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Recently, philosophers have charged that Aristotelian-based virtue theories are empirically inadequate because the conception of character in which they are grounded is largely unfounded by findings in psychology. These philosophers argue in favor of situationism, the theory from social psychology that situational rather than dispositional differences among individuals are in

Recently, philosophers have charged that Aristotelian-based virtue theories are empirically inadequate because the conception of character in which they are grounded is largely unfounded by findings in psychology. These philosophers argue in favor of situationism, the theory from social psychology that situational rather than dispositional differences among individuals are in large part responsible for human behavior. Situationists dispute the existence of traits that remain consistent across time and diverse situations and argue that features of situations can better explain and predict human behavior. After analyzing the psychological literature and historical cases put forth as evidence for situationism as well as the basic premises grounding arguments against situationism, I make some conclusions about the best responses to situationism. I agree with situationists that Aristotelian-based virtue and character are not quite empirically adequate but disagree that human behavior owes more to situational rather than dispositional determinants. Basing my theory on literature from social psychology, I argue instead that a concept of character grounded in social-cognitive theory is more psychologically realistic and can explain and predict human behavior and ground a character-based virtue theory. A social-cognitive conception of character would highlight the dynamic role between situations and individual psychological factors like beliefs, values, desires and the way that an individual perceives a situation. I sketch out a non-ideal theory of virtue based in a social-cognitive conception of character that is partially dependent on social networks for its maintenance and is fragmented, or contextualized to particular types of psychological situations. However, fragmented and socially dependent virtue is not an optimal type of virtue because it is vulnerable to situational features that place strong psychological pressures on agents to behave in various ways, including ways they would not have normally endorsed. I agree with Aristotelian virtue ethicists that argue that a type of practical wisdom can help to counter the often unwanted and dangerous influence of these strong situations but also maintain that some measure of moral luck is inevitably involved, even in the development of practical wisdom.
ContributorsValadez, Mayra (Author) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Thesis advisor) / Walker, Margaret U (Committee member) / French, Peter A. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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This dissertation puts forth an account of moral responsibility. The central claim defended is that an agent's responsibility supervenes on the agent's mental states at the time of the action. I call the mental states that determine responsibility the agent's quality of will (QOW). QOW is taken to concern the

This dissertation puts forth an account of moral responsibility. The central claim defended is that an agent's responsibility supervenes on the agent's mental states at the time of the action. I call the mental states that determine responsibility the agent's quality of will (QOW). QOW is taken to concern the agent's action, understood from an internal perspective, along with the agent's motivations, her actual beliefs about the action, and the beliefs she ought to have had about the action. This approach to responsibility has a number of surprising implications. First, blameworthiness can come apart from wrongness, and praiseworthiness from rightness. This is because responsibility is an internal notion and rightness and wrongness are external notions. Furthermore, agents can only be responsible for their QOW. It follows that agents cannot be responsible for the consequences of their actions. I further argue that one's QOW is determined by what one cares about. And the fact that we react to the QOW of others with morally reactive emotions, such as resentment and gratitude, shows that we care about QOW. The reactive attitudes can therefore be understood as ways in which we care about what others care about. Responsibility can be assessed by comparing one's actual QOW to the QOW one ought to have had.
ContributorsKhoury, Andrew (Author) / French, Peter A. (Thesis advisor) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Portmore, Douglas W. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
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Drawing on existing scholarship as well as primary analytical materials, the research within this report demonstrates Wile E. Coyote's character is reliant on human connectivity and is evocative of the human condition, reflecting his disciplined and stylized design he possesses. Comprised of literary, film/media, and rhetorical elements, this report illustrates

Drawing on existing scholarship as well as primary analytical materials, the research within this report demonstrates Wile E. Coyote's character is reliant on human connectivity and is evocative of the human condition, reflecting his disciplined and stylized design he possesses. Comprised of literary, film/media, and rhetorical elements, this report illustrates how Wile E. is an individual whose character holds various influences that provide dimensionality to his existence. The research within this report is both primary and secondary through observational recordings about the cartoons Wile E. appears in and through thorough analysis of texts elaborating on the elements comprising Wile E.'s character. Primary research from the initial observational recordings provides direction for the secondary research after viewing multiple cartoons and films containing Wile E. Coyote in his Warner Brothers Studios appearances and noting unique moments in his cinematic career. The notes from this viewing of Wile E. in his natural "habitat" drive the secondary research to focus on specific aspects of Wile E.'s character through the analysis of supporting texts which ultimately leads to the findings within this report. Research in the fields of literature, film/media studies, and rhetoric shape the analysis of Wile E.'s character as this report studies the various components compiled within the cartoon coyote. As a multifaceted individual, Wile E. illustrates a complexity within a stylized character that allows viewers to connect to his plights and to identify with his struggles. Through his emulative form, Wile E. embodies vital elements of character creation that allow him to become a memorable and prominent character that resonates in viewers and artists. From Wile E. Coyote's example, future generations of story tellers, regardless of their medium, can learn how to create similarly iconic and timeless characters within their works. Such stories can then contribute significant additions to popular narrative and characterization.
ContributorsGarza, Christopher Aaron (Author) / Baldini, Cajsa (Thesis director) / Mack, Robert (Committee member) / Sandler, Kevin (Committee member) / Department of English (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05