Matching Items (382)
Description
The end of the nineteenth century was an exhilarating and revolutionary era for the flute. This period is the Second Golden Age of the flute, when players and teachers associated with the Paris Conservatory developed what would be considered the birth of the modern flute school. In addition, the founding in 1871 of the Société Nationale de Musique by Camille Saint-Saëns (1835-1921) and Romain Bussine (1830-1899) made possible the promotion of contemporary French composers. The founding of the Société des Instruments à Vent by Paul Taffanel (1844-1908) in 1879 also invigorated a new era of chamber music for wind instruments. Within this groundbreaking environment, Mélanie Hélène Bonis (pen name Mel Bonis) entered the Paris Conservatory in 1876, under the tutelage of César Franck (1822-1890). Many flutists are dismayed by the scarcity of repertoire for the instrument in the Romantic and post-Romantic traditions; they make up for this absence by borrowing the violin sonatas of Gabriel Fauré (1845-1924) and Franck. The flute and piano works of Mel Bonis help to fill this void with music composed originally for flute. Bonis was a prolific composer with over 300 works to her credit, but her works for flute and piano have not been researched or professionally recorded in the United States before the present study. Although virtually unknown today in the American flute community, Bonis's music received much acclaim from her contemporaries and deserves a prominent place in the flutist's repertoire. After a brief biographical introduction, this document examines Mel Bonis's musical style and describes in detail her six works for flute and piano while also offering performance suggestions.
ContributorsDaum, Jenna Elyse (Author) / Buck, Elizabeth (Thesis advisor) / Holbrook, Amy (Committee member) / Micklich, Albie (Committee member) / Schuring, Martin (Committee member) / Norton, Kay (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
ContributorsMatthews, Eyona (Performer) / Yoo, Katie Jihye (Performer) / Roubison, Ryan (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-03-25
ContributorsHoeckley, Stephanie (Performer) / Lee, Juhyun (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-03-24
Description
This thesis examines the Mexican federal judiciary and the problem of corruption in this institution, particularly related to cases of drug trafficking. Given the clandestine nature of corruption and the complexities of this investigation, ethnographic methods were used to collect data. I conducted fieldwork as a "returning member" to the site under study, based on my former experience and interaction with the federal judicial system. I interviewed 45 individuals who work in the federal courts in six different Mexican cities. I also studied case files associated with an important criminal trial of suspected narco-traffickers known in Mexico as "El Michoacanazo." My study reveals the complicated nature of judicial corruption and how it can occur under certain circumstances. I conclude that the Mexican federal judiciary has become a more professional, efficient, and trustworthy institution over the past fifteen years, though institutionalized practices such as nepotism, cronyism, personal abuse of power, and gender inequalities still exist, tending to thwart the full professionalization of these courts and facilitating instances of misconduct and corruption. Although structural factors prevent full professionalization and corruption does occur in these courts, the system works better than it ever has before.
ContributorsFerreyra Orozco, Gabriel (Author) / Provine, Doris M. (Thesis advisor) / Johnson, John M. (Committee member) / Warner, Carolyn M. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
ContributorsMcClain, Katelyn (Performer) / Buringrud, Deanna (Contributor) / Lee, Juhyun (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-03-31
Description
Political and economic competition, so goes the broad argument, reduce corruption because competition increases the cost of actors to engage in corrupt practices. It increases the risk of exposure, provides non-corrupt alternatives for consumers, and introduces non-corrupt practices into the political and economic domains. Why then, has corruption persisted in the Central Eastern European countries decades after the introduction of political and economic competition in the early 1990s?
This dissertation asks how and why the emergence of competition in the political and economic domains leads to a transformation of the patterns of corruption. I define corruption as an act involving a public official who violates the norms or regulations of their office, receives some compensation in return, and thus harms the public interest.
I argue that under conditions of a communist past and high levels of uncertainty, the simultaneous emergence of political and economic competition transforms the opportunity structures of actors to engage in corruption. The resulting constellation of powerful incentives for and weak constraints against corruption encourages political and economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. Finally, the resource distribution between the actors in the corrupt state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges—legal corruption, local capture, or covert political financing.
