Matching Items (135)
Description
Russellian monism is a promising theory of consciousness that attempts to capture the strengths of both physicalism and dualism while avoiding their weaknesses. I begin by showing that the Russellian monist’s chief anti-physicalist rival, emergentism, is unable to give an adequate solution to the exclusion problem. Specifically, they fall prey to what I call “the opacity problem.” That is, because the emergentist is committed to there being both a sufficient physical cause and a sufficient mental cause for our actions, it is unclear what difference the mental cause is making in bringing about the effect. This is because, for the physical cause to truly be a sufficient cause, it must be sufficient to bring about the effect as it occurred. This distinguishes mental overdetermination from non-problematic kinds of overdetermination (like double rock throwing cases). I then show how the constitutive Russellian monist is able to avoid the exclusion problem, while the emergent Russellian monist faces similar opacity problems to emergentism. Finally, I give an account of how the constitutive Russellian monist can give a response to the strongest objection against—the subject-summing problem. I argue that we only have translucent access to our conscious states—that is, only part of the essential nature of the state is revealed to us through introspection. I then argue that we have reason to think that part of the essential nature of the conscious state not revealed to us is involved in subject-summing.
ContributorsSchreick, Forrest J (Author) / Kobes, Bernard W. (Thesis advisor) / Reynolds, Steven L. (Thesis advisor) / Pinillos, N. Angel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
After surveying the literature on the normativity of logic, the paper answers that logic is normative for reasoning and rationality. The paper then goes on to discuss whether this constitutes a new problem in issues in normativity, and the paper affirms that it does. Finally, the paper concludes by explaining that the logic as model view can address this new problem.
ContributorsCadenas, Haggeo (Author) / Pinillos, Angel (Thesis advisor) / Creath, Richard (Committee member) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / nair, shyam (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
In their criticism of various approaches to upbringing and related American family law jurisprudence, liberal theorists tend to underweight the interests of parents in directing the development of children’s values. Considered through the lens of T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism, providing a good upbringing is not a matter of identifying children’s “best interests” or acting in accordance with overriding end-state principles. Rather, children should be raised in accordance with principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement. The process of ascertaining such principles requires an understanding of relevant values; a good upbringing is what children receive when parents properly value their children, enabling them to appropriately recognize what it is that they have reason to do given the roles that they play. By developing the account of upbringing hinted at in Scanlon’s contractualist monograph, What We Owe to Each Other, this project identifies and responds to some common mistakes in contemporary liberal theorizing on childhood, suggests that contractualism yields a more plausible account of upbringing than alternative approaches, and along the way identifies some implications of contractualism for public policy where individuals properly value the children of others in their community.
ContributorsPike, Kenneth (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis advisor) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
Criminal Justice is a complex subject matter, and not everyone agrees on the way a criminal justice system ought to function. But one feature that is common to virtually all forms of proposed justice systems is that a true justice system treats people ethically. The question, then, is how a justice system can achieve this. This investigation analyzed two ethical theories, Kantianism and Utilitarianism, to determine which one would be better suited for guiding a criminal justice system on how to treat the people involved ethically. This investigation focused on applying the two theories to the U.S. Criminal Justice System in particular.
Kantianism is a duty-based moral theory in which actions have an intrinsic moral worth. This means certain actions are morally right and other are morally wrong, regardless of the intended or realized consequences. The theory relies on the categorical imperative to judge the morality of certain actions. It states that an action is moral if its maxim can be willed universal law and if it avoids treating people as merely a means. In contrast, Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory which focuses on the consequences of an action in judging moral worth. In Utilitarianism, the morally correct action is the one which will maximize utility; that is to say, the morally right action is the one which will produce the greatest amount of happiness and minimize the amount of pain for the greatest number of people.
After applying these two theories to moral dilemmas facing the U.S. Criminal Justice System, including the appropriate collection of DNA evidence, the use of police deception, and the use of criminal punishments such as solitary confinement or the death penalty, it was clear that Kantianism was the ethical theory best suited for guiding the system in treating people ethically. This is because Kantianism’s focus on the intrinsic moral worth of an action rather than its consequences leaves less room for ambiguity than does Utilitarianism.
Kantianism is a duty-based moral theory in which actions have an intrinsic moral worth. This means certain actions are morally right and other are morally wrong, regardless of the intended or realized consequences. The theory relies on the categorical imperative to judge the morality of certain actions. It states that an action is moral if its maxim can be willed universal law and if it avoids treating people as merely a means. In contrast, Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory which focuses on the consequences of an action in judging moral worth. In Utilitarianism, the morally correct action is the one which will maximize utility; that is to say, the morally right action is the one which will produce the greatest amount of happiness and minimize the amount of pain for the greatest number of people.
After applying these two theories to moral dilemmas facing the U.S. Criminal Justice System, including the appropriate collection of DNA evidence, the use of police deception, and the use of criminal punishments such as solitary confinement or the death penalty, it was clear that Kantianism was the ethical theory best suited for guiding the system in treating people ethically. This is because Kantianism’s focus on the intrinsic moral worth of an action rather than its consequences leaves less room for ambiguity than does Utilitarianism.
