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This experiment uses the Community of Knowledge framework to better understand how jurors interpret new information (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). Participants learned of an ostensibly new scientific finding that was claimed to either be well-understood or not understood by experts. Despite including no additional information, expert understanding led participants to

This experiment uses the Community of Knowledge framework to better understand how jurors interpret new information (Sloman & Rabb, 2016). Participants learned of an ostensibly new scientific finding that was claimed to either be well-understood or not understood by experts. Despite including no additional information, expert understanding led participants to believe that they personally understood the phenomenon, with expert understanding acting as a cue for trustworthiness and believability. This effect was particularly pronounced with low-quality sources. These results are discussed in the context of how information is used by jurors in court, and the implications of the “Community of Knowledge” effect being used by expert witnesses.
ContributorsJones, Ashley C. T. (Author) / Schweitzer, Nicholas J. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Salerno, Jessica M. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Description

There is substantial controversy over the extent to which social science should be used in jury selection. Underlying the debate are two competing interests in the make-up of a jury: a privilege to strike prospective jurors on subjective grounds, which supports scientific jury selection, and a collective interest of citizens

There is substantial controversy over the extent to which social science should be used in jury selection. Underlying the debate are two competing interests in the make-up of a jury: a privilege to strike prospective jurors on subjective grounds, which supports scientific jury selection, and a collective interest of citizens to be free from exclusion from jury service, which does not. While the incommensurability of the interests precludes resolution of the controversy in the abstract, specific solutions are possible. Using the example of selection of jurors based upon their respective levels of extraversion, we describe how the competing interests frequently do not apply to concrete cases. In the subsequent analysis, we show that, rhetoric notwithstanding, a normative preference for adhering to tradition and institutional inertia are the primary instrumental considerations for determining whether peremptory challenges based upon personality traits like extraversion ought to be allowed. Consistent with this analysis, we conclude that the practice of striking jurors based upon estimates of such personality traits is appropriate.

ContributorsGirvan, Erik J. (Author) / Cramer, Robert J. (Author) / Titcomb, Caroline (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Author) / Brodsky, Stanley L. (Author)
Created2013
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Description

The question as to whether the assessment of adaptive behavior (AB) for evaluations of intellectual disability (ID) in the community meet the level of rigor necessary for admissibility in legal cases is addressed. Adaptive behavior measures have made their way into the forensic domain where scientific evidence is put under

The question as to whether the assessment of adaptive behavior (AB) for evaluations of intellectual disability (ID) in the community meet the level of rigor necessary for admissibility in legal cases is addressed. Adaptive behavior measures have made their way into the forensic domain where scientific evidence is put under great scrutiny. Assessment of ID in capital murder proceedings has garnished a lot of attention, but assessments of ID in adult populations also occur with some frequency in the context of other criminal proceedings (e.g., competence to stand trial; competence to waive Miranda rights), as well as eligibility for social security disability, social security insurance, Medicaid/Medicare, government housing, and post-secondary transition services. As will be demonstrated, markedly disparate findings between raters can occur on measures of AB even when the assessment is conducted in accordance with standard procedures (i.e., the person was assessed in a community setting, in real time, with multiple appropriate raters, when the person was younger than 18 years of age) and similar disparities can be found in the context of the unorthodox and untested retrospective assessment used in capital proceedings. With full recognition that some level of disparity is to be expected, the level of disparity that can arise when these measures are administered retrospectively calls into question the validity of the results and consequently, their probative value.

ContributorsSalekin, Karen L. (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Author) / Hedge, Krystal A. (Author)
Created2018-02-01
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Description

We investigated the role of moral disengagement in a legally‐relevant judgment in this theoretically‐driven empirical analysis. Moral disengagement is a social‐cognitive phenomenon through which people reason their way toward harming others, presenting a useful framework for investigating legal judgments that often result in harming individuals for the good of society.

We investigated the role of moral disengagement in a legally‐relevant judgment in this theoretically‐driven empirical analysis. Moral disengagement is a social‐cognitive phenomenon through which people reason their way toward harming others, presenting a useful framework for investigating legal judgments that often result in harming individuals for the good of society. We tested the role of moral disengagement in forensic psychologists’ willingness to conduct the most ethically questionable clinical task in the criminal justice system: competence for execution evaluations. Our hypothesis that moral disengagement would function as mediator of participants’ existing attitudes and their judgments—a theoretical “bridge” between attitudes and judgments—was robustly supported. Moral disengagement was key to understanding how psychologists decide to engage in competence for execution evaluations. We describe in detail the moral disengagement measure we used, including exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses across two separate samples. The four‐factor measure accounted for a total of 52.18 percent of the variance in the sample of forensic psychologists, and the model adequately fit the data in the entirely different sample of jurors in a confirmatory factor analysis. Despite the psychometric strengths of this moral disengagement measure, we describe the pros and cons of existing measures of moral disengagement. We outline future directions for moral disengagement research, especially in legal contexts.

