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- All Subjects: International relations
- Creators: Siroky, David
- Creators: Thies, Cameron
Description
This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces using the economic theory of the firm. To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency. The bargaining power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is assessed by two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of those rights. These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system. In the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the military; and the more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control. Thus, the dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered to act against the regime. To minimize this threat, the dictator may choose to default on the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at the cost to the regime’s credibility and reputation, later impacting a military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis. The cycle of repression captures the various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed forces providing insights into institutional changes governing the relationship. As such, this project furthers our understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military relations and contributes conceptual tools for future studies.
ContributorsZerba, Shaio Hui (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis advisor) / Wood, Reed (Committee member) / Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
Genocide studies have traditionally focused on the perpetrator’s intent to eradicate a particular identity-based group, using the Holocaust as their model and point of comparison. Although some aspects of the Holocaust were undoubtedly unique, recent scholars have sought to challenge the notion that it was a singular phenomenon. Instead, they draw attention to a recurring pattern of genocidal events throughout history by shifting the focus from intent to structure. One particular branch of scholars seeks to connect the ideology and tactics of imperialism with certain genocidal events. These anti-imperialist genocide scholars concede that their model cannot account for all genocides, but still claim that it creates meaningful connections between genocides committed by Western colonialist powers and those that have occurred in a neoimperialist world order shaped according to Western interests. The latter includes genocides in postcolonial states, which these scholars believe were shaped by the scars of their colonial past, as well as genocides in which imperial hegemons assisted local perpetrators. Imperialist and former colonial powers have contributed meaningfully to all of these kinds of genocides, yet their contributions have largely been ignored due to their own influence on the creation of the current international order. Incorporating the anti-imperialist perspective into the core doctrine of genocide studies may lead to breakthroughs in areas of related policy and practice, such as prevention and accountability.
ContributorsParker, Ashleigh Mae (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis director) / Sivak, Henry (Committee member) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Social Transformation (Contributor) / Department of English (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
Description
While the negative humanitarian effects of sanctions are widely known, scholars and policymakers often assume these costs are geographically localized. This research questions these assertions by examining the relationship between economic sanctions and refugee flight. I argue that the imposition of sanctions produces refugees for two reasons. First, in the face of rising prices and stagnant wages, people are forced to leave in order to survive. Second, sanctions increase the level of state-sponsored repression, forcing refugees to flee political violence. The empirical results offer initial support for this theory and suggest that sanctions may promote a contagion effect that could have negative consequences for regional economic and political stability.
ContributorsTruax, Timothy Christian (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis director) / Wood, Reed (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
Civil society, when taken as a whole, is a complex phenomenon that incorporates several movements and can be accompanied with international support. For instance in 1987, 40 NGOs (non-governmental organizations) were registered by the government, and within 25 years, the number has increased to 300,000 in the present day Russian Federation. These numbers only include registered organizations, and do not count unregistered organizations, as approved under article 3 "Public organizations...can function without state registration and acquiring of the rights of registered legal body," or organizations that have been refused registration, such as the "Marriage Equality Russia" NGO that was denied registration in 2010. Thus the total amount of NGOs is significantly higher than 300,000. Every one of these NGOs "contribute to Russia‘s economic, political and social life in numerous ways and provide opportunities for citizens to help create better communities and elevate their voices" ("USAID in Russia"). With hundreds of thousands of organizations attempting to make a better society, they are creating a Russian civil society, one that could use the experience of countries with already well-established civil societies (Walzer). Walzer, however, notes the importance for civil society of political engagement with the state (317). In this thesis, I argue that the LGBT movement in Russia today has set an important example for other groups in civil society through its willingness to take on the Russian state through demonstrations and to use the state through the EU Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
ContributorsMark, Daniel (Author) / Hoogenboom, Hilde (Thesis director) / Hagen, V. Mark (Committee member) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (Contributor)
Created2012-12
Description
Recognition of sovereignty provides the means by which states have their independence and sovereignty formalized. In cases of secessionist conflict, the decision to grant or withhold recognition of a new state is forced upon the international system, unlike cases that deal with decolonization or internationally imposed partition. Recognition therefore provides a means by which members of the international system can curate the potential international membership from a set of new secessionist states. A central feature of this curatorial function is that it does not proceed evenly, multilaterally, or simultaneously across all cases. Instead, curation proceeds along hegemonic lines in a Gramscian sense: recognition is granted by great powers that lead particular hegemonic systems in an effort to expand their images of social order to new states. These fractures are expressed clearly in cases of split or contested recognition. The paper proceeds from a discussion of secession since the end of the Cold War, then assesses the input of contemporary literature, and ends with the suggestion of curation as a new means to understand the dynamics of international recognition.
