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- Genre: Academic theses
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This dissertation consists of three essays that broadly deal with the international economics and development. The first chapter provides empirical evidence of the prevalence and importance of intangible capital transfer within multinational corporations (MNCs). Using a unique data set of Korean multinational foreign affiliates, I find that most of the foreign affiliates have managers transferred from their parent, while almost half are isolated from the parent in terms of physical trade. Furthermore, the transferred managers are positively associated with labor productivity, while physical trade from the parent is less so. I consider two possibilities for this productivity effect: (1) the managers transferred from the parent are simply more efficient than native managers; and (2) they provide knowledge that increases the productivity of all inputs. I find that the latter is consistent with the data. My findings provide evidence that transferring managers from the parent is a main source of benefit from foreign direct investment (FDI) to foreign affiliates because the managers transfer firm-specific knowledge. The second chapter analyzes importance role of service or other sectors for economic growth of manufacturing. Productivity in agriculture or services has long been understood as playing an important role in the growth of manufacturing. In this paper we provide an endogenous growth model in which manufacturing growth is stimulated by the non-manufacturing sector that provides goods used for both research and final consumption. The model permits to evaluatation of two policy options for stimulating manufacturing growth: (1) a country imports more non-manufacturing goods from a foreign country with a higher productivity; or (2) the country increases productivity of domestic non-manufacturing. We find that both policies increase welfare of the economy, but depending on the policy the manufacturing sector responses differently. Specifically, employment and value added in manufacturing rise with policy (1), but contract with policy (2). Therefore, specialization through importing non-manufacturing goods explains how some Asian economies experience fast growth in the manufacturing sector without progress in the other sectors. The third chapter tests for the importance of composition effects in affecting levels and changes of education wage premiums. In this paper I revisit composition effects in the context of Korea. Korea's large and rapid expansion of education makes it an ideal place to look for composition effects. A large, policy-induced increase in attainment in the 1980s offers additional scope for identifying composition effects. I find strong evidence that the policy-induced expansion of education lowered education wage premiums for the affected cohorts, but only weak evidence that the trend expansion of education lowered education wage premiums.
ContributorsCho, Jaehan (Author) / Silverman, Daniel (Thesis advisor) / Prescott, Edward C. (Committee member) / Schoellman, Todd (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
Over the past several decades, social network remains the most prevalent and prominent in the strategy and organization theory literature. However, despite the considerable research attention scholars devoted to exploring the implications and mechanisms of social ties and networks in management and organizational contexts, the following question has largely remained understudied: To what extent can top managers' personal ties and networks actually contribute to their firms? This thesis will strive to explore this research question by theoretically highlighting three logically consequent managerial decisions: (1) "When"--when will top managers choose to use their personal ties and networks in their firms; (2) "How"--will top managers use their managerial ties and networks to serve the best interest of their firms or to satisfy their self-interests; and (3) "So what" --how would the decision of using managerial ties and networks to benefit their firms influence other decisions of the firms. Using both primary data and archival information from Chinese firms, I will empirically test the step-wise framework. I expect this thesis to contribute to both strategic leadership and social network research and management practices.
ContributorsJiang, Han (Author) / Cannella, Albert A. (Thesis advisor) / Hoetker, Glenn (Committee member) / Mesquita, Luiz F. (Committee member) / Devers, Cynthia E. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
This paper discusses the matching between CEOs of different talent and firms of different size, by considering boards' costly monitoring of CEOs who have private information about firm output. By incorporating a costly state verification model into a matching model, we have a number of novel findings. First, positive assortative matching (PAM) breaks down as larger firms match with less talented CEOs when monitoring is sufficiently costly despite of complementarity in firms' production technology. More importantly, PAM can be the equilibrium sorting pattern for large firms and high talent CEOs even it fails for small firms and low talent CEOs, which implies that empirical applications relying on PAM are more robust by using samples of large firms. Second, under positive assortative matching, CEO compensation can be decomposed into frictionless competitive market pay and information rent. More talented CEOs extract more rent, which makes their wage even higher. Third, firm-level corporate governance depends on aggregate market characteristics such as the scarcity and allocation of CEO talent. Weak corporate governance can be optimal when CEO talent is sufficiently scarce. My analysis yields a number of empirical predictions on equilibrium sorting pattern, CEO compensation, and corporate governance.
ContributorsLi, Zhan, Ph.D (Author) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
Managers’ control over the timing and content of information disclosure represents a significant strategic tool which they can use at their discretion. However, extant theoretical perspectives offer incongruent arguments and incompatible predictions about when and why managers would release inside information about their firms. More specifically, agency theory and theories within competitive dynamics provide competing hypotheses about when and why managers would disclose inside information about their firms. In this study, I highlight how voluntary disclosure theory may help to coalesce these two theoretical perspectives. Voluntary disclosure theory predicts that managers will release inside information when managers perceive that the benefits outweigh the costs of doing so. Accordingly, I posit that competitive dynamics introduce the costs associated with disclosing information (i.e., proprietary costs) and that agency theory highlights the benefits associated with disclosing information. Examining the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), I identify three ways managers can use information in SEO prospectuses. I hypothesize that competitive intensity increases proprietary costs that will reduce disclosure of inside information but will increase discussing the organization positively. I then hypothesize that capital market participants (e.g., security analysts and investors) may prefer managers to provide more, clearer, and positive information about the SEO and their firms. I find support for many of my hypotheses.
ContributorsBusenbark, John R (Author) / Certo, S. Trevis (Thesis advisor) / Semadeni, Matthew (Committee member) / Cannella, Albert (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance are stronger in markets where executives are freer to move. This evidence further supports the argument that local labor market density works as an external incentive alignment mechanism.
ContributorsZhao, Hong, Ph.D (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Stein, Luke (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017