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- Genre: Doctoral Dissertation
Description
One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face the following situation. A group of people within an organization are completely transparent to each other; however, their characters are not known by other organization members who are outside this group. In my dissertation, I try to study how this information sharing would affect the outcome of different organizations. I focus on two organizations: corporate board and political parties. I find that this information sharing may be detrimental for (some of) the members who shared information. This conclusion stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom in both corporate finance and political party literature.
ContributorsWu, Zhenhua (Author) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Thesis advisor) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
This is a study of the plight of smallholder agriculture in Northwest Costa Rica. More specifically, this is the story of 689 rice farms, of an average size of 7.2 hectares and totaling just less than 5,300 hectares within the largest agricultural irrigation system in Central America. I was able to define the physical bounds of this study quite clearly, but one would be mistaken to think that this simplicity transfers to a search for rural development solutions in this case. Those solutions lie in the national and international politics that appear to have allowed a select few to pick winners and losers in Costa Rican agriculture in the face of global changes. In this research, I found that water scarcity among smallholder farms between 2006 and 2013 was the product of the adaptations of other, more powerful actors in 2002 to threats of Costa Rica's ratification of the Central American Free Trade Agreement. I demonstrate how the adaptations of these more powerful actors produced new risks for others, and how this ultimately prevented the rural development program from meeting its development goals. I reflect on my case study to draw conclusions about the different ways risks may emerge in rural development programs of this type. Then, I focus on the household level and show that determinants of successful adaptation to one type of global change risk may make farmers more vulnerable to other types, creating a "catch-22" among vulnerable farmers adapting to multiple global change risks. Finally, I define adaptation limits in smallholder rice farming in Northwest Costa Rica. I show that the abandonment of livelihood security and well-being, and of the unique "parcelaro" identities of rice farmers in this region define adaptation limits in this context.
ContributorsWarner, Benjamin (Author) / Childers, Daniel (Thesis advisor) / Eakin, Hallie (Committee member) / Abbott, Joshua (Committee member) / Wiek, Arnim (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
Buyers have private information on auctioning divisible goods. Linearity could be a useful property on measuring their marginal utility on those goods or on their bidding strategies under such a share auction environment. This paper establishes an auction model with independent private-values paradigm (IPVP) where bidders have linear demand. A mechanism design approach is applied to explore the optimal share auction in this model. I discuss the most popular auction formats in practice, including Vickrey auction (VA), uniform-price auction (UPA) and discriminatory price auction (DPA). The ex-post equilibriums on explicit solutions are achieved. I found VA does not generally constitute an optimal mechanism as expected even in a symmetric scenario. Furthermore, I rank the different auction formats in terms of revenue and social efficiency. The more private information bidders keep, the lower revenue VA generates to seller, and it could be even inferior to UPA or DPA. My study aggregates dispersed private information with linearity and is robust to distributional assumption.
ContributorsWang, Mian (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mechanisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information. An equal-cost sharing mechanism which maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms is proved to be optimal. Under the equal-cost sharing mechanism, when the built cost is low, the public good is provided whenever one of the agents is willing to fund it at half cost; when the cost is high, the public good is provided only if both agents are willing to fund it. Thirdly, I analyze the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations. If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that absent any friction positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations into a finite number of classes, then randomly matched within these classes. The focus of this essay is the performance of coarse matching schemes with a finite number of classes. The main results of this essay are the following ones. First, assuming a multiplicative match payoff function, I derive a lower bound on the performance of n-class coarse matching under mild conditions on the distributions of agents' characteristics. Second, I prove that this result generalizes to a large class of match payoff functions. Third, I show that these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly pricing problem with incomplete information, as well as to a cost-sharing problem with incomplete information. In these problems, standard models predict that optimal contracts sort types completely. The third result implies that a monopolist can capture a large fraction of the second-best profits by offering pooling contracts with a small number of qualities.
