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公司治理结构对盈余管理的影响研究—基于民营类上市公司的实证分析

Description当前，上市公司的盈余管理问题已是我国资本市场中普遍存在的突出问题。一般来说，一些企业为了满足资本市场对于上市、增发等条件的要求,以及为有效推动企业的并购、重组等行为的顺利实现,甚至为了谋求公司管理层的个别利益,往往运用盈余管理等举措实施公司财报及关键指标的粉饰修正，让不知情的股民蒙受一定的损失。普遍分析显示，我国股市中民营企业比其他企业遭遇的问题和压力更多、更大、更突出,因此民营企业从客观上来说拥有更强的盈余管理动机。而从当前我国资本市场的实际情况来看，我国相关专家学者对盈余管理的系统性深入研究，一般都瞄准了上市企业群体或持续亏损企业，对盈余管理的研究不系统、不全面、不深入，这将对我国进一步提升盈余管理监管水平构成一定不利影响。当前，由于我国民企在自身管理及发展动力方面的特殊性,我国民企的管理、盈余管理特点和国外上市公司还存在着很大的不同,进一步深入研究我国民企上市公司自身管理方面的突出特点，以及其对企业盈余管理等方面的深层次影响,有助于监管层对症下药，更有针对性地研究出台全新的监管措施,进一步提升管理水平。这还可以为公司发展的决策层及相关会计信息使用人员提供一定的决策参考, 因此其拥有十分重要的意义。

本文首先认真总结分析了有关上市企业治理结构和盈余管理等方面的历史文献资料，依托当前资本市场上普遍运用的委托代理、内部人控制和契约等理论，系统研究了我国民企上市公司在自身治理结构方面的突出特征以及其对盈余管理方面所构成影响的深层次原理。在此基础上，本文通过2015-2017年我国上市企业数据，基于截面Jones模型对民营企业和非民营企业盈余管理程度进行测算和比较分析，发现民营企业盈余管理程度更高；从四个层面系统研究民企公司自身的治理结构突出特点,设立回归模型论证了民营企业独特的公司治理结构特征对盈余管理程度确实会产生影响；最后,本文进一步利用修正的费尔萨姆一奥尔森估价模型对民营上市公司盈余管理有公司价值的关系进行了验证，发现两者具有显著相关性。
ContributorsChen, Hui (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chang, Chun (Thesis advisor) / Huang, Xiaochuan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
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The Unintended Consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Description
Given its impact on the accounting profession and public corporations, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(SOX) is a widely researched regulation among accounting scholars. Research typically focuses on the impact it has had on corporations, executives and auditors, however, there is limited research that illustrates the impact SOX may have on average…

Given its impact on the accounting profession and public corporations, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(SOX) is a widely researched regulation among accounting scholars. Research typically focuses on the impact it has had on corporations, executives and auditors, however, there is limited research that illustrates the impact SOX may have on average Americans. There were several US criminal code sections that resulted from the passing of SOX. Statute 1519, which is often referred to as the "anti-shredding provision", penalizes anyone who "knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to" obstruct a current or foreseeable federal investigation. This statute, although intended to punish behavior similar to that which occurred in the early 2000s by corporations and auditors, has been used to charge people beyond its original intent. Several issues with the crafting of the statute cause its broad application and some litigation even reached the Supreme Court due to its vague wording. Not only is the statute being applied beyond the intent, there are other issues that legal scholars have critiqued it for. This statute is far from being the only law facing these issues as the same issues and critiques are found in the 14th amendment. Rewriting the statute seems to be the most effective way to address the concerns of judges, lawyers and defendants regarding the statute. In addition, Congress could have passed this statute outside of SOX to avoid being seen as overreaching if obstruction of justice related to documents was actually an issue outside of corporate fraud.
ContributorsGonzalez, Joana (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Lowe, Jordan (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
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Anchoring and motivated reasoning in managers' review of accounting estimates

Description
Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However, motivated reasoning theory predicts that reporting incentives will bias managers’ review in favor of estimates that are incentive consistent, and…

Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However, motivated reasoning theory predicts that reporting incentives will bias managers’ review in favor of estimates that are incentive consistent, and managers will selectively attend to information that supports their preferred conclusion, including their perceptions of the subordinate. Using experimental methods I manipulate the consistency of the subordinate estimate with management reporting incentives, and the narcissistic description of the subordinate. Consistent with motivated reasoning theory, I find that managers anchor on incentive consistent subordinate estimates, regardless of subordinate narcissism, but anchor less on incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, especially when the estimate comes from a narcissistic subordinate. I also find evidence that managers believe narcissistic subordinates act strategically in their own self-interest, and selectively attend to this belief to adjust away from incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, but not incentive consistent subordinate estimate. My results reveal two potential weaknesses in the management review process: susceptibility to subordinate anchors, and bias created by reporting incentives.
ContributorsHayes, Matthew J (Author) / Reckers, Philip (Thesis advisor) / Lowe, Jordan (Committee member) / Maksymov, Eldar (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016