suggest the importance of firm-specific factors in inducing earnings manipulation surrounding equity issues.
ContributorsIkram, Atif (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
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Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost

This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost of information gathering for both firms. I find supporting evidence for these two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. Consistent with the agency hypothesis, interlocked acquirers underperform non-interlocked acquirers by 2% during the announcement period. However, well-governed acquirers receive higher announcement returns and have better post-acquisition performance in interlocked deals. The proportional surplus accrued to an acquirer is positively correlated with the interlocking agent's ownership in the acquirer relative to her ownership in the target. Consistent with the information hypothesis, when the target's firm value is opaque, interlocks improve acquirer announcement returns and long-term performance. Interlocked acquirers are also more likely to use equity as payment, especially when the acquirer's stock value is opaque. Target announcement returns are not influenced by the existence of interlock. Finally, I find acquisitions are more likely to occur between two interlocked firms and such deals have a higher completion rate.
ContributorsWu, Qingqing (Author) / Bates, Thomas W. (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Lindsey, Laura (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Existing literature consistently documents a relationship between book-tax differences and future financial performance. Specifically, large book-tax differences are associated with lower earnings persistence. I contend that one reason the tax information contained in financial statements is informative about future earnings is that the relationship between book income and taxable income

Existing literature consistently documents a relationship between book-tax differences and future financial performance. Specifically, large book-tax differences are associated with lower earnings persistence. I contend that one reason the tax information contained in financial statements is informative about future earnings is that the relationship between book income and taxable income captures information about a firm's life cycle stage. Using a life cycle measure from the literature, I use fundamental analysis to group firm-year observations into life cycle stages and document a link between book-tax differences and firm life cycle. I build on prior studies that find a relation between earnings persistence and book-tax differences, and earnings persistence and firm life cycle. I find that after controlling for firm life cycle stage, the association between large positive book-tax differences and lower earnings persistence does not hold. My results offer an economic theory based explanation for the relation between book-tax differences and earnings persistence as an alternative explanation to findings in prior research.
ContributorsDrake, Katharine D (Author) / Mikhail, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Brown, Jennifer (Committee member) / Martin, Melissa (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
Managers’ control over the timing and content of information disclosure represents a significant strategic tool which they can use at their discretion. However, extant theoretical perspectives offer incongruent arguments and incompatible predictions about when and why managers would release inside information about their firms. More specifically, agency theory and

Managers’ control over the timing and content of information disclosure represents a significant strategic tool which they can use at their discretion. However, extant theoretical perspectives offer incongruent arguments and incompatible predictions about when and why managers would release inside information about their firms. More specifically, agency theory and theories within competitive dynamics provide competing hypotheses about when and why managers would disclose inside information about their firms. In this study, I highlight how voluntary disclosure theory may help to coalesce these two theoretical perspectives. Voluntary disclosure theory predicts that managers will release inside information when managers perceive that the benefits outweigh the costs of doing so. Accordingly, I posit that competitive dynamics introduce the costs associated with disclosing information (i.e., proprietary costs) and that agency theory highlights the benefits associated with disclosing information. Examining the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), I identify three ways managers can use information in SEO prospectuses. I hypothesize that competitive intensity increases proprietary costs that will reduce disclosure of inside information but will increase discussing the organization positively. I then hypothesize that capital market participants (e.g., security analysts and investors) may prefer managers to provide more, clearer, and positive information about the SEO and their firms. I find support for many of my hypotheses.
ContributorsBusenbark, John R (Author) / Certo, S. Trevis (Thesis advisor) / Semadeni, Matthew (Committee member) / Cannella, Albert (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Firms reduce investment when facing downward wage rigidity (DWR), the inability or unwillingness to adjust wages downward. I construct DWR measures and exploit staggered state-level changes in minimum wage laws as an exogenous variation in DWR to document this fact. Following a minimum wage increase, firms reduce their investment rate

Firms reduce investment when facing downward wage rigidity (DWR), the inability or unwillingness to adjust wages downward. I construct DWR measures and exploit staggered state-level changes in minimum wage laws as an exogenous variation in DWR to document this fact. Following a minimum wage increase, firms reduce their investment rate by 1.17 percentage points. Surprisingly, this labor market friction enhances firm value and production efficiency when firms are subject to other frictions causing overinvestment, consistent with the theory of second best. Finally, I identify increased operating leverage and aggravation of debt overhang as mechanisms by which DWR impedes investment.
ContributorsCho, DuckKi (Author) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Bessembinder, Hendrik (Committee member) / Wang, Jiaxu (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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I study the importance of financial factors and real exchange rate shocks in explaining business cycle fluctuations, which have been considered important in the literature as non-technological factors in explaining business cycle fluctuations. In the first chapter, I study the implications of fluctuations in corporate credit spreads for business cycle

I study the importance of financial factors and real exchange rate shocks in explaining business cycle fluctuations, which have been considered important in the literature as non-technological factors in explaining business cycle fluctuations. In the first chapter, I study the implications of fluctuations in corporate credit spreads for business cycle fluctuations. Motivated by the fact that corporate credit spreads are countercyclical, I build a simple model in which difference in default probabilities on corporate debts leads to the spread in interest rates paid by firms. In the model, firms differ in the variance of the firm-level productivity, which is in turn linked to the difference in the default probability. The key mechanism is that an increase in the variance of productivity for risky firms relative to safe firms leads to reallocation of capital away from risky firms toward safe firms and decrease in aggregate output and productivity. I embed the above mechanism into an otherwise standard growth model, calibrate it and numerically solve for the equilibrium. In my benchmark case, I find that shocks to variance of productivity for risky and safe firms account for about 66% of fluctuations in output and TFP in the U.S. economy. In the second chapter, I study the importance of shocks to the price of imports relative to the price of final goods, led by the real exchange rate shocks, in accounting for fluctuations in output and TFP in the Korean economy during the Asian crisis of 1997-98. Using the Korean data, I calibrate a standard small open economy model with taxes and tariffs on imported goods, and simulate it. I find that shocks to the price of imports are an important source of fluctuations in Korea's output and TFP in the Korean crisis episode. In particular, in my benchmark case, shocks to the price of imports account for about 55% of the output deviation (from trend), one third of the TFP deviation and three quarters of the labor deviation in 1998.
ContributorsKim, Seon Tae (Author) / Prescott, Edward C. (Thesis advisor) / Rogerson, Richard (Committee member) / Ahn, Seung (Committee member) / Low, Stuart (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011