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One of the salient challenges of sustainability is the Tragedy of the Commons, where individuals acting independently and rationally deplete a common resource despite their understanding that it is not in the group's long term best interest to do so. Hardin presents this dilemma as nearly intractable and solvable only

One of the salient challenges of sustainability is the Tragedy of the Commons, where individuals acting independently and rationally deplete a common resource despite their understanding that it is not in the group's long term best interest to do so. Hardin presents this dilemma as nearly intractable and solvable only by drastic, government-mandated social reforms, while Ostrom's empirical work demonstrates that community-scale collaboration can circumvent tragedy without any elaborate outside intervention. Though more optimistic, Ostrom's work provides scant insight into larger-scale dilemmas such as climate change. Consequently, it remains unclear if the sustainable management of global resources is possible without significant government mediation. To investigate, we conducted two game theoretic experiments that challenged students in different countries to collaborate digitally and manage a hypothetical common resource. One experiment involved students attending Arizona State University and the Rochester Institute of Technology in the US and Mountains of the Moon University in Uganda, while the other included students at Arizona State and the Management Development Institute in India. In both experiments, students were randomly assigned to one of three production roles: Luxury, Intermediate, and Subsistence. Students then made individual decisions about how many units of goods they wished to produce up to a set maximum per production class. Luxury players gain the most profit (i.e. grade points) per unit produced, but they also emit the most externalities, or social costs, which directly subtract from the profit of everybody else in the game; Intermediate players produce a medium amount of profit and externalities per unit, and Subsistence players produce a low amount of profit and externalities per unit. Variables influencing and/or inhibiting collaboration were studied using pre- and post-game surveys. This research sought to answer three questions: 1) Are international groups capable of self-organizing in a way that promotes sustainable resource management?, 2) What are the key factors that inhibit or foster collective action among international groups?, and 3) How well do Hardin's theories and Ostrom's empirical models predict the observed behavior of students in the game? The results of gameplay suggest that international cooperation is possible, though likely sub-optimal. Statistical analysis of survey data revealed that heterogeneity and levels of trust significantly influenced game behavior. Specific traits of heterogeneity among students found to be significant were income, education, assigned production role, number of people in one's household, college class, college major, and military service. Additionally, it was found that Ostrom's collective action framework was a better predictor of game outcome than Hardin's theories. Overall, this research lends credence to the plausibility of international cooperation in tragedy of the commons scenarios such as climate change, though much work remains to be done.
ContributorsStanton, Albert Grayson (Author) / Clark, Susan Spierre (Thesis director) / Seager, Thomas (Committee member) / Civil, Environmental and Sustainable Engineering Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2014-12
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Recent years, there has been many attempts with different approaches to the human-robot interaction (HRI) problems. In this paper, the multi-agent interaction is formulated as a differential game with incomplete information. To tackle this problem, the parameter estimation method is utilized to obtain the approximated solution in a real time

Recent years, there has been many attempts with different approaches to the human-robot interaction (HRI) problems. In this paper, the multi-agent interaction is formulated as a differential game with incomplete information. To tackle this problem, the parameter estimation method is utilized to obtain the approximated solution in a real time basis. Previous studies in the parameter estimation made the assumption that the human parameters are known by the robot; but such may not be the case and there exists uncertainty in the modeling of the human rewards as well as human's modeling of the robot's rewards. The proposed method, empathetic estimation, is tested and compared with the ``non-empathetic'' estimation from the existing works. The case studies are conducted in an uncontrolled intersection with two agents attempting to pass efficiently. Results have shown that in the case of both agents having inconsistent belief of the other agent's parameters, the empathetic agent performs better at estimating the parameters and has higher reward values, which indicates the scenarios when empathy is essential: when agent's initial belief is mismatched from the true parameters/intent of the agents.
ContributorsChen, Yi (Author) / Ren, Yi (Thesis advisor) / Zhang, Wenlong (Committee member) / Yong, Sze Zheng (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021