Matching Items (3)
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- All Subjects: Contracts
- All Subjects: Corporate Loans
- Creators: Kovrijnykh, Natalia
- Creators: Becker, Alexander Daniel
- Member of: Theses and Dissertations
Description
Modern Americans ignorantly live under a blanket of unread terms, conditions, and binding contracts. Often, these contracts (mostly associated with products and services) come and go with little effect. Periodically, the products or services cause the consumer harm, leading them to seek repair. The consumer then realizes that all the fine print they failed to read makes an impactful legal difference. This paper analyzes the work of Professor Radin through her book, Boilerplate. It goes on to explore many other arguments presented by contract theorists and makes substantial claims regarding the dangers of boilerplate (unread terms and conditions).
ContributorsBecker, Alexander Daniel (Author) / Koretz, Lora (Thesis director) / Calleros, Charles (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Department of English (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
Family economics uses economic concepts such as productions and decision making to understand family behavior. Economists place emphasis on the rule of families on labor supply, human capital investment, and consumption. In a household, the members choose the optimal time allocations between working, housework and leisure, and money between consumption of different members and savings. One-Child policy and strong inter-generational connections cause unique family structure in China. Households of different generations provide income transfer and labor support to each other. Households consider these connections in their savings, labor supply, human capital investment, fertility and marriage decisions. Especially, strong intergenerational relationships in China are one cause of the high level of young female labor supply and high saving rate. I will investigate the rules of intergenerational relationships on household economic behavior.
Affirmative Action allocates college seats to a separate group. To evaluate the distribution effects of AA on discrete groups, we need to study household's strategic reactions on the rule of college seats allocation. The admission system of National College Entrance Examination in China is a type of AA. That distributes college seats by regions. I will use the rapid expansion of Chinese college enrollment as a natural experiment to check the households' reaction on AA and college expansion.
Media economics utilizes economic empirical and theoretical tools to figure out the social, cultural, and economic issues in media industries. The impact of online piracy on genuine products sales is under debate, because people cannot find representing proxies to evaluate piracy levels. I will use Chinese data to study the effects of online piracy on theater revenue.
Affirmative Action allocates college seats to a separate group. To evaluate the distribution effects of AA on discrete groups, we need to study household's strategic reactions on the rule of college seats allocation. The admission system of National College Entrance Examination in China is a type of AA. That distributes college seats by regions. I will use the rapid expansion of Chinese college enrollment as a natural experiment to check the households' reaction on AA and college expansion.
Media economics utilizes economic empirical and theoretical tools to figure out the social, cultural, and economic issues in media industries. The impact of online piracy on genuine products sales is under debate, because people cannot find representing proxies to evaluate piracy levels. I will use Chinese data to study the effects of online piracy on theater revenue.
ContributorsYue, Yang (Author) / Silverman, Daniel (Thesis advisor) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Veramendi, Gregory (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
This dissertation consists of two essays related to dynamic debt contracting and financial economics. The first chapter studies key determinants of inclusion of a financial covenant in corporate loans from theoretical and empirical angles. Using a novel manually collected loan dataset of small to medium-sized publicly-listed U.S. firms, I find that firms that issue loans without financial covenants tend to have (i) lower accounting quality, (ii) lower assets, and (iii) are experiencing faster growth in profitability relative to firms that issue loans with financial covenants. I build a theoretical model of project financing in which there is noisy public information about the project’s profitability, and the lender can privately monitor to improve the information quality. I show that if the signal precision without monitoring is sufficiently low (high), the equilibrium contract does not include (includes) a covenant. Covenant inclusion plays a key role in providing incentives to the lender to monitor. I show that the lender monitors less often relative to the first best. Insufficient monitoring leads to “excessive risk-taking,” namely, bad quality firms continuing with the project too often. Relatedly, I also show that covenants are used less often in equilibrium relative to the first best. The second chapter examines equilibrium consequences of litigation by holdout creditors in sovereign debt renegotiation. I show that given a sufficiently high probability of winning the litigation case against the borrowing country and/or a high enough defaulted sovereign debt, the presence of the holdout creditors increases the expected debt recovery rate, which makes the default option less attractive, and decreases the country’s default probability and the interest rate on the country’s debt. The country responds by borrowing more but defaults less often along the equilibrium path as it wants to avoid default and facing holdout creditors. Having a non-zero probability of successful litigation is welfare improving for the country as it sustains higher debt and defaults less frequently.
ContributorsKim, Yong (Author) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Thesis advisor) / Mehra, Rajnish (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021