Matching Items (5)
Filtering by

Clear all filters

152668-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the

I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the level of monitoring. I find a strong relation between distance and both board meeting attendance and director membership on strategic versus monitoring committees. Increased monitoring, as measured by a reduction in effective distance, by way of addition of a direct flight, is associated with a 3% reduction in firm value. A reduction in effective distance is also associated with less risk-taking, lower stock return volatility, lower accounting return volatility, lower R&D; spending, fewer acquisitions, and fewer patents.
ContributorsBennett, Benjamin (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Babenka, Ilona (Committee member) / Custodio, Claudia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
150740-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
150898-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost

This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost of information gathering for both firms. I find supporting evidence for these two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. Consistent with the agency hypothesis, interlocked acquirers underperform non-interlocked acquirers by 2% during the announcement period. However, well-governed acquirers receive higher announcement returns and have better post-acquisition performance in interlocked deals. The proportional surplus accrued to an acquirer is positively correlated with the interlocking agent's ownership in the acquirer relative to her ownership in the target. Consistent with the information hypothesis, when the target's firm value is opaque, interlocks improve acquirer announcement returns and long-term performance. Interlocked acquirers are also more likely to use equity as payment, especially when the acquirer's stock value is opaque. Target announcement returns are not influenced by the existence of interlock. Finally, I find acquisitions are more likely to occur between two interlocked firms and such deals have a higher completion rate.
ContributorsWu, Qingqing (Author) / Bates, Thomas W. (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Lindsey, Laura (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
136098-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
In order to discover if Company X's current system of local trucking is the most efficient and cost-effective way to move freight between sites in the Western U.S., we will compare the current system to varying alternatives to see if there are potential avenues for Company X to create or

In order to discover if Company X's current system of local trucking is the most efficient and cost-effective way to move freight between sites in the Western U.S., we will compare the current system to varying alternatives to see if there are potential avenues for Company X to create or implement an improved cost saving freight movement system.
ContributorsPicone, David (Co-author) / Krueger, Brandon (Co-author) / Harrison, Sarah (Co-author) / Way, Noah (Co-author) / Simonson, Mark (Thesis director) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Supply Chain Management (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (Contributor)
Created2015-05
134974-Thumbnail Image.png
Description
The goal of this thesis was to provide in depth research into the semiconductor wet-etch market and create a supplier analysis tool that would allow Company X to identify the best supplier partnerships. Several models were used to analyze the wet etch market including Porter's Five Forces and SWOT analyses.

The goal of this thesis was to provide in depth research into the semiconductor wet-etch market and create a supplier analysis tool that would allow Company X to identify the best supplier partnerships. Several models were used to analyze the wet etch market including Porter's Five Forces and SWOT analyses. These models were used to rate suppliers based on financial indicators, management history, market share, research and developments spend, and investment diversity. This research allowed for the removal of one of the four companies in question due to a discovered conflict of interest. Once the initial research was complete a dynamic excel model was created that would allow Company X to continually compare costs and factors of the supplier's products. Many cost factors were analyzed such as initial capital investment, power and chemical usage, warranty costs, and spares parts usage. Other factors that required comparison across suppliers included wafer throughput, number of layers the tool could process, the number of chambers the tool has, and the amount of space the tool requires. The demand needed for the tool was estimated by Company X in order to determine how each supplier's tool set would handle the required usage. The final feature that was added to the model was the ability to run a sensitivity analysis on each tool set. This allows Company X to quickly and accurately forecast how certain changes to costs or tool capacities would affect total cost of ownership. This could be heavily utilized during Company X's negotiations with suppliers. The initial research as well the model lead to the final recommendation of Supplier A as they had the most cost effective tool given the required demand. However, this recommendation is subject to change as demand fluctuates or if changes can be made during negotiations.
ContributorsSchmitt, Connor (Co-author) / Rickets, Dawson (Co-author) / Castiglione, Maia (Co-author) / Witten, Forrest (Co-author) / Simonson, Mark (Thesis director) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / Department of Supply Chain Management (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12