Matching Items (379)
Description
The end of the nineteenth century was an exhilarating and revolutionary era for the flute. This period is the Second Golden Age of the flute, when players and teachers associated with the Paris Conservatory developed what would be considered the birth of the modern flute school. In addition, the founding in 1871 of the Société Nationale de Musique by Camille Saint-Saëns (1835-1921) and Romain Bussine (1830-1899) made possible the promotion of contemporary French composers. The founding of the Société des Instruments à Vent by Paul Taffanel (1844-1908) in 1879 also invigorated a new era of chamber music for wind instruments. Within this groundbreaking environment, Mélanie Hélène Bonis (pen name Mel Bonis) entered the Paris Conservatory in 1876, under the tutelage of César Franck (1822-1890). Many flutists are dismayed by the scarcity of repertoire for the instrument in the Romantic and post-Romantic traditions; they make up for this absence by borrowing the violin sonatas of Gabriel Fauré (1845-1924) and Franck. The flute and piano works of Mel Bonis help to fill this void with music composed originally for flute. Bonis was a prolific composer with over 300 works to her credit, but her works for flute and piano have not been researched or professionally recorded in the United States before the present study. Although virtually unknown today in the American flute community, Bonis's music received much acclaim from her contemporaries and deserves a prominent place in the flutist's repertoire. After a brief biographical introduction, this document examines Mel Bonis's musical style and describes in detail her six works for flute and piano while also offering performance suggestions.
ContributorsDaum, Jenna Elyse (Author) / Buck, Elizabeth (Thesis advisor) / Holbrook, Amy (Committee member) / Micklich, Albie (Committee member) / Schuring, Martin (Committee member) / Norton, Kay (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
ContributorsMatthews, Eyona (Performer) / Yoo, Katie Jihye (Performer) / Roubison, Ryan (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-03-25
ContributorsHoeckley, Stephanie (Performer) / Lee, Juhyun (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-03-24
Description
Android is currently the most widely used mobile operating system. The permission model in Android governs the resource access privileges of applications. The permission model however is amenable to various attacks, including re-delegation attacks, background snooping attacks and disclosure of private information. This thesis is aimed at understanding, analyzing and performing forensics on application behavior. This research sheds light on several security aspects, including the use of inter-process communications (IPC) to perform permission re-delegation attacks.
Android permission system is more of app-driven rather than user controlled, which means it is the applications that specify their permission requirement and the only thing which the user can do is choose not to install a particular application based on the requirements. Given the all or nothing choice, users succumb to pressures and needs to accept permissions requested. This thesis proposes a couple of ways for providing the users finer grained control of application privileges. The same methods can be used to evade the Permission Re-delegation attack.
This thesis also proposes and implements a novel methodology in Android that can be used to control the access privileges of an Android application, taking into consideration the context of the running application. This application-context based permission usage is further used to analyze a set of sample applications. We found the evidence of applications spoofing or divulging user sensitive information such as location information, contact information, phone id and numbers, in the background. Such activities can be used to track users for a variety of privacy-intrusive purposes. We have developed implementations that minimize several forms of privacy leaks that are routinely done by stock applications.
Android permission system is more of app-driven rather than user controlled, which means it is the applications that specify their permission requirement and the only thing which the user can do is choose not to install a particular application based on the requirements. Given the all or nothing choice, users succumb to pressures and needs to accept permissions requested. This thesis proposes a couple of ways for providing the users finer grained control of application privileges. The same methods can be used to evade the Permission Re-delegation attack.
This thesis also proposes and implements a novel methodology in Android that can be used to control the access privileges of an Android application, taking into consideration the context of the running application. This application-context based permission usage is further used to analyze a set of sample applications. We found the evidence of applications spoofing or divulging user sensitive information such as location information, contact information, phone id and numbers, in the background. Such activities can be used to track users for a variety of privacy-intrusive purposes. We have developed implementations that minimize several forms of privacy leaks that are routinely done by stock applications.
