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- All Subjects: Decision Theory
- Creators: Armendt, Brad
Description
One decision procedure dominates a given one if it performs well on the entire class of problems the given decision procedure performs well on, and then goes on to perform well on other problems that the given decision procedure does badly on. Performing well will be defined as generating higher expected utility before entering a problem. In this paper it will be argued that the timeless decision procedure dominates the causal
and evidential decision procedures. It will also be argued in turn that the updateless decision procedure dominates the timeless decision procedure. The difficulties of formalizing a modern variant of the ”smoking gene” problem will then be briefly examined.
and evidential decision procedures. It will also be argued in turn that the updateless decision procedure dominates the timeless decision procedure. The difficulties of formalizing a modern variant of the ”smoking gene” problem will then be briefly examined.
ContributorsHintze, Daniel Edward (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Thesis director) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / DeSerpa, Allan (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
This thesis seeks to defend transitivity as a rational constraint on preferences against two putative counterexamples to transitivity. This thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I consider two famous and popular arguments in defense of transitivity and argue they are insufficient to adequately defend transitivity. I then outline a desiderata for successful arguments in defense of transitivity and identify some basic assumptions I will be making throughout the thesis. In section two, I consider the first putative counterexample to transitivity: Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. I offer two plausible interpretations of Quinn’s puzzle and argue that both fail. One because it does not genuinely induce intransitive preferences, and the other because the situation it requires is logically impossible. I conclude this section by defending my arguments against known objections in the literature. Finally, in the third section, I consider a counterexample to transitivity from Larry Temkin that has received little attention in the literature. I argue that while the initial counterexample is unpersuasive it can be augmented and made into a more forceful argument. I then argue that this improved counterexample fails due to some erroneous assumptions prevalent in the literature on incomparability. I conclude the thesis with a brief summary and some closing remarks.
ContributorsCalloway, Carson (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas (Committee member) / Pinillos, Nestor (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015