ContributorsShao, Ran (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
This dissertation consists of two parts. The first part is about understanding the mechanism behind female labor supply movement over economic development. Female labor force participation follows a U-shape pattern over per capita GDP cross nationally as well as within some countries. This paper questions if this pattern can be explained through sectoral, uneven technological movements both at market and at home. For that I develop a general equilibrium model with married couples and home production. I defined multiple sectors both at home and in the market. And by feeding the model with uneven technological growth, I observe how participation rate moves over development. My results indicate that a decrease in labor supply is mainly due to structural transformation. Meaning, a higher technology in a large sector causes prices to go up in that sector relative to other. Hence, labor allocated to this sector will decrease. Assuming this sector has a big market share, it will decrease the labor supply. Also, I found that the increase in female labor supply is mostly because of movement from home to market as a result of a higher technological growth in the market. The second part is about developing a methodology to verify and compute the existence of recursive equilibrium in dynamic economies with capital accumulation and elastic labor supply. The method I develop stems from the multi-step monotone mapping methodology which is based on monotone operators and solving a fixed point problem at each step. The methodology is not only useful for verifying and computing the recursive competitive equilibrium, but also useful for obtaining intra- and inter-temporal comparative dynamics. I provide robust intra-temporal comparative statics about how consumption and leisure decisions change in response to changes in capital stock and inverse marginal utility of consumption. I also provide inter-temporal equilibrium comparative dynamics about how recursive equilibrium consumption and investment respond to changes in discount factor and production externality. Different from intra-temporal comparative statics, these are not robust as they only apply to a subclass of equilibrium where investment level is monotone.
ContributorsDalkiran, Dilsat Tugba (Author) / Reffett, Kevin (Thesis advisor) / Datta, Manjira (Committee member) / Vereshchagina, Galina (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
This dissertation examines cultural understandings and lived realities of entrepreneurship across South Africa’s economic landscape, comparing the experiences of Cape Town’s Black entrepreneurs in under-resourced townships to those of White entrepreneurs in the wealthy, high finance business district. Based on 13 months of participant observation and interviews with 60 entrepreneurs, I find major differences between these groups of entrepreneurs, which I explain in three independent analyses that together form this dissertation. The first analysis examines the entrepreneurial motivations of Black entrepreneurs in Khayelitsha, Cape Town’s largest township. This analysis gives insight into expressed cultural values of entrepreneurship beyond a priori neoliberal analytical frameworks. The second analysis compares the material resources that Black entrepreneurs in Khayelitsha and White entrepreneurs in downtown Cape Town require for their businesses, and the mechanisms through which they secure these resources. This analysis demonstrates how historical structures of economic inequality affect entrepreneurial strategies. The third analysis assesses the non-material obstacles and challenges that both Black entrepreneurs in Khayelitsha and White entrepreneurs in wealthy areas of downtown Cape Town face in initiating their business ventures. This analysis highlights the importance of cultural capital to entrepreneurship and explains how non-material obstacles differ for entrepreneurs in different positions of societal power. Taken together, my findings contribute to two long-established lines of anthropological scholarship on entrepreneurship: (1) the moral values and understandings of entrepreneurship, and (2) the strategies and practices of entrepreneurship. I demonstrate the need to expand anthropological understandings of entrepreneurship to better theorize diverse economies, localized understandings and values of entrepreneurship, and the relationship of entrepreneurship to notions of economic justice. Yet, through comparative analysis I also demonstrate that diverse and localized values of entrepreneurship must be considered within the context of societal power structures; such context allows scholars to assess if and how diverse entrepreneurial values have the potential to make broad-scale social and/or cultural change. As such, I argue for the importance of putting these two streams of anthropological research into conversation with one another in order to gain a more holistic understanding of the relationship between the cultural meanings and the practices of entrepreneurship.
ContributorsBeresford, Melissa (Author) / Wutich, Amber (Thesis advisor) / Bernard, H. Russell (Committee member) / Tsuda, Takeyuki (Committee member) / York, Abigail (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications
of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning
students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction
where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders
suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to
evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.
In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue
from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments.
of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning
students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction
where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders
suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to
evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.
In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue
from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments.
