Matching Items (3)
Filtering by

Clear all filters

152072-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
When a rolling ball exits a spiral tube, it typically maintains its final inertial state and travels along straight line in concordance with Newton's first law of motion. Yet, most people predict that the ball will curve, a "naive physics" misconception called the curvilinear impetus (CI) bias. In the current

When a rolling ball exits a spiral tube, it typically maintains its final inertial state and travels along straight line in concordance with Newton's first law of motion. Yet, most people predict that the ball will curve, a "naive physics" misconception called the curvilinear impetus (CI) bias. In the current paper, we explore the ecological hypothesis that the CI bias arises from overgeneralization of correct motion of biological agents. Previous research has established that humans curve when exiting a spiral maze, and college students believe this motion is the same for balls and humans. The current paper consists of two follow up experiments. The first experiment tested the exiting behavior of rodents from a spiral rat maze. Though there were weaknesses in design and procedures of the maze, the findings support that rats do not behave like humans who exhibit the CI bias when exiting a spiral maze. These results are consistent with the CI bias being an overgeneralization of human motion, rather than generic biological motion. The second experiment tested physics teachers on their conception of how a humans and balls behave when exiting a spiral tube. Teachers demonstrated correct knowledge of the straight trajectory of a ball, but generalized the ball's behavior to human motion. Thus physics teachers exhibit the opposite bias from college students and presume that all motion is like inanimate motion. This evidence supports that this type of naive physics inertial bias is at least partly due to participants overgeneralizing both inanimate and animate motion to be the same, perhaps in an effort to minimize cognitive reference memory load. In short, physics training appears not to eliminate the bias, but rather to simply shift it from the presumption of stereotypical animate to stereotypical inanimate behavior.
ContributorsDye, Rosaline (Author) / Mcbeath, Michael K (Thesis advisor) / Sanabria, Federico (Committee member) / Megowan, Colleen (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
150669-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) evidence has been shown to have a strong effect on juror decision-making when presented in court. While DNA evidence has been shown to be extremely reliable, fingerprint evidence, and the way it is presented in court, has come under much scrutiny. Forensic fingerprint experts have been working

Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) evidence has been shown to have a strong effect on juror decision-making when presented in court. While DNA evidence has been shown to be extremely reliable, fingerprint evidence, and the way it is presented in court, has come under much scrutiny. Forensic fingerprint experts have been working on a uniformed way to present fingerprint evidence in court. The most promising has been the Probabilistic Based Fingerprint Evidence (PBFE) created by Forensic Science Services (FSS) (G. Langenburg, personal communication, April 16, 2011). The current study examined how the presence and strength of DNA evidence influenced jurors' interpretation of probabilistic fingerprint evidence. Mock jurors read a summary of a murder case that included fingerprint evidence and testimony from a fingerprint expert and, in some conditions, DNA evidence and testimony from a DNA expert. Results showed that when DNA evidence was found at the crime scene and matched the defendant other evidence and the overall case was rated as stronger than when no DNA was present. Fingerprint evidence did not cause a stronger rating of other evidence and the overall case. Fingerprint evidence was underrated in some cases, and jurors generally weighed all the different strengths of fingerprint testimony to the same degree.
ContributorsArthurs, Shavonne (Author) / McQuiston, Dawn (Thesis advisor) / Hall, Deborah (Committee member) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
141320-Thumbnail Image.png
Description

This chapter integrates from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and social psychology the basic science of bias in human judgment as relevant to judgments and decisions by forensic mental health professionals. Forensic mental health professionals help courts make decisions in cases when some question of psychology pertains to the legal issue,

This chapter integrates from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and social psychology the basic science of bias in human judgment as relevant to judgments and decisions by forensic mental health professionals. Forensic mental health professionals help courts make decisions in cases when some question of psychology pertains to the legal issue, such as in insanity cases, child custody hearings, and psychological injuries in civil suits. The legal system itself and many people involved, such as jurors, assume mental health experts are “objective” and untainted by bias. However, basic psychological science from several branches of the discipline suggest the law’s assumption about experts’ protection from bias is wrong. Indeed, several empirical studies now show clear evidence of (unintentional) bias in forensic mental health experts’ judgments and decisions. In this chapter, we explain the science of how and why human judgments are susceptible to various kinds of bias. We describe dual-process theories from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and social psychology that can help explain these biases. We review the empirical evidence to date specifically about cognitive and social psychological biases in forensic mental health judgments, weaving in related literature about biases in other types of expert judgment, with hypotheses about how forensic experts are likely affected by these biases. We close with a discussion of directions for future research and practice.

ContributorsNeal, Tess M.S. (Author) / Hight, Morgan (Author) / Howatt, Brian C. (Author) / Hamza, Cassandra (Author)
Created2017-04-30