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I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large,

I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large, limited substitutability between the factors of production may call for fixed capital investment. Hence, firms with lower substitutability are more likely to invest in both factors together and have larger sensitivities of fixed capital investment to cash flow. By building a frictionless capital markets model that allows firms to optimize over fixed capital and inventories as substitutable factors, I establish the significance of the substitutability channel in explaining cross-sectional differences in cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, incorporating variable capital into firms' investment decisions helps explain the sharp decrease in cash flow sensitivities over the past decades. Empirical evidence confirms the model's predictions.
ContributorsKim, Kirak (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Merton (1987) predicts that idiosyncratic risk can be priced. I develop a simple equilibrium model of capital markets with information costs in which the idiosyncratic risk premium depends on the average level of idiosyncratic volatility. This dependence suggests that the idiosyncratic risk premium varies over time. I find that in

Merton (1987) predicts that idiosyncratic risk can be priced. I develop a simple equilibrium model of capital markets with information costs in which the idiosyncratic risk premium depends on the average level of idiosyncratic volatility. This dependence suggests that the idiosyncratic risk premium varies over time. I find that in U.S. markets, the covariance between stock-level idiosyncratic volatility and the idiosyncratic risk premium explains future stock returns. Stocks in the highest quintile of the covariance between the volatility and risk premium earn an average 3-factor alpha of 70 bps per month higher than those in the lowest quintile.
ContributorsXie, Daruo (Author) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Mehra, Rajnish (Thesis advisor) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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This paper examines dealers' inventory holding periods and the associated price markups on corporate bonds from 2003 to 2010. Changes in these measures explain a large part of the time series variation in aggregate corporate bond prices. In the cross-section, holding periods and markups overshadow extant liquidity measures and have

This paper examines dealers' inventory holding periods and the associated price markups on corporate bonds from 2003 to 2010. Changes in these measures explain a large part of the time series variation in aggregate corporate bond prices. In the cross-section, holding periods and markups overshadow extant liquidity measures and have significant explanatory power for individual bond prices. Both measures shed light on the credit spread puzzle: changes in credit spread are positively correlated with changes in holding periods and markups, and a large portion of credit spread changes is explained by them. The economic effects of holding periods and markups are particularly sharp during crisis periods.
ContributorsQian, Zhiyi (Author) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Mehra, Rajnish (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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This paper examines how equity analysts' roles as information intermediaries and monitors affect corporate liquidity policy and its associated value of cash, providing new evidence that analysts have a direct impact on corporate liquidity policy. Greater analyst coverage (1) reduces information asymmetry between a firm and outside shareholders and (2)

This paper examines how equity analysts' roles as information intermediaries and monitors affect corporate liquidity policy and its associated value of cash, providing new evidence that analysts have a direct impact on corporate liquidity policy. Greater analyst coverage (1) reduces information asymmetry between a firm and outside shareholders and (2) enhances the monitoring process. Consistent with these arguments, analyst coverage increases the value of cash, thereby allowing firms to hold more cash. The cash-to-assets ratio increases by 5.2 percentage points when moving from the bottom analyst-coverage decile to the top decile. The marginal value of $1 of corporate cash holdings is $0.93 for the bottom analyst-coverage decile and $1.83 for the top decile. The positive effects remain robust after a battery of endogeneity checks. I also perform tests employing a unique dataset that consists of public and private firms, as well as a dataset that consists of public firms that have gone private. A public firm with analyst coverage can hold approximately 8% more cash than its private counterpart. These findings constitute new evidence on the real effect of analyst coverage.
ContributorsChang, Ching-Hung (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Lindsey, Laura (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families

By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into wealthy families, as measured by a variety of proxies for firm performance. There is no evidence of higher risk-taking by the CEOs from low social status backgrounds. Further, CEOs from less privileged families perform better in firms with high R&D spending but they underperform CEOs from wealthy families when firms operate in a more uncertain environment. Taken together, my results show that endowed family wealth of a CEO is useful in identifying his or her managerial ability.
ContributorsDu, Fangfang (Author) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Wang, Jessie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate policy. The first chapter analyzes whether being labeled a “growth” firm or a “value” firm affects the firm’s dividend policy. I focus on the dividend policy because of its discretionary nature and the link to investor demand. To address endogeneity concerns, I

This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate policy. The first chapter analyzes whether being labeled a “growth” firm or a “value” firm affects the firm’s dividend policy. I focus on the dividend policy because of its discretionary nature and the link to investor demand. To address endogeneity concerns, I use regression discontinuity design around the threshold to assign firms to each category. The results show that “value” firms have a significantly higher dividend payout - about four percentage points - than growth firms. This approach establishes a causal link between firm “growth/value” labels and dividend policy.

The second chapter develops investment policy model which associated with du- ration of cash flow. Firms are doing their business by operating a portfolio of projects that have various duration, and the duration of the project portfolio generates dif- ferent duration of cash flow stream. By assuming the duration of cash flow as a firm specific characteristic, this paper analyzes how the duration of cash flow affects firms’ investment decision. I develop a model of investment, external finance, and savings to characterize how firms’ decision is affected by the duration of cash flow. Firms maximize total value of cash flow, while they have to maintain their solvency by paying a fixed cost for the operation. I empirically confirm the positive correlation between duration of cash flow and investment with theoretical support. Financial constraint suffocates the firm when they face solvency issue, so that model with financial constraint shows that the correlation between duration of cash flow and investment is stronger than low financial constraint case.
ContributorsLee, Tae Eui (Author) / Mehra, Rajnish (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Thesis advisor) / Custodio, Claudia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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This dissertation is a collection of three essays relating household financial obligations to asset prices. Financial obligations include both debt payments and other financial commitments.