ContributorsNeal, Tess M.S. (Author) / Cramer, Robert J. (Author)
Created2017-11-07
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Description

The essential tasks for an expert witness are to be prepared, to be effective and credible on the stand, and to manage well the demands of cross-examinations. Most novice experts are excessively anxious about their testimony. Effective experts are well-oriented to the legal and scientific context of court testimony. This

The essential tasks for an expert witness are to be prepared, to be effective and credible on the stand, and to manage well the demands of cross-examinations. Most novice experts are excessively anxious about their testimony. Effective experts are well-oriented to the legal and scientific context of court testimony. This chapter reviews research-backed tips for preparing for expert testimony.

ContributorsBrodsky, Stanley L. (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Author)
Created2013
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Description

The majority of trust research has focused on the benefits trust can have for individual actors, institutions, and organizations. This “optimistic bias” is particularly evident in work focused on institutional trust, where concepts such as procedural justice, shared values, and moral responsibility have gained prominence. But trust in institutions may

The majority of trust research has focused on the benefits trust can have for individual actors, institutions, and organizations. This “optimistic bias” is particularly evident in work focused on institutional trust, where concepts such as procedural justice, shared values, and moral responsibility have gained prominence. But trust in institutions may not be exclusively good. We reveal implications for the “dark side” of institutional trust by reviewing relevant theories and empirical research that can contribute to a more holistic understanding. We frame our discussion by suggesting there may be a “Goldilocks principle” of institutional trust, where trust that is too low (typically the focus) or too high (not usually considered by trust researchers) may be problematic. The chapter focuses on the issue of too-high trust and processes through which such too-high trust might emerge. Specifically, excessive trust might result from external, internal, and intersecting external-internal processes. External processes refer to the actions institutions take that affect public trust, while internal processes refer to intrapersonal factors affecting a trustor’s level of trust. We describe how the beneficial psychological and behavioral outcomes of trust can be mitigated or circumvented through these processes and highlight the implications of a “darkest” side of trust when they intersect. We draw upon research on organizations and legal, governmental, and political systems to demonstrate the dark side of trust in different contexts. The conclusion outlines directions for future research and encourages researchers to consider the ethical nuances of studying how to increase institutional trust.

ContributorsNeal, Tess M.S. (Author) / Shockley, Ellie (Author) / Schilke, Oliver (Author)
Created2016
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Description

Examinations of trust have advanced steadily over the past several decades, yielding important insights within criminal justice, economics, environmental studies, management and industrial organization, psychology, political science, and sociology. Cross-disciplinary approaches to the study of trust, however, have been limited by differences in defining and measuring trust and in methodological

Examinations of trust have advanced steadily over the past several decades, yielding important insights within criminal justice, economics, environmental studies, management and industrial organization, psychology, political science, and sociology. Cross-disciplinary approaches to the study of trust, however, have been limited by differences in defining and measuring trust and in methodological approaches. In this chapter, we take the position that: 1) cross-disciplinary studies can be improved by recognizing trust as a multilevel phenomenon, and 2) context impacts the nature of trusting relations. We present an organizing framework for conceptualizing trust between trustees and trustors at person, group, and institution levels. The differences between these levels have theoretical implications for the study of trust and that might be used to justify distinctions in definitions and methodological approaches across settings. We highlight where the levels overlap and describe how this overlap has created confusion in the trust literature to date. Part of the overlap – and confusion – is the role of interpersonal trust at each level. We delineate when and how interpersonal trust is theoretically relevant to conceptualizing and measuring trust at each level and suggest that other trust-related constructs, such as perceived legitimacy, competence, and integrity, may be more important than interpersonal trust at some levels and in some contexts. Translating findings from trust research in one discipline to another and collaborating across disciplines may be facilitated if researchers ensure that their levels of conceptualization and measurement are aligned, and that models developed for a particular context are relevant in other, distinct contexts.

