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This dissertation advances the capability of water infrastructure utilities to anticipate and adapt to vulnerabilities in their systems from temperature increase and interdependencies with other infrastructure systems. Impact assessment models of increased heat and interdependencies were developed which incorporate probability, spatial, temporal, and operational information. Key findings from the models

This dissertation advances the capability of water infrastructure utilities to anticipate and adapt to vulnerabilities in their systems from temperature increase and interdependencies with other infrastructure systems. Impact assessment models of increased heat and interdependencies were developed which incorporate probability, spatial, temporal, and operational information. Key findings from the models are that with increased heat the increased likelihood of water quality non-compliances is particularly concerning, the anticipated increases in different hardware components generate different levels of concern starting with iron pipes, then pumps, and then PVC pipes, the effects of temperature increase on hardware components and on service losses are non-linear due to spatial criticality of components, and that modeling spatial and operational complexity helps to identify potential pathways of failure propagation between infrastructure systems. Exploring different parameters of the models allowed for comparison of institutional strategies. Key findings are that either preventative maintenance or repair strategies can completely offset additional outages from increased temperatures though-- improved repair times reduce overall duration of outages more than preventative maintenance, and that coordinated strategies across utilities could be effective for mitigating vulnerability.
ContributorsBondank, Emily (Author) / Chester, Mikhail V (Thesis advisor) / Ruddell, Benjamin L (Committee member) / Johnson, Nathan G (Committee member) / Seager, Thomas P (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
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A mathematical approach was developed to evaluate the resilience of coupled power-water networks using a variant of contingency analysis adapted from electric transmission studies. In particular, the “what if” scenarios explored in power systems research were extended and applied for coupled power-water network research by evaluating how stressors and failures

A mathematical approach was developed to evaluate the resilience of coupled power-water networks using a variant of contingency analysis adapted from electric transmission studies. In particular, the “what if” scenarios explored in power systems research were extended and applied for coupled power-water network research by evaluating how stressors and failures in the water network can propagate across system boundaries and into the electric network. Reduction in power system contingency reserves was the metric for determining violation of N-1 contingency reliability. Geospatial considerations were included using high-resolution, publicly available Geographic Information System data on infrastructure in the Phoenix Metropolitan Area that was used to generate a power network with 599 transmission lines and total generation capacity of 18.98 GW and a water network with 2,624 water network lines and capacity to serve up to 1.72M GPM of surface water. The steady-state model incorporated operating requirements for the power network—e.g., contingency reserves—and the water network—e.g., pressure ranges—while seeking to meet electric load and water demand. Interconnections developed between the infrastructures demonstrated how alternations to the system state and/or configuration of one network affect the other network, with results demonstrated through co-simulation of the power network and water network using OpenDSS and EPANET, respectively. Results indicate four key findings that help operators understand the interdependent behavior of the coupled power-water network: (i) two water failure scenarios (water flowing out of Waddell dam and CAP canal flowing west of Waddell dam) are critical to power-water network N-1 contingency reliability above 60% power system loading and at 100% water system demand, (ii) fast-starting natural gas generating units are necessary to maintain N-1 contingency reliability below 60% power system loading, (iii) Coolidge Station was the power plant to most frequently undergo a reduction in reserves amongst the water failure scenarios that cause a violation of N-1 reliability, (iv) power network vulnerability to water network failures was non-linear because it depends on the generating units that are dispatched, which can vary as line thermal limits or unit generation capacities are reached.
ContributorsGorman, Brandon (Author) / Johnson, Nathan G (Thesis advisor) / Seager, Thomas P (Committee member) / Chester, Mikhail V (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020