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Many wildlife species that are essential to human livelihoods are targeted with the aim of extracting short-term benefits. Overexploitation, resulting from failed common-pool resource governance, has endangered the sustainability of large animal species, in particular. Rights-based approaches to wildlife conservation offer a possible path forward. In a wildlife market, property

Many wildlife species that are essential to human livelihoods are targeted with the aim of extracting short-term benefits. Overexploitation, resulting from failed common-pool resource governance, has endangered the sustainability of large animal species, in particular. Rights-based approaches to wildlife conservation offer a possible path forward. In a wildlife market, property rights, or shares of an animal population, are allocated to resource users with interests in either harvest or preservation. Here, I apply the Social-Ecological Systems (SES) framework (Ostrom, 2009) to identify the conditions under which the ecological, social, and economic outcomes of a conservation market are improved compared to the status quo. I first consider three case studies (Bighorn sheep, white rhino, and Atlantic Bluefin tuna) all of which employ different market mechanisms. Based on the SES framework and these case studies, I then evaluate whether markets are a feasible management option for other socially and ecologically significant species, such as whales (and similar highly migratory species), and whether market instruments are capable of accommodating non-consumptive environmental values in natural resource decision making. My results suggest that spatial and temporal distribution, ethical and cultural relevance, and institutional histories compatible with commodification of wildlife are key SES subsystem variables. Successful conservation markets for cross-boundary marine species, such as whales, sea turtles, and sharks, will require intergovernmental agreements.
ContributorsSturm, Melanie (Author) / Minteer, Ben A (Thesis advisor) / Gerber, Leah R. (Thesis advisor) / Perrings, Charles (Committee member) / York, Abigail (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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Description
This dissertation consists of three substantive chapters. The first substantive chapter investigates the premature harvesting problem in fisheries. Traditionally, yield-per-recruit analysis has been used to both assess and address the premature harvesting of fish stocks. However, the fact that fish size often affects the unit price suggests that this approach

This dissertation consists of three substantive chapters. The first substantive chapter investigates the premature harvesting problem in fisheries. Traditionally, yield-per-recruit analysis has been used to both assess and address the premature harvesting of fish stocks. However, the fact that fish size often affects the unit price suggests that this approach may be inadequate. In this chapter, I first synthesize the conventional yield-per-recruit analysis, and then extend this conventional approach by incorporating a size-price function for a revenue-per-recruit analysis. An optimal control approach is then used to derive a general bioeconomic solution for the optimal harvesting of a short-lived single cohort. This approach prevents economically premature harvesting and provides an "optimal economic yield". By comparing the yield- and revenue-per-recruit management strategies with the bioeconomic management strategy, I am able to test the economic efficiency of the conventional yield-per-recruit approach. This is illustrated with a numerical study. It shows that a bioeconomic strategy can significantly improve economic welfare compared with the yield-per-recruit strategy, particularly in the face of high natural mortality. Nevertheless, I find that harvesting on a revenue-per-recruit basis improves management policy and can generate a rent that is close to that from bioeconomic analysis, in particular when the natural mortality is relatively low.

The second substantive chapter explores the conservation potential of a whale permit market under bounded economic uncertainty. Pro- and anti-whaling stakeholders are concerned about a recently proposed, "cap and trade" system for managing the global harvest of whales. Supporters argue that such an approach represents a novel solution to the current gridlock in international whale management. In addition to ethical objections, opponents worry that uncertainty about demand for whale-based products and the environmental benefits of conservation may make it difficult to predict the outcome of a whale share market. In this study, I use population and economic data for minke whales to examine the potential ecological consequences of the establishment of a whale permit market in Norway under bounded but significant economic uncertainty. A bioeconomic model is developed to evaluate the influence of economic uncertainties associated with pro- and anti- whaling demands on long-run steady state whale population size, harvest, and potential allocation. The results indicate that these economic uncertainties, in particular on the conservation demand side, play an important role in determining the steady state ecological outcome of a whale share market. A key finding is that while a whale share market has the potential to yield a wide range of allocations between conservation and whaling interests - outcomes in which conservationists effectively "buy out" the whaling industry seem most likely.

The third substantive chapter examines the sea lice externality between farmed fisheries and wild fisheries. A central issue in the debate over the effect of fish farming on the wild fisheries is the nature of sea lice population dynamics and the wild juvenile mortality rate induced by sea lice infection. This study develops a bioeconomic model that integrates sea lice population dynamics, fish population dynamics, aquaculture and wild capture salmon fisheries in an optimal control framework. It provides a tool to investigate sea lice control policy from the standpoint both of private aquaculture producers and wild fishery managers by considering the sea lice infection externality between farmed and wild fisheries. Numerical results suggest that the state trajectory paths may be quite different under different management regimes, but approach the same steady state. Although the difference in economic benefits is not significant in the particular case considered due to the low value of the wild fishery, I investigate the possibility of levying a tax on aquaculture production for correcting the sea lice externality generated by fish farms.
ContributorsHuang, Biao (Author) / Abbott, Joshua K (Thesis advisor) / Perrings, Charles (Thesis advisor) / Gerber, Leah R. (Committee member) / Muneepeerakul, Rachata (Committee member) / Schoon, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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Description
Environmental agencies often want to accomplish additional objectives beyond their central environmental protection objective. This is laudable; however it begets a need for understanding the additional challenges and trade-offs involved in doing so. The goal of this thesis is to examine the trade-offs involved in two such cases that have