ContributorsHerian, Mitchell N. (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Author)
Created2016
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Description
The United States Supreme Court’s 1993 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals case established criteria for admitting scientific evidence in federal courts. It holds that scientific evidence must be valid, reliable, and relevant, and judges are required to be “gatekeepers” of evidence by screening out evidence that has not been empirically

The United States Supreme Court’s 1993 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals case established criteria for admitting scientific evidence in federal courts. It holds that scientific evidence must be valid, reliable, and relevant, and judges are required to be “gatekeepers” of evidence by screening out evidence that has not been empirically tested or vetted through the academic community. Yet, little is known about whether psychological assessment tools are subjected to scrutiny through the standards courts are supposed to apply. In three different studies, from the perspectives of judges, attorneys, and forensic mental health experts, the authors investigate whether psychological assessment evidence is being challenged. Information was collected on participants’ experiences with challenges to psychological assessments. Judges and lawyers completed a series of experimental case vignettes to assess their decision-making about legal admissibility of different qualities of psychological assessments. It was hypothesized they would not distinguish between low- and high-quality psychological assessments in admissibility. Bayesian model selection methods did not support the null hypothesis, however. It was found attorneys differentiate between the conditions. The rates in which legal professionals and forensic mental health evaluators experienced challenges were also higher than was expected. These positive findings show there is some degree of gatekeeping psychological assessment evidence in the courts.
ContributorsNeu Line, Emily C (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Horne, Zachary (Committee member) / Saks, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
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Description
Across three studies and two robust pilot studies, this project addressed issues surrounding prejudicial evidence and jury instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence. Specifically, this project examined a new framework for understanding how people vary in their response to prejudicial evidence, based on the morals they value, and tested the effectiveness

Across three studies and two robust pilot studies, this project addressed issues surrounding prejudicial evidence and jury instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence. Specifically, this project examined a new framework for understanding how people vary in their response to prejudicial evidence, based on the morals they value, and tested the effectiveness of a novel way to phrase jury instructions to debias jurors inspired by moral foundations theory. In two experimental studies, participants read a transcript of a sexual assault (Study 1: n = 544) or an assault and battery criminal case (Study 2: n = 509). In each experiment, participants were randomly assigned to read either a case with or without prejudicial evidence. Participants exposed to prejudicial evidence were either given standard jury instructions to disregard the evidence, no instructions, or novel jury instructions inspired by moral foundations theory. Individual differences in moral foundations affected how susceptible people were to prejudicial evidence and case facts in general. This pattern emerged regardless of the type of jury instructions in most cases, suggesting that the moral foundation inspired instructions failed to help jurors disregard prejudicial evidence. The impact of people’s moral foundation endorsement has direct implications for how attorneys may phrase evidence to cater towards these moral biases and select ideal jurors during the voir dire process. To further advance people’s understanding of the effects of prejudicial evidence and jury instructions in legal settings, a third study looked at how attorneys (n = 138) perceived the prevalence and impact of prejudicial evidence in real cases and the effectiveness of jury instructions. Over three quarters of the sample (77.54%) reported having experienced prejudicial evidence in their cases and expressed concern that prejudicial evidence is influential to jurors with jury instructions being ineffective. Taken altogether, the results of this project show the potential impact moral foundation endorsement can have on case judgments and how jurors are differently influenced by prejudicial evidence. In addition, data from attorneys showing the perceived prevalent and impact of prejudicial evidence in real cases further justifies the need to continue researching safeguards against prejudicial evidence.
ContributorsMcCowan, Kristen Marie (Author) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Thesis advisor) / Stolzenberg, Stacia N (Committee member) / Fox, Kate A (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2022
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Description
For decades, researchers have found that jurors are consistently unable - or unwilling - to disregard inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so by a judge. The legal system ignores the problem entirely: judges have repeatedly affirmed that a judge’s instructions to disregard are a sufficient safeguard of defendants’ constitutional

For decades, researchers have found that jurors are consistently unable - or unwilling - to disregard inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so by a judge. The legal system ignores the problem entirely: judges have repeatedly affirmed that a judge’s instructions to disregard are a sufficient safeguard of defendants’ constitutional rights, regardless of whether the jury actually disregards the inadmissible evidence. This study tested four interventions derived from psychological research to identify the combination that most effectively helped jurors disregard inadmissible evidence (operationalized by lower conviction rates). It was hypothesized that the most effective interventions identified in Study 1 would yield significantly lower conviction rates when compared to traditional instructions to disregard in Study 2. The interventions were tested in Study 1 using Multiphase Optimization Strategy (MOST) methodology to identify the optimized intervention package through regression analysis. Study 2 served as a randomized controlled trial in which treatment as usual (a judge’s instructions to disregard) was compared to the optimized intervention package. Participants were randomly assigned to either (1) be exposed to no inadmissible evidence, (2) receive inadmissible evidence and treatment as usual, (3) receive inadmissible evidence, treatment as usual and the optimized intervention package, or (4) receive the inadmissible evidence without objection. Logistic regression revealed that jurors who were given an instruction to disregard produced lower conviction rates when they also received the optimized intervention package. Interpretation, limitations, and calls to action are discussed.
ContributorsSandberg, Pamela Nicole (Author) / O'Hara, Karey L. (Thesis advisor) / Neal, Tess M.S. (Committee member) / Hall, Deborah L. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023