ContributorsMorett, Xavier Laakea (Author) / Manninen, Bertha (Thesis director) / Kimberly, Kobojek (Committee member) / School of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Natural Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2020-05
Description
Abstract. The term "sex trafficking" can mean many different things, depending on who uses it. To some, it may be synonymous with prostitution. To others, it may equate to slavery. And some may find that sex trafficking differs from both slavery and prostitution. But I find that the term "sex trafficking" is used improperly when referring to phenomena that may not entail the violation of rights of any individual involved. For this reason, various definitions of "sex trafficking" may inappropriately conflate sex trafficking with prostitution. In this essay, I argue against such a conflation through supporting a rights-based approach of defining "sex trafficking," in which every instance of true sex trafficking necessitates a violation of someone's rights. First, I begin by laying the foundation of my discussion with definitions and various government and non-government uses of the term "sex trafficking." Then, I argue for the rights-based approach. I proceed to explore how the rights-based approach relates to consent, force, coercion, deception, and competence. Then, I compile my findings, synthesize a definition, and elaborate on a few questions regarding my definition. Using the term "sex trafficking" correctly, as I argue, means that we necessarily use the term in a context of a violation of rights.
ContributorsMiller, Isaac Jonathan (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis director) / McGregor, Joan (Committee member) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
I argue that a morally heavy, poorly researched, emotionally powerful piece of non-fiction media with complex subject matter shown to an ill-equipped audience is unethical. I then evaluate methods of avoiding unethical situations from the perspective of media creators. I conclude by calling for a strictly diligence based ratings board anchored in the professional guilds of the entertainment industry.
ContributorsBroderick, Nathan Andrew (Author) / Maday, Gregg (Thesis director) / Watson, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Film, Dance and Theatre (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-12
Description
The globalized food system has caused detriments to the environment, to economic justice, and to social and health rights within the food system. Due to an increasing concern over these problems, there has been a popular turn back to a localized food system. Localization's main principle is reconnecting the producer and consumer while advocating for healthy, local, environmentally friendly, and socially just food. I give utilitarian reasons within a Kantian ethical framework to argue that while partaking in a local food system may be morally good, we cannot advocate for localization as a moral obligation. It is true from empirical research that localizing food could solve many of the environmental, economic, social, and health problems that exist today due to the food system. However, many other countries depend upon the import/export system to keep their own poverty rates low and economies thriving. Utilitarian Peter Singer argues that it would be irresponsible to stop our business with those other countries because we would be causing more harm than good. There are reasons to support food localization, and reasons to reject food localization. Food localization is a moral good in respect to the many benefits that it has, yet it is not a moral obligation due to some of the detriments it may itself cause.
ContributorsGulinson, Chelsea Leah (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis director) / Watson, Jeff (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor) / Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
"Should I kill myself, or have a cup of coffee?" \u2014 Albert Camus Making a decision between committing suicide or continuing about the monotony of a life void of meaning can be surprisingly difficult to make when all human logic entices us to do the former. In fact, doing the latter seems definitively humanely impossible. In my art series "The Absurd Man", I visually analyze a variety of human reactions to absurdism, drawing from absurdist texts as well as personal experiences to force upon the viewer, recognition of the discomforting reality of human frailty.
ContributorsTa, Trang Thuy (Author) / Pessler, Anthony (Thesis director) / Obuck, John (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Art (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
Some scholars have suggested that individuals are inclined to believe that they have souls because they are also inclined to believe that they have a core, immutable self. The present study will explore this question in several parts. First, what is the extent to which individuals report having a core self? Next, how do beliefs about a core self relate to belief or non-belief in an eternal soul? The final question looks at location as an extension of the core self and soul relationship. Where is the self perceived to reside within a dualistic framework, the body or the soul? This study assessed the stated beliefs of 200 respondents using Amazon Mechanical Turk as a recruiting platform. Greater belief in a core self was moderately associated with greater belief in an eternal soul (r= 0.30, p<.01), and with belief in the self as a reflection of the soul (r=0.31, p<.01) and as a reflection of the brain (r=0.21, p<.01). This suggests that belief in a core self does hold association with belief in an eternal soul. However, its perceived location seems to show little preference as residing withing the soul versus the body.
ContributorsLy, Destiny (Author) / Hruschka, Daniel (Thesis director) / Parker, John (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2014-12
Description
The Paradox of Fiction can be understood as the acceptance of three plausible but inconsistent claims: Claim 1. We are genuinely moved by fiction Claim 2. We know that what is portrayed by fiction is not actual Claim 3. We are only genuinely moved by what we believe is actual. Taken individually, we intuitively accept each of the claims, however, they form a contradiction when taken together. The issue at hand is although we observe many instances of fiction moving a spectator/reader to tears, we know that the grief we observe does not reference an existent entity. How can we grieve at the death of Mercutio in "Romeo and Juliet" when Mercutio never existed let alone died? How can we fear a monster we know exists only in the world of a film? Many theories have been proposed to dissolve this paradox, and I focus on the ones that approach the puzzle by rejecting one of the above three claims. I examine some of these theories and explain why they fail to solve the paradox, and in doing so I demonstrate that the Make-Believe Theory succeeds where the others failed. Make-Believe Theory rejects Claim 1 and I shall prove that although unintuitive, we are completely justified in claiming that we are not genuinely moved by fiction. Instead, when we are moved by fictions, we are moved in a similar way to how a child is moved in a game of make-believe.
ContributorsGoitia, Brice Edward (Author) / Bolton, Cynthia (Thesis director) / de Marneffe, Peter (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2015-05