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Description
The purpose of this project was to implement and analyze a new proposed rootkit that claims a greater level of stealth by hiding in cache. Today, the vast majority of embedded devices are powered by ARM processors. To protect their processors from attacks, ARM introduced a hardware security extension known

The purpose of this project was to implement and analyze a new proposed rootkit that claims a greater level of stealth by hiding in cache. Today, the vast majority of embedded devices are powered by ARM processors. To protect their processors from attacks, ARM introduced a hardware security extension known as TrustZone. It provides an isolated execution environment within the embedded device that enables us to run various memory integrity and malware detection tools to identify possible breaches in security to the normal world. Although TrustZone provides this additional layer of security, it also adds another layer of complexity, and thus comes with its own set of vulnerabilities. This new rootkit identifies and exploits a cache incoherence in the ARM device as a result of TrustZone. The newly proposed rootkit, called CacheKit, takes advantage of this cache incoherence to avoid memory introspection from tools in secure world. We implement CacheKit on the i.MX53 development board, which features a single ARM Cortex A8 processor, to analyze the limitations and vulnerabilities described in the original paper. We set up the Linux environment on the computer to be able to cross-compile for the development board which will be running the FreeScale android 2.3.4 platform with a 2.6.33 Linux kernel. The project is implemented as a kernel module that once installed on the board can manipulate cache as desired to conceal the rootkit. The module exploits the fact that in TrustZone, the secure world does not have access to the normal world cache. First, a technique known as Cache-asRAM is used to ensure that the rootkit is loaded only into cache of the normal world where it can avoid detection from the secure world. Then, we employ the cache maintenance instructions and resisters provided in the cp15 coprocessor to keep the code persistent in cache. Furthermore, the cache lines are mapped to unused I/O address space so that if cache content is flushed to RAM for inspection, the data is simply lost. This ensures that even if the rootkit were to be flushed into memory, any trace of the malicious code would be lost. CacheKit prevents defenders from analyzing the code and destroys any forensic evidence. This provides attackers with a new and powerful tool that is excellent for certain scenarios that were previously thought to be secure. Finally, we determine the limitations of the prototype to determine possible areas for future growth and research into the security of networked embedded devices.
ContributorsGutierrez Barnett, Mauricio Antonio (Author) / Zhao, Ziming (Thesis director) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
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Description
Phishing is a form of online fraud where a spoofed website tries to gain access to user's sensitive information by tricking the user into believing that it is a benign website. There are several solutions to detect phishing attacks such as educating users, using blacklists or extracting phishing characteristics found

Phishing is a form of online fraud where a spoofed website tries to gain access to user's sensitive information by tricking the user into believing that it is a benign website. There are several solutions to detect phishing attacks such as educating users, using blacklists or extracting phishing characteristics found to exist in phishing attacks. In this thesis, we analyze approaches that extract features from phishing websites and train classification models with extracted feature set to classify phishing websites. We create an exhaustive list of all features used in these approaches and categorize them into 6 broader categories and 33 finer categories. We extract 59 features from the URL, URL redirects, hosting domain (WHOIS and DNS records) and popularity of the website and analyze their robustness in classifying a phishing website. Our emphasis is on determining the predictive performance of robust features. We evaluate the classification accuracy when using the entire feature set and when URL features or site popularity features are excluded from the feature set and show how our approach can be used to effectively predict specific types of phishing attacks such as shortened URLs and randomized URLs. Using both decision table classifiers and neural network classifiers, our results indicate that robust features seem to have enough predictive power to be used in practice.
ContributorsNamasivayam, Bhuvana Lalitha (Author) / Bazzi, Rida (Thesis advisor) / Zhao, Ziming (Committee member) / Liu, Huan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017