Matching Items (5)
Description
Emergentism offers a promising compromise in the philosophy of mind between Cartesian substance dualism and reductivistic physicalism. The ontological emergentist holds that conscious mental phenomena supervene on physical phenomena, but that they have a nature over and above the physical. However, emergentist views have been subjected to a variety of powerful objections: they are alleged to be self-contradictory, incompatible with mental causation, justified by unreliable intuitions, and in conflict with our contemporary scientific understanding of the world. I defend the emergentist position against these objections. I clarify the concepts of supervenience and of ontological novelty in a way that ensures the emergentist position is coherent, while remaining distinct from physicalism and traditional dualism. Making note of the equivocal way in which the concept of sufficiency is used in Jaegwon Kim's arguments against emergent mental causation, I argue that downward causation does not entail widespread overdetermination. I argue that considerations of ideal a priori deducibility from some physical base, or "Cosmic Hermeneutics", will not themselves provide answers to where the cuts in the structure of nature lie. Instead, I propose reconsidering the question of Cosmic Hermeneutics in terms of which cognitive resources would be required for the ideal reasoner to perform the deduction. Lastly, I respond to the objection that emergence in the philosophy of mind is in conflict with our contemporary scientific understanding of the world. I suggest that a kind of weak ontological emergence is a viable form of explanation in many fields, and discuss current applications of emergence in biology, sociology, and the study of complex systems.
ContributorsWatson, Jeffrey (Author) / Kobes, Bernard W (Thesis advisor) / Pinillos, Nestor (Committee member) / Horgan, Terence (Committee member) / Reynolds, Steven (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
Given the success of science, weak forms of mind-brain dependence are commonly treated as uncontroversial within contemporary philosophies of mind. More controversial are the different metaphysical claims inferred from this dependence, many ascribing ontological priority to the brain. Consider the following three propositions: (i) neurological events are essentially identified by their role in material systems, laws, and causes that are constitutively non-rational; (ii) at least some mental events are essentially identified in virtue of their role in the use of reason; (iii) all mental events are realized by, identical to, or composed out of, neurological events. (i) is uncontroversial. However, (iii) is strictly materialistic. (i), (ii) and (iii) taken together appear incoherent. A fruitful task for philosophy is to resolve this apparent incoherence. In his 1997 book The Last Word Thomas Nagel offers an explication of reason that conceptually transcends the nature of material substrate. In his 2010 article "Modest Dualism" Tyler Burge offers reasons to think of propositional thought as irreducible to the concepts of the material sciences. Both focus on rationality as a unique form of intentionality. Both philosophers also reject materialism (iii). On their accounts it's reasonable to take 'rational intentionality' as exhibiting a logical priority of the mind with respect to the brain in inquiries into the nature of mind. Granting this, the diminished conception of mind presupposed by prevailing contemporary theories is seen to be the result of a more general failure to recognize the logical priority and intricate nature of rationality. The robust views of rationality expressed by Nagel and Burge constitute grounds for argument against even the weakest form of materialism. I develop such an argument in this thesis, showing that the propositional attitudes exhibited in thought and speech preclude all materialistic notions of mind. Furthermore, I take the nature of propositional attitudes to suggest a perspective for exploring the fundamental nature of mind, one that focuses not on composition but on rational powers.
ContributorsGoodrich, Gregory (Author) / Kobes, Bernard W (Thesis advisor) / White, Michael J. (Committee member) / Anderson, Owen (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
Some scholars have suggested that individuals are inclined to believe that they have souls because they are also inclined to believe that they have a core, immutable self. The present study will explore this question in several parts. First, what is the extent to which individuals report having a core self? Next, how do beliefs about a core self relate to belief or non-belief in an eternal soul? The final question looks at location as an extension of the core self and soul relationship. Where is the self perceived to reside within a dualistic framework, the body or the soul? This study assessed the stated beliefs of 200 respondents using Amazon Mechanical Turk as a recruiting platform. Greater belief in a core self was moderately associated with greater belief in an eternal soul (r= 0.30, p<.01), and with belief in the self as a reflection of the soul (r=0.31, p<.01) and as a reflection of the brain (r=0.21, p<.01). This suggests that belief in a core self does hold association with belief in an eternal soul. However, its perceived location seems to show little preference as residing withing the soul versus the body.
ContributorsLy, Destiny (Author) / Hruschka, Daniel (Thesis director) / Parker, John (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2014-12
Description
In this paper, I analyze representations of nature in popular film, using the feminist / deconstructionist concept of a dualism to structure my critique. Using Val Plumwood’s analysis of the logical structure of dualism and the 5 ‘features of a dualism’ that she identifies, I critique 5 popular movies – Star Wars, Lord of the Rings, Brave, Grizzly Man, and Planet Earth – by locating within each of them one of the 5 features and explaining how the movie functions to reinforce the Nature/Culture dualism . By showing how the Nature/Culture dualism shapes and is shaped by popular cinema, I show how “Nature” is a social construct, created as part of this very dualism, and reified through popular culture. I conclude with the introduction of a number of ‘subversive’ pieces of visual art that undermine and actively deconstruct the Nature/Culture dualism and show to the viewer a more honest presentation of the non-human world.
ContributorsBarton, Christopher Joseph (Author) / Broglio, Ron (Thesis director) / Minteer, Ben (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Sustainability (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / School of Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
This thesis attempts to use psychoneuroimmunology (PNI) as a lens for examining different immune and autoimmune disorders, as well as psychological function and dysfunction. Through this examination, it is hypothesized that PNI could point to an accurate theoretical framework for describing the mind-body relation, or at the very least gain a deeper respect for showing the complexity of consciousness and health. Conversely, an appropriate view of the mind-body relation should provide a sound theoretical framework for PNI research.
ContributorsJording, Colten (Author) / Hoffman, Steven (Thesis director) / Robert, Jason (Committee member) / Lewis, Candace (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor)
Created2023-05