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I study the performance of hedge fund managers, using quarterly stock holdings from 1995 to 2010. I use the holdings-based measure built on Ferson and Mo (2012) to decompose a manager's overall performance into stock selection and three components of timing ability: market return, volatility, and liquidity. At the aggregate

I study the performance of hedge fund managers, using quarterly stock holdings from 1995 to 2010. I use the holdings-based measure built on Ferson and Mo (2012) to decompose a manager's overall performance into stock selection and three components of timing ability: market return, volatility, and liquidity. At the aggregate level, I find that hedge fund managers have stock picking skills but no timing skills, and overall I do not find strong evidence to support their superiority. I show that the lack of abilities is driven by the large fluctuations of timing performance with market conditions. I find that conditioning information, equity capital constraints, and priority in stocks to liquidate can partly explain the weak evidence. At the individual fund level, bootstrap analysis results suggest that even top managers' abilities cannot be separated from luck. Also, I find that hedge fund managers exhibit short-horizon persistence in selectivity skill.
ContributorsKang, MinJeong (Author) / Aragon, George O. (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael G (Committee member) / Boguth, Oliver (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Description
I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large,

I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large, limited substitutability between the factors of production may call for fixed capital investment. Hence, firms with lower substitutability are more likely to invest in both factors together and have larger sensitivities of fixed capital investment to cash flow. By building a frictionless capital markets model that allows firms to optimize over fixed capital and inventories as substitutable factors, I establish the significance of the substitutability channel in explaining cross-sectional differences in cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, incorporating variable capital into firms' investment decisions helps explain the sharp decrease in cash flow sensitivities over the past decades. Empirical evidence confirms the model's predictions.
ContributorsKim, Kirak (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Description
The Dodd-Frank Act was created to promote financial stability in the United States. However, no one is quite sure what it is yet. While action had to be taken and Dodd-Frank has some positives, Dodd-Frank, as it is deciphered today, has severe drawbacks. Since Dodd-Frank is only in its infancy,

The Dodd-Frank Act was created to promote financial stability in the United States. However, no one is quite sure what it is yet. While action had to be taken and Dodd-Frank has some positives, Dodd-Frank, as it is deciphered today, has severe drawbacks. Since Dodd-Frank is only in its infancy, it is difficult to form an interim conclusion about its effects on agricultural lending at this point. After passing Dodd-Frank in 2010, the government began trying to figure out what it means. Four years later, they are still trying and are about half way through making the rules. This law essentially replaces Glass-Steagall, which was repealed several years ago. Many believe repealing Glass-Steagall was a big reason for the financial collapse of 2008. While Glass-Steagall was a short, easily understood document, Dodd Frank adds many more regulations and pages. This creates a long, bulky, confusing law that seems to be extremely tough to comprehend legally or as a banker. In this study, I try to balance the positives and negatives of Dodd-Frank to understand if it is more detrimental or beneficial to agricultural lending. While we find that Dodd-Frank does help keep banks from some of the risky investments that many believe led to the financial crisis, the added paperwork, compliance costs, and strain it puts on small banks can be worrisome. I interviewed several agriculture-lending professionals who regularly deal with the rules and regulations of Dodd-Frank to discover the impact the new law has on banks, their customers, and the economy as a whole. These interviews give insight into what Dodd-Frank means to the agriculture-lending market and what changes have had to occur since the law was passed. These interviews demonstrate that Dodd-Frank is largely looked down upon by the banking industry. The professionals interviewed are very experienced. After the extensive research, interviews, and discoveries that came of this study, it was concluded that Dodd-Frank seems to hurt the lending industry much more than it helps. One major concern is the strain Dodd-Frank puts on small banks and how it makes "too big to fail" banks even bigger.
ContributorsBettencourt, Bradley D (Author) / Thor, Eric (Thesis advisor) / Manfredo, Mark (Committee member) / Englin, Jeff (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face the following

