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- All Subjects: Accounting
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- All Subjects: Investment analysis--Law and legislation--United States--History--21st century.
- All Subjects: Investment banking--Law and legislation--United States--History--21st century.
- Member of: ASU Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Description
Responding to the allegedly biased research reports issued by large investment banks, the Global Research Analyst Settlement and related regulations went to great lengths to weaken the conflicts of interest faced by investment bank analysts. In this paper, I investigate the effects of these changes on small and large investor confidence and on trading profitability. Specifically, I examine abnormal trading volumes generated by small and large investors in response to security analyst recommendations and the resulting abnormal market returns generated. I find an overall increase in investor confidence in the post-regulation period relative to the pre-regulation period consistent with a reduction in existing conflicts of interest. The change in confidence observed is particularly striking for small traders. I also find that small trader profitability has increased in the post-regulation period relative to the pre-regulation period whereas that for large traders has decreased. These results are consistent with the Securities and Exchange Commission's primary mission to protect small investors and maintain the integrity of the securities markets.
ContributorsDong, Xiaobo (Author) / Mikhail, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Hugon, Artur J (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is a strategic planning and management system that causally links actions and subsequent financial and nonfinancial outcomes. The primary goal of the BSC is to motivate actions that are congruent with the organization's long-term strategy. A secondary purpose of the BSC is to facilitate the performance evaluation of managers charged with advancing the corporate strategy. To serve this second purpose the BSC must include a time dimension. Specifically, the strategic plan must recognize time lags between actions taken, lead outcomes (often nonfinancial in nature) and lagged outcomes (usually financial success measures). If an evaluator is not provided with timeline information a subordinate may be evaluated based on inappropriate performance metrics; that is, a subordinate may be held accountable for an outcome beyond the subordinate's time span of control. This study evaluates the effect on performance evaluations and bonus allocations when evaluators are provided (or not provided) with a strategy implementation timeline. This issue has not been previously examined in the literature. This study also examines the moderating effect of experience, management buy-in to the corporate strategy, and affect on performance evaluations and bonus allocations. Results from an experiment conducted with evening MBA students show that inclusion of a strategy implementation timeline leads to more normatively correct performance evaluations, but only for experienced participants. Higher levels of both positive and negative affect were found to result in choice avoidance behavior. Buy-in to the corporate strategy was not found to have an effect.
ContributorsBartlett, Geoffrey (Author) / Reckers, Philip M.J. (Thesis advisor) / Lowe, D. Jordan (Committee member) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012