In the first essay, I investigate how household financial obligations affect the equity premium. I modify the standard Mehra-Prescott (1985) consumption-based asset pricing model to resolve

This dissertation is a collection of three essays relating household financial obligations to asset prices. Financial obligations include both debt payments and other financial commitments.

In the first essay, I investigate how household financial obligations affect the equity premium. I modify the standard Mehra-Prescott (1985) consumption-based asset pricing model to resolve the equity risk premium puzzle. I focus on two channels: the preference channel and the borrowing constraints channel. Under reasonable parameterizations, my model generates equity risk premiums similar in magnitudes to those observed in U.S. data. Furthermore, I show that relaxing the borrowing constraint shrinks the equity risk premium.

In the Second essay, I test the predictability of excess market returns using the household financial obligations ratio. I show that deviations in the household financial obligations ratio from its long-run mean is a better forecaster of future market returns than alternative prediction variables. The results remain significant using either quarterly or annual data and are robust to out-of-sample tests.

In the third essay, I investigate whether the risk associated with household financial obligations is an economy-wide risk with the potential to explain fluctuations in the cross-section of stock returns. The multifactor model I propose, is a modification of the capital asset pricing model that includes the financial obligations ratio as a ``conditioning down" variable. The key finding is that there is an aggregate hedging demand for securities that pay off in periods characterized by higher levels of financial obligations ratios. The consistent pricing of financial obligations risk with a negative risk premium suggests that the financial obligations ratio acts as a state variable.
ContributorsJahangiry, Pedram (Author) / Mehra, Rajnish (Thesis advisor) / Wahal, Sunil (Committee member) / Reffett, Kevin (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who do not exhibit such behavior and interprets the investment and

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who do not exhibit such behavior and interprets the investment and financing decisions by overconfident or optimistic CEOs as inferior. This paper argues that it may be rational to exhibit behavior interpreted as optimistic and that the determinants of a CEO’s perceived optimism are important. Further, this paper shows that CEOs whose apparent optimism results from above average industry-adjusted CEO performance in prior years make investment and financing decisions which are actually similar, and sometimes superior to, those of unbiased CEOs.
ContributorsWalton, Richard (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Lindsey, Laura (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
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This dissertation consists of two essays related to dynamic debt contracting and financial economics. The first chapter studies key determinants of inclusion of a financial covenant in corporate loans from theoretical and empirical angles. Using a novel manually collected loan dataset of small to medium-sized publicly-listed U.S. firms, I find

This dissertation consists of two essays related to dynamic debt contracting and financial economics. The first chapter studies key determinants of inclusion of a financial covenant in corporate loans from theoretical and empirical angles. Using a novel manually collected loan dataset of small to medium-sized publicly-listed U.S. firms, I find that firms that issue loans without financial covenants tend to have (i) lower accounting quality, (ii) lower assets, and (iii) are experiencing faster growth in profitability relative to firms that issue loans with financial covenants. I build a theoretical model of project financing in which there is noisy public information about the project’s profitability, and the lender can privately monitor to improve the information quality. I show that if the signal precision without monitoring is sufficiently low (high), the equilibrium contract does not include (includes) a covenant. Covenant inclusion plays a key role in providing incentives to the lender to monitor. I show that the lender monitors less often relative to the first best. Insufficient monitoring leads to “excessive risk-taking,” namely, bad quality firms continuing with the project too often. Relatedly, I also show that covenants are used less often in equilibrium relative to the first best. The second chapter examines equilibrium consequences of litigation by holdout creditors in sovereign debt renegotiation. I show that given a sufficiently high probability of winning the litigation case against the borrowing country and/or a high enough defaulted sovereign debt, the presence of the holdout creditors increases the expected debt recovery rate, which makes the default option less attractive, and decreases the country’s default probability and the interest rate on the country’s debt. The country responds by borrowing more but defaults less often along the equilibrium path as it wants to avoid default and facing holdout creditors. Having a non-zero probability of successful litigation is welfare improving for the country as it sustains higher debt and defaults less frequently.
ContributorsKim, Yong (Author) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Thesis advisor) / Mehra, Rajnish (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
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This dissertation consists of three essays studying topics in financial economicsthrough the lens of quantitative models. In particular, I provide three examples of the effective use of data in the disciplining of financial economics models. In the first essay, I provide evidence of a significant transitory component of aggregate equity payout. Leading asset

This dissertation consists of three essays studying topics in financial economicsthrough the lens of quantitative models. In particular, I provide three examples of the effective use of data in the disciplining of financial economics models. In the first essay, I provide evidence of a significant transitory component of aggregate equity payout. Leading asset pricing models assume exogenous dividend growth processes which are inconsistent with this fact. I find that imposing market clearing for consumption and income in these models induces the relevant behaviors in dividend growth, even when dividend growth is obtained indirectly. In the second essay, I provide a novel decomposition of the unconditional equity risk premium. In the data, the majority of the equity premium is attributable to moderate left tail risks, not those associated with disaster states. In stark contrast to the data, leading asset pricing models do not predict that this intermediate left tail region meaningfully contributes to the equity premium. The shortcomings of the models can be pinned on unreasonably low prices of risk for tail events relative to the data. In the third essay, I document a large dispersion in household allocations to risky assets conditional on age. I show that while standard household portfolio choice models can be made to match the average risky share over the lifecycle, the models fall short of generating sufficient heterogeneity in the cross-section of household portfolios.
ContributorsBeason, Tyler (Author) / Mehra, Rajnish (Thesis advisor) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Pruitt, Seth (Committee member) / Schreindorfer, David (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021