The purpose of this study was to test the reproducibility of the current data set. It was hypothesized that older adults’ scores on the Repeatable Battery for Assessment of Neuropsychological Status (RBANS) would decrease from their initial visit to their one year follow-up visit and that greater overall age is associated with worse performance. Overall, the older adults with a follow-up visit in this study experienced greater decline on the RBANS DMI than on the RBANS total scaled score. There seems to be a negative trend in which individuals with higher first-visit VCI scores experience greater improvement on the first trial of the motor task with the non-dominant hand. The same trend can be seen in DMI scores where higher initial DMI scores are associated with greater improvement on the first non-dominant hand trial of the motor task. This initial trend suggests that visuospatial scores have an association with long-term change in the motor task. The number of participants in this data set were limited, thus more data will be needed to increase confidence in conclusions about these relationships in the future.

This chapter integrates from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and social psychology the basic science of bias in human judgment as relevant to judgments and decisions by forensic mental health professionals. Forensic mental health professionals help courts make decisions in cases when some question of psychology pertains to the legal issue, such as in insanity cases, child custody hearings, and psychological injuries in civil suits. The legal system itself and many people involved, such as jurors, assume mental health experts are “objective” and untainted by bias. However, basic psychological science from several branches of the discipline suggest the law’s assumption about experts’ protection from bias is wrong. Indeed, several empirical studies now show clear evidence of (unintentional) bias in forensic mental health experts’ judgments and decisions. In this chapter, we explain the science of how and why human judgments are susceptible to various kinds of bias. We describe dual-process theories from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and social psychology that can help explain these biases. We review the empirical evidence to date specifically about cognitive and social psychological biases in forensic mental health judgments, weaving in related literature about biases in other types of expert judgment, with hypotheses about how forensic experts are likely affected by these biases. We close with a discussion of directions for future research and practice.