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Description
As mobile devices have risen to prominence over the last decade, their importance has been increasingly recognized. Workloads for mobile devices are often very different from those on desktop and server computers, and solutions that worked in the past are not always the best fit for the resource- and energy-constrained

As mobile devices have risen to prominence over the last decade, their importance has been increasingly recognized. Workloads for mobile devices are often very different from those on desktop and server computers, and solutions that worked in the past are not always the best fit for the resource- and energy-constrained computing that characterizes mobile devices. While this is most commonly seen in CPU and graphics workloads, this device class difference extends to I/O as well. However, while a few tools exist to help analyze mobile storage solutions, there exists a gap in the available software that prevents quality analysis of certain research initiatives, such as I/O deduplication on mobile devices. This honors thesis will demonstrate a new tool that is capable of capturing I/O on the filesystem layer of mobile devices running the Android operating system, in support of new mobile storage research. Uniquely, it is able to capture both metadata of writes as well as the actual written data, transparently to the apps running on the devices. Based on a modification of the strace program, fstrace and its companion tool fstrace-replay can record and replay filesystem I/O of actual Android apps. Using this new tracing tool, several traces from popular Android apps such as Facebook and Twitter were collected and analyzed.
ContributorsMor, Omri (Author) / Zhao, Ming (Thesis director) / Zhao, Ziming (Committee member) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor, Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-05
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Description
The purpose of this project was to implement and analyze a new proposed rootkit that claims a greater level of stealth by hiding in cache. Today, the vast majority of embedded devices are powered by ARM processors. To protect their processors from attacks, ARM introduced a hardware security extension known

The purpose of this project was to implement and analyze a new proposed rootkit that claims a greater level of stealth by hiding in cache. Today, the vast majority of embedded devices are powered by ARM processors. To protect their processors from attacks, ARM introduced a hardware security extension known as TrustZone. It provides an isolated execution environment within the embedded device that enables us to run various memory integrity and malware detection tools to identify possible breaches in security to the normal world. Although TrustZone provides this additional layer of security, it also adds another layer of complexity, and thus comes with its own set of vulnerabilities. This new rootkit identifies and exploits a cache incoherence in the ARM device as a result of TrustZone. The newly proposed rootkit, called CacheKit, takes advantage of this cache incoherence to avoid memory introspection from tools in secure world. We implement CacheKit on the i.MX53 development board, which features a single ARM Cortex A8 processor, to analyze the limitations and vulnerabilities described in the original paper. We set up the Linux environment on the computer to be able to cross-compile for the development board which will be running the FreeScale android 2.3.4 platform with a 2.6.33 Linux kernel. The project is implemented as a kernel module that once installed on the board can manipulate cache as desired to conceal the rootkit. The module exploits the fact that in TrustZone, the secure world does not have access to the normal world cache. First, a technique known as Cache-asRAM is used to ensure that the rootkit is loaded only into cache of the normal world where it can avoid detection from the secure world. Then, we employ the cache maintenance instructions and resisters provided in the cp15 coprocessor to keep the code persistent in cache. Furthermore, the cache lines are mapped to unused I/O address space so that if cache content is flushed to RAM for inspection, the data is simply lost. This ensures that even if the rootkit were to be flushed into memory, any trace of the malicious code would be lost. CacheKit prevents defenders from analyzing the code and destroys any forensic evidence. This provides attackers with a new and powerful tool that is excellent for certain scenarios that were previously thought to be secure. Finally, we determine the limitations of the prototype to determine possible areas for future growth and research into the security of networked embedded devices.
ContributorsGutierrez Barnett, Mauricio Antonio (Author) / Zhao, Ziming (Thesis director) / Doupe, Adam (Committee member) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12