Matching Items (3)
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- All Subjects: Corporate governance
- All Subjects: SOX
- Creators: Casas-Arce, Pablo
Description
Growing concerns over climate change and the lack of a federal climate policy have prompted many sub-national organizations to undertake greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation actions on their own. However, the interventions associated with these efforts are typically selected in a top-down and ad hoc manner, and have not created the desired GHG emissions reductions. Accordingly, new approaches are needed to identify, select, develop, and coordinate effective climate change mitigation interventions in local and regional contexts. This thesis develops a process to create a governance system for negotiating local and regional climate interventions. The process consists of four phases: 1) mapping the overall transition, 2) reconstructing the current intervention selection system, 3) assessing the system against principles identified in the literature, and 4) creating an improved system based on the assessment. This process gives users a detailed understanding of how the overall transition has progressed, how and why interventions are currently selected, what changes are needed to improve the selection system, and how to re-structure the system to create more desirable outcomes. The process results in an improved system that relies on participation, coordination, and accountability to proactively select evidence-based interventions that incorporate the interests of stakeholders and achieve system-level goals. The process was applied to climate change mitigation efforts underway in Sonoma County, California to explore the implications of real-world application, and demonstrate its utility for current climate change mitigation efforts. Note that results and analysis from interviews with Sonoma County climate actors are included as a supplementary file.
ContributorsCulotta, Daniel Scott (Author) / Wiek, Arnim (Thesis advisor) / Basile, George (Committee member) / Shrestha, Milan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
Executive compensation is broken into two parts: one fixed and one variable. The fixed component of executive compensation is the annual salary and the variable components are performance-based incentives. Clawback provisions of executive compensation are designed to require executives to return performance-based, variable compensation that was erroneously awarded in the year of a misstatement. This research shows the need for the use of a new clawback provision that combines aspects of the two currently in regulation. In our current federal regulation, there are two clawback provisions in play: Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley and section 954 of The Dodd\u2014Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This paper argues for the use of an optimal clawback provision that combines aspects of both the current SOX provision and the Dodd-Frank provision, by integrating the principles of loss aversion and narcissism. These two factors are important to consider when designing a clawback provision, as it is generally accepted that average individuals are loss averse and executives are becoming increasingly narcissistic. Therefore, when attempting to mitigate the risk of a leader keeping erroneously awarded executive compensation, the decision making factors of narcissism and loss aversion must be taken into account. Additionally, this paper predicts how compensation structures will shift post-implementation. Through a survey analyzing the level of both loss- aversion and narcissism in respondents, the research question justifies the principle that people are loss averse and that a subset of the population show narcissistic tendencies. Both loss aversion and narcissism drove the results to suggest there are benefits to both clawback provisions and that a new provision that combines elements of both is most beneficial in mitigating the risk of executives receiving erroneously awarded compensation. I concluded the most optimal clawback provision is mandatory for all public companies (Dodd-Frank), targets all executives (Dodd-Frank), and requires the recuperation of the entire bonus, not just that which was in excess of what should have been received (SOX).
ContributorsLarscheid, Elizabeth (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation contracts entails the use of peer performance to filter out exogenous shocks and reduce exposure to risk. Theory predicts that high-quality peers can effectively filter out noise from performance measurement, yet prior empirical studies do not examine how differences in peer quality affect the use of RPE in practice. In this study, I propose a model to select peers with the highest capacity to filter out noise and introduce a novel measure of peer quality. Consistent with the theory, I find that firms with high quality peers rely on RPE to a greater extent than firms with few good peers available. I also examine the extent to which peers disclosed in proxy statements overlap with the best peers predicted by my model. I find that the overlap is positively associated with institutional ownership, use of top 5 compensation consultants, and compensation committee competence.
ContributorsCho, Jeh-Hyun (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020