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- All Subjects: Internal Controls
- All Subjects: Occupational Fraud
- Creators: Casas Arce, Pablo
- Creators: Lowe, Jordan
- Member of: Theses and Dissertations
Description
Within this paper I summarize the key features, and results, of research conducted to support the development, design, and implementation of an internal control system at a startup small business. These efforts were conducted for an Honors Thesis/Creative Project for Barrett, the Honors College at Arizona State University. The research revolved around deciding which financial policies, procedures, and safeguards could be useful in creating an internal control system for small businesses. In addition to academic research, I developed an “Internal Control Questionnaire” for use as a ‘jumping off point’ in conversations about a business’ existing accounting system. This questionnaire is applicable across many industries, covering the major topics which every small business/startup should consider.
The questionnaire was then used in conjunction with two interviews of small business owners. The interviews covered both the overall financial status of their business and their business’ pre-existing accounting system. The feedback received during these interviews was subsequently used to provide the business owners with eleven recommendations ranging from the implementation of new policies to verification of existing internal controls.
Finally, I summarize my findings, both academic and real-world, conveying that many small business owners do not implement formal internal control systems. I also discuss why the business owners, in this specific circumstance, did not yet implement the aforementioned eleven suggestions.
The questionnaire was then used in conjunction with two interviews of small business owners. The interviews covered both the overall financial status of their business and their business’ pre-existing accounting system. The feedback received during these interviews was subsequently used to provide the business owners with eleven recommendations ranging from the implementation of new policies to verification of existing internal controls.
Finally, I summarize my findings, both academic and real-world, conveying that many small business owners do not implement formal internal control systems. I also discuss why the business owners, in this specific circumstance, did not yet implement the aforementioned eleven suggestions.
ContributorsDuncan, Spencer James (Author) / Garverick, Michael (Thesis director) / Casas Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
Description
Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However, motivated reasoning theory predicts that reporting incentives will bias managers’ review in favor of estimates that are incentive consistent, and managers will selectively attend to information that supports their preferred conclusion, including their perceptions of the subordinate. Using experimental methods I manipulate the consistency of the subordinate estimate with management reporting incentives, and the narcissistic description of the subordinate. Consistent with motivated reasoning theory, I find that managers anchor on incentive consistent subordinate estimates, regardless of subordinate narcissism, but anchor less on incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, especially when the estimate comes from a narcissistic subordinate. I also find evidence that managers believe narcissistic subordinates act strategically in their own self-interest, and selectively attend to this belief to adjust away from incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, but not incentive consistent subordinate estimate. My results reveal two potential weaknesses in the management review process: susceptibility to subordinate anchors, and bias created by reporting incentives.
ContributorsHayes, Matthew J (Author) / Reckers, Philip (Thesis advisor) / Lowe, Jordan (Committee member) / Maksymov, Eldar (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016