ContributorsInglis, Cody James (Author) / Siroky, David (Thesis director) / Bustikova, Lenka (Committee member) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2015-12
Description
In this dissertation, I investigate the causes of differences in the use of suicide terror by non-state armed groups, including magnitude of use, targeting decisions, and how reliant groups are on suicide attacks. I develop and test the propositions that the age of groups and the capability of the state military they face significantly impact the scale of use and targeting selection of their suicide attacks. Older groups are predicted to carry out a decreased number of suicide attacks in comparison with younger groups, but increase their focus on attacking hard targets and decrease their focus on attacking soft targets, due to older groups being more likely to possess skilled terror operatives and to follow traditional guerrilla warfare practices. Groups that began using suicide terror later in their existence are predicted to carry out less suicide attacks than groups that adopt the tactic earlier in their histories, due to organizations having increased reliance on established practices and procedures. Groups fighting strong state militaries are predicted to carry out more suicide attacks, a higher proportion of attacks on soft targets, and be more reliant on suicide terror than are groups fighting weak militaries, as increased military pressure on groups decreases the effectiveness of their individual attacks, reduces their ability to train skilled operatives, and increases their desperation and incentive to use unconventional tactics. I conduct a quantitative analysis of 140 groups from 1998-2012 and find that older groups and groups that adopt suicide terror later in their existence carry out less suicide attacks than younger groups and groups that adopt suicide terror earlier in their histories. I also find that groups respond to increases in state military personnel by carrying out more suicide attacks overall, a higher proportion of suicide attacks against soft targets, a lower proportion against hard targets, and by becoming more reliant on suicide terror. These dynamics are also illustrated in depth through case study analysis of suicide terror campaigns by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which represent two distinct models of suicide terror.
ContributorsGoldenberg, Samuel Klapper (Author) / Wood, Reed (Thesis advisor) / Wright, Thorin (Thesis advisor) / Peterson, Timothy (Committee member) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
When does coercion succeed in international relations? Why do states resist coercion in some cases but concede in others? This dissertation adopts network analysis to investigate the network factors influencing the success and failure of economic and military coercion. The first chapter addresses the coercion target states’ information problem regarding how coercers would react to the targets’ resistances and concessions. By regarding resistances and concessions as network ties that can transmit information, it argues that past coercion outcomes endogenously influence targets’ current responses and coercion outcomes. Specifically, target states are more likely to concede to coercers who have been successful in gaining others’ compliance. Sender states are more likely to succeed in coercion when they had successful coercion in the past. The second chapter adds a condition to the first chapter’s argument. It argues that when being coerced by the same sender, a stronger sanction target’s compliance is likely to prompt a weaker target’s acquiescence, and that a weaker target’s resistance is likely to prompt a stronger target’s resistance. The third chapter explores how states’ positions in international security and economic networks influence the success and failure of military and trade coercion. States that occupy different network positions own different network power. I argue that when the coercion sender has relatively more network power than the target, the more likely coercion will be successful. I use interstate military alliances and arms transfer data to operationalize international security networks. International economic networks are operationalized by bilateral trade and regional trade agreements networks. Using military and trade coercion outcomes in the Military Compellent Threats (MCT) and the Threats and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) datasets as outcome variables, the statistical analysis partially supports my argument. Trade coercion is more likely to succeed when the sender has more network power. However, military coercion is less likely to succeed when the sender has more network power than the target.
