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Description
Neuroimaging has appeared in the courtroom as a type of `evidence' to support claims about whether or not criminals should be held accountable for their crimes. Yet the ability to abstract notions of culpability and criminal behavior with confidence from these imagines is unclear. As there remains much to be discovered in the relationship between personal responsibility, criminal behavior, and neurological abnormalities, questions have been raised toward neuroimaging as an appropriate means to validate these claims.
This project explores the limits and legitimacy of neuroimaging as a means of understanding behavior and culpability in determining appropriate criminal sentencing. It highlights key philosophical issues surrounding the ability to use neuroimaging to support this process, and proposes a method of ensuring their proper use. By engaging case studies and a thought experiment, this project illustrates the circumstances in which neuroimaging may assist in identifying particular characteristics relevant for criminal sentencing.
I argue that it is not a question of whether or not neuroimaging itself holds validity in determining a criminals guilt or motives, but rather a proper application of the issue is to focus on the way in which information regarding these images is communicated from the `expert' scientists to the `non-expert' making decisions about the sentence that are most important. Those who are considering this information's relevance, a judge or jury, are typically not well versed in criminal neuroscience and interpreting the significance of different images. I advocate the way in which this information is communicated from the scientist-informer to the decision-maker parallels in importance to its actual meaning.
As a solution, I engage Roger Pielke's model of honest brokering as a solution to ensure the appropriate use of neuroimaging in determining criminal responsibility and sentencing. A thought experiment follows to highlight the limits of science, engage philosophical repercussions, and illustrate honest brokering as a means of resolution. To achieve this, a hypothetical dialogue reminiscent of Kenneth Schaffner's `tools for talking' with behavioral geneticists and courtroom professionals will exemplify these ideas.
This project explores the limits and legitimacy of neuroimaging as a means of understanding behavior and culpability in determining appropriate criminal sentencing. It highlights key philosophical issues surrounding the ability to use neuroimaging to support this process, and proposes a method of ensuring their proper use. By engaging case studies and a thought experiment, this project illustrates the circumstances in which neuroimaging may assist in identifying particular characteristics relevant for criminal sentencing.
I argue that it is not a question of whether or not neuroimaging itself holds validity in determining a criminals guilt or motives, but rather a proper application of the issue is to focus on the way in which information regarding these images is communicated from the `expert' scientists to the `non-expert' making decisions about the sentence that are most important. Those who are considering this information's relevance, a judge or jury, are typically not well versed in criminal neuroscience and interpreting the significance of different images. I advocate the way in which this information is communicated from the scientist-informer to the decision-maker parallels in importance to its actual meaning.
As a solution, I engage Roger Pielke's model of honest brokering as a solution to ensure the appropriate use of neuroimaging in determining criminal responsibility and sentencing. A thought experiment follows to highlight the limits of science, engage philosophical repercussions, and illustrate honest brokering as a means of resolution. To achieve this, a hypothetical dialogue reminiscent of Kenneth Schaffner's `tools for talking' with behavioral geneticists and courtroom professionals will exemplify these ideas.
ContributorsTaddeo, Sarah (Author) / Robert, Jason S (Thesis advisor) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Hurlbut, James B (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
I present in this dissertation a theory of moral disillusion. In chapter 1 I explain moral innocence and its loss. I show that becoming morally responsible requires shattering the illusion that one is not an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. The morally responsible individual must understand that she can be an agent of wrongdoing. In chapter 2 I explore the nature of the understanding that accompanies the different phases of disillusion. I show that moral disillusion is an ability, not to follow moral principles, but to question them. In chapter 3 I argue that another phase of disillusion involves an acquaintance with evil. One shatters the illusion that only malicious individuals can be evildoers. Morally good people can also bring about evil. I conclude that evil is the exploitation of the extremely vulnerable. In chapters 4 and 5, I analyze more complex phases of moral disillusion. These stages are characterized by an understanding that one can be an agent of unchosen evil, that one might bring about evil even when pursuing the morally best course of action, and that one can be morally responsible for doing so. In order to understand unchosen evil and the tragedy of inescapable moral wrongdoing, the individual sees that moral responsibility ought to track what we care about, rather than what we believe. In chapter 6 I show that Kierkegaard's conception of the self is a philosophy of moral disillusion. I argue that his prescription that we shatter moral illusions is congruent with Harry Frankfurt's prescription that we ought to care about some things and not others. From this discussion emerges the explicit distinction between moral disillusion and moral goodness. Moreover, I conclude that the morally disillusioned are morally accountable for more than those still harboring moral illusions. Although moral disillusion does not entail becoming morally good, by acquiring the ability to raise questions about moral principles and to affect the content of one's cares, one acquires the ability to take responsibility for, and potentially minimize, evil. To have and understand these abilities, but not to care about them, increases one's moral accountability.