ContributorsHernandez Chanto, Allan Roberto (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
This dissertation discusses the Cournot competition and competitions in the exploitation of common pool resources and its extension to the tragedy of the commons. I address these models by using potential games and inquire how these models reflect the real competitions for provisions of environmental resources. The Cournot models are dependent upon how many firms there are so that the resultant Cournot-Nash equilibrium is dependent upon the number of firms in oligopoly. But many studies do not take into account how the resultant Cournot-Nash equilibrium is sensitive to the change of the number of firms. Potential games can find out the outcome when the number of firms changes in addition to providing the "traditional" Cournot-Nash equilibrium when the number of firms is fixed. Hence, I use potential games to fill the gaps that exist in the studies of competitions in oligopoly and common pool resources and extend our knowledge in these topics. In specific, one of the rational conclusions from the Cournot model is that a firm's best policy is to split into separate firms. In real life, we usually witness the other way around; i.e., several firms attempt to merge and enjoy the monopoly profit by restricting the amount of output and raising the price. I aim to solve this conundrum by using potential games. I also clarify, within the Cournot competition model, how regulatory intervention in the management of environmental pollution externalities affects the equilibrium number of polluters. In addition, the tragedy of the commons is the term widely used to describe the overexploitation of open-access common-pool resources. Open-access encourages potential resource users to continue to enter the resource up to the point where rents are exhausted. The resulting level of resource use is higher than is socially optimal, and in extreme cases can lead to the collapse of the resource and the communities that may depend on it. In this paper I use the concept of potential games to evaluate the relation between the cost of resource use and the equilibrium number of resource users in open access regimes. I find that costs of access and costs of production are sufficient to determine the equilibrium number of resource users, and that there is in fact a continuum between Cournot competition and the tragedy of the commons. I note that the various common pool resource management regimes identified in the empirical literature are associated with particular cost structures, and hence that this may be the mechanism that determines the number of resource users accessing the resource.
ContributorsMamada, Robert H (Author) / Perrings, Charles (Thesis advisor) / Castillo-Chavez, Carlos (Thesis advisor) / Lampert, Adam (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
This dissertation draws upon modern Chomskyan theory to address issues surrounding the development of a unified, minimalist account of language as a mental and biological object, both in terms of its generation and historic change. Towards that end, I investigate, apply, and advance the labeling approach to generative syntax. Labeling is a hypothetical process, operating within the confines of phase theory, which is thought to prepare constructed syntactic objects for interpretation at relevant mental interfaces. I argue a number of points applicable to both synchronic and diachronic linguistics: 1) Labeling failures happen as a matter of course during a derivation, forcing re-evaluation of labeled syntactic structures which ultimately leads to a successful derivation. 2) Labeling and its errors do not happen in real-time, but are bounded by phases. This has consequences for how researchers ought to look at notions and limitations of phasal memory. 3) Labeling not only drives an individual’s mature syntax, but has an effect on how children acquire their syntax, causing them in some cases to alter structures and create new categories. This is responsible for many cases of language change, and I support this argument by investigating data from the history of Chinese and Macedonian that are sensitive to labeling-based phenomena. 4) Research into labeling can help us speculate about the evolution of language generally. Although recursion is sometimes thought to be a defining feature of Universal Grammar, labeling in fact is a much more likely candidate in this regard.
ContributorsSanatana-LaBarge, Robert E. (Author) / Gelderen, Elly van (Thesis advisor) / Ingram, David (Committee member) / Piattelli-Palmarini, Massimo (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
In this dissertation, I study strategic communication, in which a sender strategically discloses information to persuade a receiver to take an action favorable to the sender. I study two models of constrained communication. The first one generalizes the standard Bayesian Persuasion model to allow for the receiver's strategic behavior. The second one, joint work with Nour Chalhoub, studies a dynamic information disclosure under the assumption that the sender can only lie in one direction, by under-reporting the state, but never over-reporting it. The constraints in each model are intuitive for real-life application and lead to results that are of substantial difference from the results of the standard settings.
ContributorsEscobar, Marco Eugenio (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro M (Thesis advisor) / Chade, Hector A (Committee member) / Kleiner, Andreas (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022