ContributorsAi, Weining (Author) / Peterson, Timothy (Thesis advisor) / Thies, Cameron (Committee member) / Thomson, Henry (Committee member) / Chyzh, Olga (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
This dissertation grapples with the dynamics of intractable conflicts, especially those fought on religious grounds. Intractable conflicts are conceptualized as those which are particularly resistant to resolution. They tend to widen in scope, grow in destructive intensity, and even lengthen in duration. Traditional conflict resolution techniques such as negotiation and mediation fail to manage or resolve such conflicts. Tangible issues with intangible salience are difficult to be resolved peacefully. Disagreements over religion have intangible significance, meaning they are difficult or impossible to define, understand and divide. They result in indivisible bargains, which subsequently lead to intense, persistent and hence, intractable conflicts. Existing literature mostly compares religious and non-religious conflicts and overlook the variations within religious conflicts, especially among different religious causes and their effects on conflict intractability. Operationalizing intractable conflicts in terms of their intensity and duration, I concentrate on conflicts between two world religions – Hinduism and Islam in India. Using the Varshney-Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India (1950-1995) and Mitra and Ray’s (2014) extension of the same dataset (1996-2000), I classify religious conflicts into four types – (1) Conflicts over Sacred Sites, (2) Animal Slaughter, (3) Religious Festivities and (4) Mixed. I hypothesize that compared to the latter three conflicts, any conflict that involves Sacred Sites results in greater intensity and duration and hence, will be the most intractable. Moreover, in comparison to non-religious conflicts, the same holds true. My findings confirm these hypotheses and additionally demonstrate the varied effects that each of these types have on conflict intensity and duration.
ContributorsMukherjee, Chirasree (Author) / Thomas, George (Thesis advisor) / Siroky, David (Committee member) / Fox, Jonathan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
How do religion and ethnicity shape the sustainability of peace after civil wars? Ethnic and religious conflicts have been rising in prevalence over the last half-century, generating larger headlines as they influence every corner of the world. These conflicts occur across faiths, sects, and nations, and they appear to reignite in intervals, devolving into conflict again and again with spells of relative peace in between. With some notable exceptions, previous research on conflict recurrence has focused primarily on either ethnicity or religion, resulting in limited understanding of the ways that religion and ethnicity may interact. Moreover, many studies simplify the study of religion, ethnicity, and conflict by reducing it to an issue of shared identity, i.e., whether the two warring parties are from the same nominal religious or ethnic group. This project explores the role that religion and ethnicity play in three major causes of conflict recurrence: post-war autonomy, peacetime discrimination, and territorial claims. The primary argument is that religious and ethnic identities drive conflict recurrence through territorial claims, achieving autonomy, and their reactions to discrimination. Using a stratified Cox Proportional Hazard model, I analyze global data on all post-intrastate armed conflict peace years between 1980 and 2006. The results suggest that the indivisibility of territory in religious conflicts makes conflict more likely to recur, but only in cases where the fundamental question at hand is the role of religion in government. In addition, conflicts organized around ethnicity are increasingly unlikely to respond to discrimination by returning to war. The extreme scarcity of post-war autonomy arrangements rendered robust conclusions about its effect difficult to discern.
ContributorsTarr, Nathan (Author) / Siroky, David (Thesis advisor) / Warner, Carolyn (Committee member) / Wright, Thorin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
Description
Operational code analysis (OCA) is a common method of content analysis within the foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature used to determine the “operational code” of state leaders and, by extension, the foreign policy behaviors of their respective state. It has been tried and tested many times before, on many different world leaders from many different time periods, to predict what the foreign policy behavior of a state/organization might be based on the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of their leader about the political universe. This paper, however, questions if there might be types of politicians that OCA, conducted using the automated Verbs In Context System (VICS), has problems delivering accurate results for. More specifically, I have theoretical reasons for thinking that populist leaders, who engage in a populist style of communication, confound VICS’ analysis primarily because the simplistic speaking style of populists obscures an underlying context (and by extension meaning) to that leader’s words. Because the computer cannot understand this underlying context and takes the meaning of the words said at face value, it fails to code the speeches of populists accurately and thus makes inaccurate predictions about that leader’s foreign policy. To test this theory, I conduct the content analysis on speeches made by three individuals: Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and Narendra Modi, before and after they became the executives of their respective countries, and compared them to a “norming “ group representing the average world leader. The results generally support my hypotheses but with a few caveats. For the cases of Trump and Johnson, VICS found them to be a lot more cooperative than what I would expect, but it was also able to track changes in their operational code - as they transition into the role of chief executive – in the expected direction. The opposite was the case for Modi’s operational code. All-in-all, I provide suggestive evidence that OCA using VICS has trouble providing valid results for populist leaders.
ContributorsLuengas, David Leonardo (Author) / Thies, Cameron (Thesis advisor) / Lewis, Paul (Committee member) / Wright, Thorin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020