ContributorsGoldberg, Zachary J. (Author) / French, Peter A. (Thesis advisor) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Matustik, Martin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
This dissertation puts forth an account of moral responsibility. The central claim defended is that an agent's responsibility supervenes on the agent's mental states at the time of the action. I call the mental states that determine responsibility the agent's quality of will (QOW). QOW is taken to concern the agent's action, understood from an internal perspective, along with the agent's motivations, her actual beliefs about the action, and the beliefs she ought to have had about the action. This approach to responsibility has a number of surprising implications. First, blameworthiness can come apart from wrongness, and praiseworthiness from rightness. This is because responsibility is an internal notion and rightness and wrongness are external notions. Furthermore, agents can only be responsible for their QOW. It follows that agents cannot be responsible for the consequences of their actions. I further argue that one's QOW is determined by what one cares about. And the fact that we react to the QOW of others with morally reactive emotions, such as resentment and gratitude, shows that we care about QOW. The reactive attitudes can therefore be understood as ways in which we care about what others care about. Responsibility can be assessed by comparing one's actual QOW to the QOW one ought to have had.
ContributorsKhoury, Andrew (Author) / French, Peter A. (Thesis advisor) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Portmore, Douglas W. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
Responsibility for academic outcomes is an important factor to consider within the study of student motivation, yet measures for the construct remain elusive and inconsistent. The present study uses a new measure developed by Lauermann and Karabenick to assess students' sense of responsibility for their academic outcomes. This study examined the relationship between perceived academic control, implicit theory of intelligence, and student responsibility. Results were based on a sample of 152 undergraduate students. A significant relationship between perceived academic control and student responsibility was established. Results also indicated a significant association between implicit theory of intelligence and student responsibility; however, contrary to hypotheses, implicit theory did not mediate the relationship between perceived academic control and student responsibility.
ContributorsFishman, Evan Jacob (Author) / Nakagawa, Kathryn (Thesis advisor) / Jenefer, Husman (Committee member) / Elsie, Moore (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
As automation becomes more prevalent in society, the frequency that systems involve interactive human-automation control increases. Previous studies have shown accountability to be a valuable way of eliciting human engagement and reducing various biases, but these studies have involved the presence of an authority figure during the research. The current research sought to explore the effect of accountability in the absence of an authority figure. To do this, 40 participants took part in this study by playing a microworld simulation. Half were told they would be interviewed after the simulation, and half were told data was not being collected. Eleven dependent variables were collected (accountability, number of resources shared, player score, agent score, combined score, and the six measures of the NASA- Task Load Index), of which statistical significance was found in number of resources shared, player score, and agent score. While not conclusive, the results suggest that accountability affects human-automation interactions even in the absence of an authority figure. It is suggested that future research seek to find a reliable way to measure accountability and examine how long accountability effects last.
ContributorsWilkins, Adam (Author) / Chiou, Erin K. (Thesis advisor) / Gray, Robert (Committee member) / Craig, Scotty (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
It is no secret that humans at some point in their lives will endure some sort of immense pain or suffering that continues, making life difficult to live in such a way. The question then becomes how a sufferer goes about dealing with their distress and whether or not they choose to deal with it or continue to live a life that is detrimental to them. This is a topic in which I will discuss in the terms of modern day psychology and how people who suffer from psychological disorders can embrace a new path to recovery through words and being able to rewrite their stories. Throughout this thesis, I shall argue, with the assistance of various philosophic works, that everyone is born into a story and responsibility lies within a person either to continue with a story to which they have become accustomed or choose to embark on a new journey all together. When the decision is rendered to rewrite the path one has taken, it is essential to look at what is driving the story or the goals one has been pursuing. The person suffering can then go to treatment based upon the exchange of words between them and their psychoanalyst in hopes of regaining a sense of responsibility in their lives.
ContributorsWilson, Bailey Rachelle (Author) / Ramsey, Ramsey Eric (Thesis director) / Piemonte, Nicole (Committee member) / School of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-12
Description
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a fascinating and complex topic. There is consensus that companies both make a large impact on the world and have a responsibility beyond profits. The challenge with this responsibility is that determining businesses' responsibility and measuring the impact remains unclear. Scholars most often point to the early to mid 1900s as its starting point and the increased economic growth and workers' unions occurring in the 1950s as one of the reasons for scholars paying more attention to the topic. This thesis project analyzes current examples of CSR from Starbucks and IBM. These companies have reputations for their positive CSR practices. Both companies' availability of information, the vast number of their CSR practices, and efforts to measure the impact set them apart. IBM and Starbucks stand out because of the sheer volume of CSR activities they have, and when examined closely, the mixed, primarily good, impact of these activities is revealed. Having a high number of CSR practices alone does not equate to doing CSR well. Instead, companies' CSR should be examined based on both the number of practices and their impact. Considering both of these metrics will help consumers, as well as other stakeholders, better evaluate the success or failure of CSR in a business.
