Matching Items (8)
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- All Subjects: Game Theory
- All Subjects: Probability
- Creators: Lanchier, Nicolas
Description
One of the salient challenges of sustainability is the Tragedy of the Commons, where individuals acting independently and rationally deplete a common resource despite their understanding that it is not in the group's long term best interest to do so. Hardin presents this dilemma as nearly intractable and solvable only by drastic, government-mandated social reforms, while Ostrom's empirical work demonstrates that community-scale collaboration can circumvent tragedy without any elaborate outside intervention. Though more optimistic, Ostrom's work provides scant insight into larger-scale dilemmas such as climate change. Consequently, it remains unclear if the sustainable management of global resources is possible without significant government mediation. To investigate, we conducted two game theoretic experiments that challenged students in different countries to collaborate digitally and manage a hypothetical common resource. One experiment involved students attending Arizona State University and the Rochester Institute of Technology in the US and Mountains of the Moon University in Uganda, while the other included students at Arizona State and the Management Development Institute in India. In both experiments, students were randomly assigned to one of three production roles: Luxury, Intermediate, and Subsistence. Students then made individual decisions about how many units of goods they wished to produce up to a set maximum per production class. Luxury players gain the most profit (i.e. grade points) per unit produced, but they also emit the most externalities, or social costs, which directly subtract from the profit of everybody else in the game; Intermediate players produce a medium amount of profit and externalities per unit, and Subsistence players produce a low amount of profit and externalities per unit. Variables influencing and/or inhibiting collaboration were studied using pre- and post-game surveys. This research sought to answer three questions: 1) Are international groups capable of self-organizing in a way that promotes sustainable resource management?, 2) What are the key factors that inhibit or foster collective action among international groups?, and 3) How well do Hardin's theories and Ostrom's empirical models predict the observed behavior of students in the game? The results of gameplay suggest that international cooperation is possible, though likely sub-optimal. Statistical analysis of survey data revealed that heterogeneity and levels of trust significantly influenced game behavior. Specific traits of heterogeneity among students found to be significant were income, education, assigned production role, number of people in one's household, college class, college major, and military service. Additionally, it was found that Ostrom's collective action framework was a better predictor of game outcome than Hardin's theories. Overall, this research lends credence to the plausibility of international cooperation in tragedy of the commons scenarios such as climate change, though much work remains to be done.
ContributorsStanton, Albert Grayson (Author) / Clark, Susan Spierre (Thesis director) / Seager, Thomas (Committee member) / Civil, Environmental and Sustainable Engineering Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2014-12
Description
This paper uses network theory to simulate Nash equilibria for selfish travel within a traffic network. Specifically, it examines the phenomenon of Braess's Paradox, the counterintuitive occurrence in which adding capacity to a traffic network increases the social costs paid by travelers in a new Nash equilibrium. It also employs the measure of the price of anarchy, a ratio between the social cost of the Nash equilibrium flow through a network and the socially optimal cost of travel. These concepts are the basis of the theory behind undesirable selfish routing to identify problematic links and roads in existing metropolitan traffic networks (Youn et al., 2008), suggesting applicative potential behind the theoretical questions this paper attempts to answer. New topologies of networks which generate Braess's Paradox are found. In addition, the relationship between the number of nodes in a network and the number of occurrences of Braess's Paradox, and the relationship between the number of nodes in a network and a network's price of anarchy distribution are studied.
ContributorsChotras, Peter Louis (Author) / Armbruster, Dieter (Thesis director) / Lanchier, Nicolas (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
We model communication among social insects as an interacting particle system in which individuals perform one of two tasks and neighboring sites anti-mimic one another. Parameters of our model are a probability of defection 2 (0; 1) and relative cost ci > 0 to the individual performing task i. We examine this process on complete graphs, bipartite graphs, and the integers, answering questions about the relationship between communication, defection rates and the division of labor. Assuming the division of labor is ideal when exactly half of the colony is performing each task, we nd that on some bipartite graphs and the integers it can eventually be made arbitrarily close to optimal if defection rates are sufficiently small. On complete graphs the fraction of individuals performing each task is also closest to one half when there is no defection, but is bounded by a constant dependent on the relative costs of each task.
ContributorsArcuri, Alesandro Antonio (Author) / Lanchier, Nicolas (Thesis director) / Kang, Yun (Committee member) / Fewell, Jennifer (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
Serge Galams voting systems and public debate models are used to model voting behaviors of two competing opinions in democratic societies. Galam assumes that individuals in the population are independently in favor of one opinion with a fixed probability p, making the initial number of that type of opinion a binomial random variable. This analysis revisits Galams models from the point of view of the hypergeometric random variable by assuming the initial number of individuals in favor of an opinion is a fixed deterministic number. This assumption is more realistic, especially when analyzing small populations. Evolution of the models is based on majority rules, with a bias introduced when there is a tie. For the hier- archical voting system model, in order to derive the probability that opinion +1 would win, the analysis was done by reversing time and assuming that an individual in favor of opinion +1 wins. Then, working backwards we counted the number of configurations at the next lowest level that could induce each possible configuration at the level above, and continued this process until reaching the bottom level, i.e., the initial population. Using this method, we were able to derive an explicit formula for the probability that an individual in favor of opinion +1 wins given any initial count of that opinion, for any group size greater than or equal to three. For the public debate model, we counted the total number of individuals in favor of opinion +1 at each time step and used this variable to define a random walk. Then, we used first-step analysis to derive an explicit formula for the probability that an individual in favor of opinion +1 wins given any initial count of that opinion for group sizes of three. The spatial public debate model evolves based on the proportional rule. For the spatial model, the most natural graphical representation to construct the process results in a model that is not mathematically tractable. Thus, we defined a different graphical representation that is mathematically equivalent to the first graphical representation, but in this model it is possible to define a dual process that is mathematically tractable. Using this graphical representation we prove clustering in 1D and 2D and coexistence in higher dimensions following the same approach as for the voter model interacting particle system.
