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This case study analyzed the internal controls of a real estate company using the widely accepted COSO framework. Testing of the internal environment and controls was completed using the COSO framework. The major internal control problem identified in the study was a lack of ethical standards in the control environment.

This case study analyzed the internal controls of a real estate company using the widely accepted COSO framework. Testing of the internal environment and controls was completed using the COSO framework. The major internal control problem identified in the study was a lack of ethical standards in the control environment. In addition to this main problem, inadequate documentation, no separation of duties, and unqualified employees were also identified as violations of effective internal controls. The department of real estate ordered a "cease and desist" on August 8, 2013 due to illegal company activities. The company participated in illegal actions regarding: the trust account and company documentation and procedures. Material weaknesses were found in the company's internal controls; therefore the result of this study was an adverse opinion on internal controls.
ContributorsFrederick, Nicole Lorraine (Author) / Munshi, Perseus (Thesis director) / Benali, Kayla (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor)
Created2013-12
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Description
Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However, motivated reasoning theory predicts that reporting incentives will bias managers’ review in favor of estimates that are incentive consistent, and

Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However, motivated reasoning theory predicts that reporting incentives will bias managers’ review in favor of estimates that are incentive consistent, and managers will selectively attend to information that supports their preferred conclusion, including their perceptions of the subordinate. Using experimental methods I manipulate the consistency of the subordinate estimate with management reporting incentives, and the narcissistic description of the subordinate. Consistent with motivated reasoning theory, I find that managers anchor on incentive consistent subordinate estimates, regardless of subordinate narcissism, but anchor less on incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, especially when the estimate comes from a narcissistic subordinate. I also find evidence that managers believe narcissistic subordinates act strategically in their own self-interest, and selectively attend to this belief to adjust away from incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, but not incentive consistent subordinate estimate. My results reveal two potential weaknesses in the management review process: susceptibility to subordinate anchors, and bias created by reporting incentives.
ContributorsHayes, Matthew J (Author) / Reckers, Philip (Thesis advisor) / Lowe, Jordan (Committee member) / Maksymov, Eldar (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016