ContributorsSullivan, Victoria Mary (Author) / Brian, Jennifer (Thesis director) / York, Abigail (Committee member) / School of Human Evolution and Social Change (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-05
Description
Over the last twenty years, governments at all levels have made changes to increase their level of accountability and transparency. The researcher proposed that the concepts of organizational agility (OA) (leveraging core competencies, proactively seeking new opportunities, implementation of performance metrics, and strategically planning projects) are well-aligned with the public accountability systems. In the first part of this dissertation, the researcher examined the components of a “Value-Based Model” for public works contractor selection and project delivery, and its propensity to increase public accountability. The researcher studied 415 projects ($561.47M value) delivered with the Value-Based Model at eight different public agencies over a ten-year period.
Next, the researcher analyzed factors affecting contractor organizational agility. In light of the “Great Recession”, the concepts of organizational agility offers insights into companies could have made different strategic decisions to avoid many of the issues faced. Construction was particularly affected: by January 2010, unemployment reached approximately 20 percent. One way to combat declining profits is to adjust general overhead costs (indirect expenses). These costs include items such as home office expenses, business development, and bonuses. The objective of the second part of this research was to conduct a study of how contractors responded to dynamic market conditions and to identify if whether contractors’ company attributes impacted their responses to the market changes. A total of 437 contractors responded to the survey, and 92 percent reported that they reduced overhead costs in five areas, by an average of about 15 percent. Additional analysis suggests that there are distinct categories of overhead flexibility.
Next, the researcher analyzed factors affecting contractor organizational agility. In light of the “Great Recession”, the concepts of organizational agility offers insights into companies could have made different strategic decisions to avoid many of the issues faced. Construction was particularly affected: by January 2010, unemployment reached approximately 20 percent. One way to combat declining profits is to adjust general overhead costs (indirect expenses). These costs include items such as home office expenses, business development, and bonuses. The objective of the second part of this research was to conduct a study of how contractors responded to dynamic market conditions and to identify if whether contractors’ company attributes impacted their responses to the market changes. A total of 437 contractors responded to the survey, and 92 percent reported that they reduced overhead costs in five areas, by an average of about 15 percent. Additional analysis suggests that there are distinct categories of overhead flexibility.
ContributorsSmithwick, Jake (Author) / Sullivan, Kenneth T. (Thesis advisor) / Badger, William W. (Committee member) / Schleifer, Thomas C. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
Accountability has been commonly referred to in the literature as a person’s expectation about others’ evaluations. However, in this study, I develop an alternative perspective of leader accountability by defining it as an individual’s degree of ownership regarding good or poor performance and acceptance of associated rewards or disciplinary actions. Based on attribution theory, leaders can have internal and external ownership regarding good and poor performance. I propose that accountability can be categorized into two correlated but distinct aspects: self-benefitting and other-benefitting. Leader self-benefitting accountability refers to leaders’ attributions towards their own benefits (i.e., internal attribution of good performance and external attribution of poor performance). Leader other-benefitting accountability reflects leaders’ attributions towards others’ interests (i.e., internal attribution of poor performance and external attribution of good performance). Using multiple samples, I develop and validate a leader accountability scale, and then test a theoretical model with a focus on leader accountability and collective accountability (i.e., a group of individuals’ degree of ownership) by collecting data from 57 leaders and 162 followers in three Chinese companies. The findings show that leader humility is positively related to leader other-benefitting accountability. Both leader self-benefitting and other-benefitting accountability are associated with collective self-benefitting and other-benefitting accountability, respectively. Moreover, the relationship between leader self-benefitting and collective self-benefitting accountability is enhanced when the leader has high organization prototypicality. Furthermore, collective self-benefitting accountability decreases leader effectiveness and team effectiveness, while collective other-benefitting accountability increases leader effectiveness.
ContributorsWang, Danni (Author) / Waldman, David (Thesis advisor) / Zhang, Zhen (Thesis advisor) / Balthazard, Pierre (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
This dissertation engages with the philosophical, psychological, and scientific literature on two important topics: empathy and human enhancement. My two broad goals are to clarify the role of empathy in ascriptions of responsibility and to consider how enhanced empathy might alter those ascriptions.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
ContributorsGurney, David (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis advisor) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Tsosie, Rebecca (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016