ContributorsTaylor, Nicole Robyn (Co-author) / Lanchier, Nicolas (Co-author, Thesis director) / Smith, Hal (Committee member) / Hurlbert, Glenn (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
We study two models of a competitive game in which players continuously receive points and wager them in one-on-one battles. In each model the loser of a battle has their points reset, while the points the winner receives is what sets the two models apart. In the knockout model the winner receives no new points, while in the winner-takes-all model the points that the loser had are added to the winner's total. Recurrence properties are assessed for both models: the knockout model is recurrent except for the all-zero state, and the winner-takes-all model is transient, but retains some aspect of recurrence. In addition, we study the population-level allocation of points; for the winner-takes-all model we show explicitly that the proportion of individuals having any number j of points, j=0,1,... approaches a stationary distribution that can be computed recursively. Graphs of numerical simulations are included to exemplify the results proved.
ContributorsVanKirk, Maxwell Joshua (Author) / Lanchier, Nicolas (Thesis director) / Foxall, Eric (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
This dissertation investigates the dynamics of evolutionary games based on the framework of interacting particle systems in which individuals are discrete, space is explicit, and dynamics are stochastic. Its focus is on 2-strategy games played on a d-dimensional integer lattice with a range of interaction M. An overview of related past work is given along with a summary of the dynamics in the mean-field model, which is described by the replicator equation. Then the dynamics of the interacting particle system is considered, first when individuals are updated according to the best-response update process and then the death-birth update process. Several interesting results are derived, and the differences between the interacting particle system model and the replicator dynamics are emphasized. The terms selfish and altruistic are defined according to a certain ordering of payoff parameters. In these terms, the replicator dynamics are simple: coexistence occurs if both strategies are altruistic; the selfish strategy wins if one strategy is selfish and the other is altruistic; and there is bistability if both strategies are selfish. Under the best-response update process, it is shown that there is no bistability region. Instead, in the presence of at least one selfish strategy, the most selfish strategy wins, while there is still coexistence if both strategies are altruistic. Under the death-birth update process, it is shown that regardless of the range of interactions and the dimension, regions of coexistence and bistability are both reduced. Additionally, coexistence occurs in some parameter region for large enough interaction ranges. Finally, in contrast with the replicator equation and the best-response update process, cooperators can win in the prisoner's dilemma for the death-birth process in one-dimensional nearest-neighbor interactions.
ContributorsEvilsizor, Stephen (Author) / Lanchier, Nicolas (Thesis advisor) / Kang, Yun (Committee member) / Motsch, Sebastien (Committee member) / Smith, Hal (Committee member) / Thieme, Horst (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
The Axelrod Model is an agent-based adaptive model. The Axelrod Model shows the eects of a mechanism of convergent social inuence. Do local conver- gences generate global polarization ? Will it be possible for all dierences between individuals in a population comprised of neighbors to disappear ? There are many mechanisms to approach this issue ; the Axelrod Model is one of them.
ContributorsYu, Yili (Author) / Lanchier, Nicolas (Thesis director) / Kang, Yun (Committee member) / Brooks, Dan (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
For fifty years, inquiry has attempted to capture how groups of people experience microaggression phenomena through multiple methodological and analytic applications grounded in psychology-influenced frameworks. Yet, despite theoretical advancements, the phenomenon has met criticisms trivializing its existence, falsifiability, and social significance. Unpacking possible interactive factors of a microaggressive moment invites a revisitation of the known and unknown pragmatic conditions that may produce and influence its discomforting situational “content.” This study employs an intentional, game-theoretic methodology based on brief, publicly-recorded, everyday conversation segments. Conversation segments of social interactions provide a means to conduct a mathematically-solid, computationally-tractable analysis of explaining what is happening during encounters where disability microaggressions are likely the result of partial (non)cooperation between communicators. Such analysis extends the microaggression research program (MRP) by: (1) proposing theoretical consequences for conversational repair phenomena, algorithmic programming, and experimental designs in negotiation research; and (2) outlining practical approaches for preventing microaggressions with new communication pedagogy, anti-oppression/de-escalation training programs, and calculable, focus-oriented psychotherapy. It concludes with an invitation for scholars to “be” in ambiguity so that they may speculate possible trajectories for the study of microaggressions as a communicative phenomenon.
ContributorsReutlinger, Corey Jon (Author) / de la Garza, Sarah Amira (Thesis advisor) / Alberts, Janet (Committee member) / Lanchier, Nicolas (Committee member) / Cherney, James L. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021