Environmental agencies often want to accomplish additional objectives beyond their central environmental protection objective. This is laudable; however it begets a need for understanding the additional challenges and trade-offs involved in doing so. The goal of this thesis is to examine the trade-offs involved in two such cases that have received considerable attention recently. The two cases I examine are (1) the protection of multiple environmental goods (e.g., bundles of ecosystem services); and (2) the use of payments for ecosystem services as a poverty reduction mechanism. In the first case (chapter 2), I build a model based on the fact that efforts to protect one environmental good often increase or decrease the levels of other environmental goods, what I refer to as "cobenefits" and "disbenefits" respectively. There is often a desire to increase the cobenefits of environmental protection efforts in order to synergize across conservation efforts; and there is also a desire to decrease disbenefits because they are seen as negative externalities of protection efforts. I show that as a result of reciprocal externalities between environmental protection efforts, environmental agencies likely have a disincentive to create cobenefits, but may actually have an incentive to decrease disbenefits. In the second case (chapter 3), I model an environmental agency that wants to increase environmental protection, but would also like to reduce poverty. The model indicates that in theory, the trade-offs between these two goals may depend on relevant parameters of the system, particularly the ratio of the price of monitoring to participant's compliance cost. I show that when the ratio of monitoring costs to compliance cost is higher, trade-offs between environmental protection and poverty reduction are likely to be smaller. And when the ratio of monitoring costs to compliance costs is lower, trade-offs are likely to be larger. This thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of the trade-offs faced by environmental agencies that want to pursue secondary objectives of protecting additional environmental goods or reducing poverty.
ContributorsGilliland, Ted (Author) / Perrings, Charles (Thesis advisor) / Abbott, Josh K (Committee member) / Kinzig, Ann P (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description

This brief article, written for a symposium on "Collaboration and the Colorado River," evaluates the U.S. Department of the Interior's Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program ("AMP"). The AMP has been advanced as a pioneering collaborative and adaptive approach for both decreasing scientific uncertainty in support of regulatory decision-making and

This brief article, written for a symposium on "Collaboration and the Colorado River," evaluates the U.S. Department of the Interior's Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program ("AMP"). The AMP has been advanced as a pioneering collaborative and adaptive approach for both decreasing scientific uncertainty in support of regulatory decision-making and helping manage contentious resource disputes -- in this case, the increasingly thorny conflict over the Colorado River's finite natural resources. Though encouraging in some respects, the AMP serves as a valuable illustration of the flaws of existing regulatory processes purporting to incorporate collaboration and regulatory adaptation into the decision-making process. Born in the shadow of the law and improvised with too little thought as to its structure, the AMP demonstrates the need to attend to the design of the regulatory process and integrate mechanisms that compel systematic program evaluation and adaptation. As such, the AMP provides vital information on how future collaborative experiments might be modified to enhance their prospects of success.

ContributorsCamacho, Alejandro E. (Author)
Created2008-09-19
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Description

The Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (AMP) has been identified as a model for natural resource management. We challenge that assertion, citing the lack of progress toward a long-term management plan for the dam, sustained extra-programmatic conflict, and a downriver ecology that is still in jeopardy, despite over ten

The Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (AMP) has been identified as a model for natural resource management. We challenge that assertion, citing the lack of progress toward a long-term management plan for the dam, sustained extra-programmatic conflict, and a downriver ecology that is still in jeopardy, despite over ten years of meetings and an expensive research program. We have examined the primary and secondary sources available on the AMP’s design and operation in light of best practices identified in the literature on adaptive management and collaborative decision-making. We have identified six shortcomings: (1) an inadequate approach to identifying stakeholders; (2) a failure to provide clear goals and involve stakeholders in establishing the operating procedures that guide the collaborative process; (3) inappropriate use of professional neutrals and a failure to cultivate consensus; (4) a failure to establish and follow clear joint fact-finding procedures; (5) a failure to produce functional written agreements; and (6) a failure to manage the AMP adaptively and cultivate long-term problem-solving capacity.

Adaptive management can be an effective approach for addressing complex ecosystem-related processes like the operation of the Glen Canyon Dam, particularly in the face of substantial complexity, uncertainty, and political contentiousness. However, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP shows that a stated commitment to collaboration and adaptive management is insufficient. Effective management of natural resources can only be realized through careful attention to the collaborative design and implementation of appropriate problem-solving and adaptive-management procedures. It also requires the development of an appropriate organizational infrastructure that promotes stakeholder dialogue and agency learning. Though the experimental Glen Canyon Dam AMP is far from a success of collaborative adaptive management, the lessons from its shortcomings can foster more effective collaborative adaptive management in the future by Congress, federal agencies, and local and state authorities.

ContributorsSusskind, Lawrence (Author) / Camacho, Alejandro E. (Author) / Schenk, Todd (Author)
Created2010-03-23