Matching Items (7)
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- All Subjects: Corporations--Finance.
- Creators: Hertzel, Michael
Description
I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large, limited substitutability between the factors of production may call for fixed capital investment. Hence, firms with lower substitutability are more likely to invest in both factors together and have larger sensitivities of fixed capital investment to cash flow. By building a frictionless capital markets model that allows firms to optimize over fixed capital and inventories as substitutable factors, I establish the significance of the substitutability channel in explaining cross-sectional differences in cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, incorporating variable capital into firms' investment decisions helps explain the sharp decrease in cash flow sensitivities over the past decades. Empirical evidence confirms the model's predictions.
ContributorsKim, Kirak (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
In this dissertation, I examine the source of some of the anomalous capital market outcomes that have been documented for firms with high accruals. Chapter 2 develops and implements a methodology that decomposes a firm's discretionary accruals into a firm-specific and an industry-specific component. I use this decomposition to investigate which component drives the subsequent negative returns associated with firms with high discretionary accruals. My results suggest that these abnormal returns are driven by the firm-specific component of discretionary accruals. Moreover, although industry-specific discretionary accruals do not directly contribute towards this anomaly, I find that it is precisely when industry-specific discretionary accruals are high that firms with high firm-specific discretionary accruals subsequently earn these negative returns. While consistent with irrational mispricing or a rational risk premium associated with high discretionary accruals, these findings also support a transactions-cost based explanation for the accruals anomaly whereby search costs associated with distinguishing between value-relevant and manipulative discretionary accruals can induce investors to overlook potential earnings manipulation. Chapter 3 extends the decomposition to examine the role of firm-specific and industry-specific discretionary accruals in explaining the subsequent market underperformance and negative analysts' forecast errors documented for firms issuing equity. I examine the post-issue market returns and analysts' forecast errors for a sample of seasoned equity issues between 1975 and 2004 and find that offering-year firm-specific discretionary accruals can partially explain these anomalous capital market outcomes. Nonetheless, I find this predictive power of firm-specific accruals to be more pronounced for issues that occur during 1975 - 1989 compared to issues taking place between 1990 and 2004. Additionally, I find no evidence that investors and analysts are more overoptimistic about the prospects of issuers that have both high firm-specific and industry-specific discretionary accruals (compared to firms with high discretionary accruals in general). The results indicate no role for industry-specific discretionary accruals in explaining overoptimistic expectations from seasoned equity issues and suggest the importance of firm-specific factors in inducing earnings manipulation surrounding equity issues.
ContributorsIkram, Atif (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost of information gathering for both firms. I find supporting evidence for these two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. Consistent with the agency hypothesis, interlocked acquirers underperform non-interlocked acquirers by 2% during the announcement period. However, well-governed acquirers receive higher announcement returns and have better post-acquisition performance in interlocked deals. The proportional surplus accrued to an acquirer is positively correlated with the interlocking agent's ownership in the acquirer relative to her ownership in the target. Consistent with the information hypothesis, when the target's firm value is opaque, interlocks improve acquirer announcement returns and long-term performance. Interlocked acquirers are also more likely to use equity as payment, especially when the acquirer's stock value is opaque. Target announcement returns are not influenced by the existence of interlock. Finally, I find acquisitions are more likely to occur between two interlocked firms and such deals have a higher completion rate.
ContributorsWu, Qingqing (Author) / Bates, Thomas W. (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Lindsey, Laura (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
Company X has developed RealSenseTM technology, a depth sensing camera that provides machines the ability to capture three-dimensional spaces along with motion within these spaces. The goal of RealSense was to give machines human-like senses, such as knowing how far away objects are and perceiving the surrounding environment. The key issue for Company X is how to commercialize RealSense's depth recognition capabilities. This thesis addresses the problem by examining which markets to address and how to monetize this technology. The first part of the analysis identified potential markets for RealSense. This was achieved by evaluating current markets that could benefit from the camera's gesture recognition, 3D scanning, and depth sensing abilities. After identifying seven industries where RealSense could add value, a model of the available, addressable, and obtainable market sizes was developed for each segment. Key competitors and market dynamics were used to estimate the portion of the market that Company X could capture. These models provided a forecast of the discounted gross profits that could be earned over the next five years. These forecasted gross profits, combined with an examination of the competitive landscape and synergistic opportunities, resulted in the selection of the three segments thought to be most profitable to Company X. These segments are smart home, consumer drones, and automotive. The final part of the analysis investigated entrance strategies. Company X's competitive advantages in each space were found by examining the competition, both for the RealSense camera in general and other technologies specific to each industry. Finally, ideas about ways to monetize RealSense were developed by exploring various revenue models and channels.
ContributorsDunn, Nicole (Co-author) / Boudreau, Thomas (Co-author) / Kinzy, Chris (Co-author) / Radigan, Thomas (Co-author) / Simonson, Mark (Thesis director) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Science (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
The goal of this thesis was to provide in depth research into the semiconductor wet-etch market and create a supplier analysis tool that would allow Company X to identify the best supplier partnerships. Several models were used to analyze the wet etch market including Porter's Five Forces and SWOT analyses. These models were used to rate suppliers based on financial indicators, management history, market share, research and developments spend, and investment diversity. This research allowed for the removal of one of the four companies in question due to a discovered conflict of interest. Once the initial research was complete a dynamic excel model was created that would allow Company X to continually compare costs and factors of the supplier's products. Many cost factors were analyzed such as initial capital investment, power and chemical usage, warranty costs, and spares parts usage. Other factors that required comparison across suppliers included wafer throughput, number of layers the tool could process, the number of chambers the tool has, and the amount of space the tool requires. The demand needed for the tool was estimated by Company X in order to determine how each supplier's tool set would handle the required usage. The final feature that was added to the model was the ability to run a sensitivity analysis on each tool set. This allows Company X to quickly and accurately forecast how certain changes to costs or tool capacities would affect total cost of ownership. This could be heavily utilized during Company X's negotiations with suppliers. The initial research as well the model lead to the final recommendation of Supplier A as they had the most cost effective tool given the required demand. However, this recommendation is subject to change as demand fluctuates or if changes can be made during negotiations.
ContributorsSchmitt, Connor (Co-author) / Rickets, Dawson (Co-author) / Castiglione, Maia (Co-author) / Witten, Forrest (Co-author) / Simonson, Mark (Thesis director) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / Department of Supply Chain Management (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
Firms reduce investment when facing downward wage rigidity (DWR), the inability or unwillingness to adjust wages downward. I construct DWR measures and exploit staggered state-level changes in minimum wage laws as an exogenous variation in DWR to document this fact. Following a minimum wage increase, firms reduce their investment rate by 1.17 percentage points. Surprisingly, this labor market friction enhances firm value and production efficiency when firms are subject to other frictions causing overinvestment, consistent with the theory of second best. Finally, I identify increased operating leverage and aggravation of debt overhang as mechanisms by which DWR impedes investment.
ContributorsCho, DuckKi (Author) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Bessembinder, Hendrik (Committee member) / Wang, Jiaxu (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017