To test the causal mechanism, I employ intensive process-tracing of the micro-causal mechanisms of eleven corruption cases in Poland and Hungary. Using paired comparisons of cases from the same business sector but at different points in time, the dissertation examines how corruption patterns transformed over time in Poland and Hungary.
The dissertation shows that the emergence of political and economic competition changes the opportunity structures of actors in favor of corruption. Moreover, the new constellation of incentives and constraints encourages political and economic actors to establish corrupt state-business relationships. Crucially, I find that the resource distribution within these corrupt relationships determines the type of corruption emerges—local capture where both sides have concentrated resources that balance each other out, legal corruption when a strong economic actor confronts a fragmented political actor, and covert political financing when a weak economic actor faces a strong political actor.
This dissertation asks how and why the emergence of competition in the political and economic domains leads to a transformation of the patterns of corruption. I define corruption as an act involving a public official who violates the norms or regulations of their office, receives some compensation in return, and thus harms the public interest.
I argue that under conditions of a communist past and high levels of uncertainty, the simultaneous emergence of political and economic competition transforms the opportunity structures of actors to engage in corruption. The resulting constellation of powerful incentives for and weak constraints against corruption encourages political and economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. Finally, the resource distribution between the actors in the corrupt state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges—legal corruption, local capture, or covert political financing.
To test the causal mechanism, I employ intensive process-tracing of the micro-causal mechanisms of eleven corruption cases in Poland and Hungary. Using paired comparisons of cases from the same business sector but at different points in time, the dissertation examines how corruption patterns transformed over time in Poland and Hungary.
The dissertation shows that the emergence of political and economic competition changes the opportunity structures of actors in favor of corruption. Moreover, the new constellation of incentives and constraints encourages political and economic actors to establish corrupt state-business relationships. Crucially, I find that the resource distribution within these corrupt relationships determines the type of corruption emerges—local capture where both sides have concentrated resources that balance each other out, legal corruption when a strong economic actor confronts a fragmented political actor, and covert political financing when a weak economic actor faces a strong political actor.
ContributorsKartner, Jennifer Joan (Author) / Warner, Carolyn (Thesis advisor) / Thies, Cameron (Committee member) / Von Hagen, Mark (Committee member) / Berliner, Daniel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
ContributorsHur, Jiyoun (Performer) / Lee, Juhyun (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-03-01
Description
Corruption is a growing issue in China that has only worsened in recent years due to the competition for power between the two foremost factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Tuanpai and Princelings. Based on a series of case studies of high-ranking Chinese officials, I analyze patterns of corruption employed by members of the two factions that enable them to gain power and authority within the CCP. This analysis argues that due to the high levels of intense corruption within China and the CCP, change in the form of small and gradual reform is the only way to battle this corruption without further threatening the legitimacy of the government. Small changes such as allowing the competition between factions to remain as a form of checks and balances for the government or allowing more freedom with social media will gain some trust back for the Chinese government. If drastic changes are made and all corrupt officials in the government are indicted, that may in turn destabilize the country by ruining all faith in the government and removing so many individuals who contribute to day-to-day governance. This analysis suggests that possible solutions must start small and gradually increase to maintain the stability and legitimacy of China and the CCP while also beginning to fight the corruption culture.
ContributorsLloyd, Jennifer Alexandra (Author) / Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Thesis director) / Bustikova-Siroky, Lenka (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2015-05
ContributorsZaleski, Kimberly (Contributor) / Kazarian, Trevor (Performer) / Ryan, Russell (Performer) / IN2ATIVE (Performer) / ASU Library. Music Library (Publisher)
Created2018-09-28
Description
The results in this research study shows that experience with corruption affects a person's behavior, although it does not impact their attitude towards corruption. Condemnation to both corruption and bribery is widespread amongst citizens of both countries; however, more Angolan citizens experienced bribe demands and confessed paying more bribes than Brazilians did. This paper studies the effect of corruption towards citizens by analyzing a sample of 200 surveyed Brazilians and Angolans. The surveys questioned participants about their (i.) experience with corruption by looking at the number of bribe demands, (ii.) attitudes by identifying their values or views towards corruption and bribery and finally (iii.) their behavior through their actions.
ContributorsFernandes, Domingas Manuela Da Fonseca (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12