One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face the following situation. A group of people within an organization are completely transparent to each other; however, their characters are not known by other organization members who are outside this group. In my dissertation, I try to study how this information sharing would affect the outcome of different organizations. I focus on two organizations: corporate board and political parties. I find that this information sharing may be detrimental for (some of) the members who shared information. This conclusion stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom in both corporate finance and political party literature.
ContributorsWu, Zhenhua (Author) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Thesis advisor) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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Financing lease has bloomed as a new financing tool in China for the last several years. In this thesis I investigate the factors that influence China’s automobile financial leasing decisions by both lessors and lessees through market surveys. Based on Probit regression analysis of the data collected from 250 companies

Financing lease has bloomed as a new financing tool in China for the last several years. In this thesis I investigate the factors that influence China’s automobile financial leasing decisions by both lessors and lessees through market surveys. Based on Probit regression analysis of the data collected from 250 companies and 300 individuals, I find that a firm is more likely to use automobile financial leasing when its corporate tax rate is lower, growth potential is more stabilized, and profit is higher. It is also more likely to happen when a firm's long-term debt ratio and its degree of internationalization are higher. At the individual level, I find that the likelihood of individuals’ leasing decision is influenced by their risk preference, income level, and car price. Individuals’ gender, age and education level show no effect.

Using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) analysis, I further find that financing costs, service value-added, and products diversity are the three most important competitive factors for the auto financial leasing service providers. This is the case for both the corporate and individual customers in the sample. By contrast, the factors of sales channel and government relationship are found to be much less important. Finally, through an in-depth case study of the leasing company Shanghai Auto Financial Leasing, I find that the key factors determining the customers’ credit default risk are interest rate and automobile type. I also investigate factors that influence business risk during the automobile procurement stage, at the selling stage, and toward the disposition stage. The managerial implications of the above results are discussed throughout the thesis.
ContributorsLin, Zhen, Ph.D (Author) / Zhang, Anming (Thesis advisor) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Chen, Hong (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Merton (1987) predicts that idiosyncratic risk can be priced. I develop a simple equilibrium model of capital markets with information costs in which the idiosyncratic risk premium depends on the average level of idiosyncratic volatility. This dependence suggests that the idiosyncratic risk premium varies over time. I find that in

Merton (1987) predicts that idiosyncratic risk can be priced. I develop a simple equilibrium model of capital markets with information costs in which the idiosyncratic risk premium depends on the average level of idiosyncratic volatility. This dependence suggests that the idiosyncratic risk premium varies over time. I find that in U.S. markets, the covariance between stock-level idiosyncratic volatility and the idiosyncratic risk premium explains future stock returns. Stocks in the highest quintile of the covariance between the volatility and risk premium earn an average 3-factor alpha of 70 bps per month higher than those in the lowest quintile.
ContributorsXie, Daruo (Author) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Mehra, Rajnish (Thesis advisor) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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In the first chapter, I develop a representative agent model in which the purchase of consumption goods must be planned in advance. Volatility in the agent's portfolio increases the risk that a purchase cannot be implemented. This implementation risk causes the agent to make conservative consumption plans. In the model,

In the first chapter, I develop a representative agent model in which the purchase of consumption goods must be planned in advance. Volatility in the agent's portfolio increases the risk that a purchase cannot be implemented. This implementation risk causes the agent to make conservative consumption plans. In the model, this leads to persistent and negatively skewed consumption growth and a slow reaction of consumption to wealth shocks. The model proposes a novel explanation for the negative relation between volatility and expected utility. In equilibrium, prices of risky assets must compensate for the utility loss. Hence, the model suggests a new mechanism for generating the equity risk premium. Importantly, because implementation risk does not rely on the co-movement of asset prices with marginal utility, the resulting equity premium does not require concavity of the intratemporal utility function.

