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- All Subjects: International relations
- Creators: Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah
Description
East Asia in the aftermath of the Cold War might provide the most favorable case for realist theory due to historical rivalries, territorial disputes, economic competition, great power politics and deep-rooted realist beliefs among politicians in the region. Yet the fundamental realist prediction of balance of power in the region has not materialized. Neither internal nor external balancing in their original senses is explicitly present. This poses a serious challenge to realism and more broadly, western international relations theories for understanding regional dynamics. Several explanations have been put forward in previous research, such as a total rejection of the applicability of realism for explaining East Asian politics, modifying realism by adding new variables, and focusing on domestic variables. Using a neoclassical realist term, underbalancing, this dissertation goes beyond neoclassical realist theory of underbalancing by reintroducing the distinction between external and internal balancing, which has direct implications for the resources needed for a balancing policy and external reactions to balancing policy. In particular, this approach emphasizes the effect of interaction between states on underbalancing. By doing so, it also highlights what is omitted by realism, namely, the agency of the targeted state at risk of being balanced. In other words, the policy of the state that is aware of its risk of being balanced could draw upon foreign policy tools it possesses to neutralize the balancing efforts from others. This notion of state policies influencing the outcome of balance of power is tested with post-Cold War East Asian politics. The cases included China-Japan and China-ASEAN strategic interactions after the Cold War. Based on materials from public media outlets, official documents and recently leaked U.S. diplomatic cables, this dissertation argues that China's policies towards neighboring states- policies expressed variously through cultural, diplomatic, economic and security initiatives- are indispensable to explain the fact of underbalancing in the region.
ContributorsChi, Zhipei (Author) / Simon, Sheldon (Thesis advisor) / Rush, James (Committee member) / Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces using the economic theory of the firm. To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency. The bargaining power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is assessed by two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of those rights. These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system. In the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the military; and the more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control. Thus, the dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered to act against the regime. To minimize this threat, the dictator may choose to default on the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at the cost to the regime’s credibility and reputation, later impacting a military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis. The cycle of repression captures the various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed forces providing insights into institutional changes governing the relationship. As such, this project furthers our understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military relations and contributes conceptual tools for future studies.
ContributorsZerba, Shaio Hui (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis advisor) / Wood, Reed (Committee member) / Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
How do political elites perceive regional intergovernmental organizations that seek to promote democracy? When do political elites view regional intergovernmental institutions promoting democracy as legitimate? Many informal and formal types of regional intergovernmental institutions have sought to spread democracy. However, previous research on the nexus of regional intergovernmental institutions and democracy has focused primarily on the latter. Furthermore, these studies claim that membership in these formal international institutions (a.k.a. international organizations) increases the likelihood of the democratic survival of a newly democratic regime. Membership in these organizations provides a seal of approval that the newly democratic country intends to remain democratic. This kind of external validation should dissuade spoilers from undermining the transition and encourage ordinary people to support the transitional regime. This argument assumes that the domestic audience trusts this organization and believes it plays a vital role in society. Whether elites have confidence that the regional organization can positively impact democratic consolidation and how they perceive different types of regional organizations promoting democracy are empirical questions. This project seeks to answer these questions through a small sample and non-population-based elite survey experiment in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. I also run a laboratory survey experiment with a larger sample of university students, giving me the opportunity for statistical power. The results suggest that political elites are skeptical of regional intergovernmental bodies promoting democracy. Meanwhile, non-elites consider regional institutions promoting democracy illegitimate when they are informal, i.e., no written shared expectations, rules, and permanent secretariat. When regional interstate cooperation on democracy operates under a formal procedure or codified in an international treaty and supported by a permanent secretariat, non-elites tend to consider them more legitimate.
ContributorsSari, Angguntari Ceria (Author) / Thies, Cameron G. (Thesis advisor) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis advisor) / Neuner, Fabian (Committee member) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022