ContributorsGollapudi, Narasimha Aditya (Author) / Dasgupta, Partha (Thesis advisor) / Xue, Guoliang (Committee member) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
ContributorsMcClain, Katelyn (Performer) / Buringrud, Deanna (Contributor) / Lee, Juhyun (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-03-31
ContributorsHur, Jiyoun (Performer) / Lee, Juhyun (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-03-01
ContributorsZaleski, Kimberly (Contributor) / Kazarian, Trevor (Performer) / Ryan, Russell (Performer) / IN2ATIVE (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-09-28
Description
On Android, existing security procedures require apps to request permissions for access to sensitive resources.
Only when the user approves the requested permissions will the app be installed.
However, permissions are an incomplete security mechanism.
In addition to a user's limited understanding of permissions, the mechanism does not account for the possibility that different permissions used together have the ability to be more dangerous than any single permission alone.
Even if users did understand the nature of an app's requested permissions, this mechanism is still not enough to guarantee that a user's information is protected.
Applications can potentially send or receive sensitive information from other applications without the required permissions by using intents.
In other words, applications can potentially collaborate in ways unforeseen by the user, even if the user understands the permissions of each app independently.
In this thesis, we present several graph-based approaches to address these issues.
We determine the permissions of an app and generate scores based on our assigned value of certain resources.
We analyze these scores overall, as well as in the context of the app's category as determined by Google Play.
We show that these scores can be used to identify overzealous apps, as well as apps that do not properly fit within their category.
We analyze potential interactions between different applications using intents, and identify several promiscuous apps with low permission scores, showing that permissions alone are not sufficient to evaluate the security risks of an app.
Our analyses can form the basis of a system to assist users in identifying apps that can potentially compromise user privacy.
Only when the user approves the requested permissions will the app be installed.
However, permissions are an incomplete security mechanism.
In addition to a user's limited understanding of permissions, the mechanism does not account for the possibility that different permissions used together have the ability to be more dangerous than any single permission alone.
Even if users did understand the nature of an app's requested permissions, this mechanism is still not enough to guarantee that a user's information is protected.
Applications can potentially send or receive sensitive information from other applications without the required permissions by using intents.
In other words, applications can potentially collaborate in ways unforeseen by the user, even if the user understands the permissions of each app independently.
In this thesis, we present several graph-based approaches to address these issues.
We determine the permissions of an app and generate scores based on our assigned value of certain resources.
We analyze these scores overall, as well as in the context of the app's category as determined by Google Play.
We show that these scores can be used to identify overzealous apps, as well as apps that do not properly fit within their category.
We analyze potential interactions between different applications using intents, and identify several promiscuous apps with low permission scores, showing that permissions alone are not sufficient to evaluate the security risks of an app.
Our analyses can form the basis of a system to assist users in identifying apps that can potentially compromise user privacy.
ContributorsGibson, Aaron (Author) / Bazzi, Rida (Thesis advisor) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Committee member) / Walker, Erin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
ContributorsDelaney, Erin (Performer) / Novak, Gail (Pianist) (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-03-18
Description
Smartphones are pervasive nowadays. They are supported by mobile platforms that allow users to download and run feature-rich mobile applications (apps). While mobile apps help users conveniently process personal data on mobile devices, they also pose security and privacy threats and put user's data at risk. Even though modern mobile platforms such as Android have integrated security mechanisms to protect users, most mechanisms do not easily adapt to user's security requirements and rapidly evolving threats. They either fail to provide sufficient intelligence for a user to make informed security decisions, or require great sophistication to configure the mechanisms for enforcing security decisions. These limitations lead to a situation where users are disadvantageous against emerging malware on modern mobile platforms. To remedy this situation, I propose automated and systematic approaches to address three security management tasks: monitoring, assessment, and confinement of mobile apps. In particular, monitoring apps helps a user observe and record apps' runtime behaviors as controlled under security mechanisms. Automated assessment distills intelligence from the observed behaviors and the security configurations of security mechanisms. The distilled intelligence further fuels enhanced confinement mechanisms that flexibly and accurately shape apps' behaviors. To demonstrate the feasibility of my approaches, I design and implement a suite of proof-of-concept prototypes that support the three tasks respectively.
ContributorsJing, Yiming (Author) / Ahn, Gail-Joon (Thesis advisor) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / Huang, Dijiang (Committee member) / Zhang, Yanchao (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015