Matching Items (5)
Filtering by
- All Subjects: Bias
- All Subjects: Scientific Evidence
- Creators: Salerno, Jessica
- Creators: Berry, Megan Cheyenne
Description
Cultivation theory states that consuming television cultivates a social reality in the real world which aligns with the reality present in television. When the television show CSI was released, researchers studied a form of cultivation stemming from the show titled the "CSI Effect." One of the components of the CSI Effect is the tendency of those who watch CSI to be more likely to overestimate the presence of forensic evidence present in a trial and place more trust in such evidence. In recent years, several true crime documentaries that examined controversial cases have been released. In a similar vein of research conducted on CSI, the current study examines true crime documentaries and their possible impacts on viewers’ judgments and beliefs about the criminal justice system. In the current study, participants were provided with a mock case and asked about their perceptions of the case along with their viewership habits. While overall true crime documentary viewership did not influence judgments of evidence manipulation or perceptions of police, findings point to viewership of the targeted documentaries being associated with feelings of mistrust towards the criminal justice system overall, while the lesser-viewed documentaries correlated with judgments of strength and responsibility of the defendant in the case. One possible explanation is that individual characteristics may serve as the driving factor in how individuals choose what to watch when the popularity of the show is not as well-known.
ContributorsDoughty, Kathryn A (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
People often rely on experts' opinions and knowledge to inform their own decisions. This can be problematic, as expertise does not necessarily protect one from bias, and increased experience does not always increase an experts' accuracy (Cassidy & Buede, 2009; Goldberg, 1968; Molins et al., 2008). The nature of task characteristics of expert domains is associated with experts' performance (Shanteau 1992). The purpose of this thesis is to examine how people perceive experts in different disciplines, and to explore the factors that affect perceptions of expert objectivity. Perceptions of objectivity in 26 expert domains were examined. As hypothesized, higher ratings of clear and immediate feedback available to experts were associated with higher ratings of objectivity. However, other indicators of higher domain validity were not recognized by laypeople, such as higher levels of training and education. Contrary to our hypotheses, higher levels of familiarity with experts in a given domain and more experiences of disagreement with experts in a given domain were not associated with perceptions of objectivity. These results suggest that laypeople can correctly identify some indicators of the validity of different expert domains, but they cannot identify others. These perceptions affect how objectivity is perceived.
ContributorsVelez, Rebecca Ellen (Author) / Neal, Tess (Thesis director) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / School of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-12
Description
By providing vignettes with manipulated scientific evidence, this research examined if including more or less scientific detail affected decision-making in regards to the death penalty. Participants were randomly assigned one of the two manipulations (less science and more science) after reading a short scenario introducing the mock capital trial and their role as jury members. Survey respondents were told that a jury had previously found the defendant guilty and they would now deliberate the appropriate punishment. Before being exposed to the manipulation, respondents answered questions pertaining to their prior belief in the death penalty, as well as their level of support of procedural justice and science. These questions provided a baseline to compare to their sentencing decision. Participants were then asked what sentence they would impose \u2014 life in prison or death \u2014 and how the fMRI evidence presented by an expert witness for the defense affected their decision. Both quantitative and qualitative measures were used to identify how the level of scientific detail affected their decision. Our intended predictor variable (level of scientific detail) did not affect juror decision-making. In fact, the qualitative results revealed a variety of interpretations of the scientific evidence used both in favor of death and in favor of life. When looking at what did predict juror decision-making, gender, prior belief in the death penalty, and political ideology all were significant predictors. As in previous literature, the fMRI evidence in our study had mixed results with regards to implementation of the death penalty. This held true in both of our manipulations, showing that despite the level of detail in evidence intended for mitigation, jurors with preconceived notions may still disregard the evidence, and some jurors may even view it is aggravating and thus increase the likelihood of a death sentence for a defendant with such brain abnormalities.
ContributorsBerry, Megan Cheyenne (Author) / Fradella, Hank (Thesis director) / Pardini, Dustin (Committee member) / Department of Psychology (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
There is conflicting evidence regarding whether a biasing effect of neuroscientific evidence exists. Early research warned of such bias, but more recent papers dispute such claims, with some suggesting a bias only occurs in situations of relative judgment, but not in situations of absolute judgment. The current studies examined the neuroimage bias within both criminal and civil court case contexts, specifically exploring if a bias is dependent on the context in which the neuroimage evidence is presented (i.e. a single expert vs. opposing experts). In the first experiment 408 participants read a criminal court case summary in which either one expert witness testified (absolute judgment) or two experts testified (relative judgment). The experts presented neurological evidence in the form of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data and the evidence type varied between a brain image and a graph. A neuroimage bias was found, in that jurors who were exposed to two experts were more punitive when the prosecution presented the image and less punitive when the defense did. In the second experiment 240 participants read a summary of a civil court case in which either a single expert witness testified or two experts testified. The experts presented fMRI data to support or refute a claim of chronic pain and the evidence type again varied between image and graph. The expected neuroimage bias was not found, in that jurors were more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff when either side proffered the image, but more likely to find for the defense when only graphs were offered by the experts. These findings suggest that the introduction of neuroimages as evidence may affect jurors punitiveness in criminal cases, as well as liability decisions in civil cases and overall serves to illustrate that the influence of neuroscientific information on legal decision makers is more complex than originally thought.
ContributorsHafdahl, Riquel J (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas (Thesis advisor) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / Neal, Tess (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
Individuals are often susceptible to bias in their given fields; however, they may not acknowledge nor be aware of this phenomenon. Moreover, people typically can recognize bias in others yet fail to realize that they themselves are susceptible to their own bias. This is referred to as the bias blind spot, an unconscious meta-cognitive bias. Unconscious bias can lead to impaired decisions and can cause problems in the field, especially if professionals are defensive about bias mitigation procedures if they see them as unnecessary and threatening. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and examine the perceptions that professional forensic psychologists have about bias in themselves and bias in their colleagues. Eighty-four professional forensic psychologists were surveyed and asked about their perception of bias in themselves, their colleagues, an average adult, and experts in another domain: forensic science. For this study, these forensic psychologists were asked to predict the bias that they themselves might have in their judgment, that forensic scientists might have in their judgment, and that the average adult would have. As hypothesized, and consistent with the bias blind spot, professional forensic psychologists rated their peers in the same field as having a higher amount of bias in their decisions than they themselves. Moreover, they also rated other professionals in similar fields (forensic science) as having a higher bias rate than themselves. In addition, participants rated bias mitigating procedures as being a higher threat to their field than a different domain (i.e., forensic science) – consistent with hypotheses. These results suggest that professional forensic psychologists are susceptible to the bias blind spot and its consequences.
Keywords: implicit bias, bias blind spot, perceptions, judgment, mitigating procedures
Keywords: implicit bias, bias blind spot, perceptions, judgment, mitigating procedures
ContributorsVelazquez, Annelisse Danielle (Author) / Neal, Tess (Thesis director) / Salerno, Jessica (Committee member) / School of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Contributor) / School of Social Transformation (Contributor) / School of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Contributor, Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05