In the second chapter, I challenge the view that equity market timing always benefits

shareholders. By distinguishing the effect of a firm's equity decisions from the effect of mispricing itself, I show that market timing can decrease shareholder value. Additionally, the timing of equity sales has a more negative effect on existing shareholders than the timing of share repurchases. My theory can be used to infer firms' maximization objectives from their observed market timing strategies. I argue that the popularity of stock buybacks, the low frequency of seasoned equity offerings, and the observed post-event stock returns are consistent with managers maximizing current shareholder value.
ContributorsWan, Pengcheng (Author) / Boguth, Oliver (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Thesis advisor) / Babenka, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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While credit rating agencies use both forward-looking and historical information in evaluating a firm's credit risk, the role of forward-looking information in their rating decisions is not well understood. In this study, I examine the association between management earnings guidance news and future credit rating changes. While upward earnings guidance

While credit rating agencies use both forward-looking and historical information in evaluating a firm's credit risk, the role of forward-looking information in their rating decisions is not well understood. In this study, I examine the association between management earnings guidance news and future credit rating changes. While upward earnings guidance is not informative for credit rating changes, downward earnings guidance is significantly and positively associated with both the likelihood and speed of rating downgrades. In cross-sectional analyses, I find that downward guidance is especially informative in two important circumstances: (i) when a firm's current credit rating is overly optimistic compared to a model predicted rating, and (ii) when the relevance or reliability of alternative information sources is lower. In addition, I find that downward guidance is associated with lower future cash flows, as well as a higher volatility of future cash flows. Overall, the results are consistent with credit rating agencies incorporating voluntary bad news disclosures into their decisions about whether and when to downgrade a firm.
ContributorsLin, An-Ping (Author) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Hugon, Jean (Thesis advisor) / Call, Andrew (Committee member) / Dhaliwal, Dan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the

I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the level of monitoring. I find a strong relation between distance and both board meeting attendance and director membership on strategic versus monitoring committees. Increased monitoring, as measured by a reduction in effective distance, by way of addition of a direct flight, is associated with a 3% reduction in firm value. A reduction in effective distance is also associated with less risk-taking, lower stock return volatility, lower accounting return volatility, lower R&D; spending, fewer acquisitions, and fewer patents.
ContributorsBennett, Benjamin (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Babenka, Ilona (Committee member) / Custodio, Claudia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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This dissertation provides an analysis of the effects of public secondary equity offerings by private equity sponsors at portfolio firms that have become publicly traded entities via initial public offerings. Such secondary offerings were rare prior to 2000, but in recent years have become an increasingly common form of financial

This dissertation provides an analysis of the effects of public secondary equity offerings by private equity sponsors at portfolio firms that have become publicly traded entities via initial public offerings. Such secondary offerings were rare prior to 2000, but in recent years have become an increasingly common form of financial activity. A large sample of these offerings is analyzed within the framework of corporate finance theory, taking into account that they allow a private equity sponsor to sell off a large, controlling block of common stock to dispersed investors. This work provides a basis to draw conclusions about the effects of these secondary offerings on shareholder wealth and the implications for the firm's subsequent operating performance (profitability). The results show that that there is a significant decline in portfolio firm value at announcements of secondary offerings by private equity, and that such offerings are not a precursor of future underperformance. Instead, there is greater share liquidity and higher industry-adjusted performance after these secondary offerings. Moreover, the proportion of portfolio firms that subsequently become bankrupt is significantly less than that of benchmark firms. There is no evidence of an effect of the size of the secondary offering on the magnitude of the change in share price, but the reputation of private equity sponsors has a significant effect on the share price reaction. Overall, the evidence from these secondary equity offerings suggests that private equity successfully prepares portfolio firms for exit from private equity control, implying that the market can expect that the stand-alone public firm will operate effectively after the change in ownership structure associated with the exit of private equity.
ContributorsDong, Qi (Author) / Sushka, Marie E. (Thesis advisor) / Slovin, Myron B. (Thesis advisor) / Stein, Luke C.D. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015