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In this study, I test whether firms reduce the information asymmetry stemming from the political process by investing in political connections. I expect that connected firms enjoy differential access to relevant political information, and use this information to mitigate the negative consequences of political uncertainty. I investigate this construct in

In this study, I test whether firms reduce the information asymmetry stemming from the political process by investing in political connections. I expect that connected firms enjoy differential access to relevant political information, and use this information to mitigate the negative consequences of political uncertainty. I investigate this construct in the context of firm-specific investment, where prior literature has documented a negative relation between investment and uncertainty. Specifically, I regress firm investment levels on the interaction of time-varying political uncertainty and the degree of a firm's political connectedness, controlling for determinants of investment, political participation, general macroeconomic conditions, and firm and time-period fixed effects. Consistent with prior work, I first document that firm-specific investment levels are significantly lower during periods of increased uncertainty, defined as the year leading up to a national election. I then assess the extent that political connections offset the negative effect of political uncertainty. Consistent with my hypothesis, I document the mitigating effect of political connections on the negative relation between investment levels and political uncertainty. These findings are robust to controls for alternative explanations related to the pre-electoral manipulation hypothesis and industry-level political participation. These findings are also robust to alternative specifications designed to address the possibility that time-invariant firm characteristics are driving the observed results. I also examine whether investors consider time-varying political uncertainty and the mitigating effect of political connections when capitalizing current earnings news. I find support that the earnings-response coefficient is lower during periods of increased uncertainty. However, I do not find evidence that investors incorporate the value relevant information in political connections as a mitigating factor.
ContributorsWellman, Laura (Author) / Dhaliwal, Dan (Thesis advisor) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Walther, Beverly (Committee member) / Mikhail, Mike (Committee member) / Hillman, Amy (Committee member) / Brown, Jenny (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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Description
While credit rating agencies use both forward-looking and historical information in evaluating a firm's credit risk, the role of forward-looking information in their rating decisions is not well understood. In this study, I examine the association between management earnings guidance news and future credit rating changes. While upward earnings guidance

While credit rating agencies use both forward-looking and historical information in evaluating a firm's credit risk, the role of forward-looking information in their rating decisions is not well understood. In this study, I examine the association between management earnings guidance news and future credit rating changes. While upward earnings guidance is not informative for credit rating changes, downward earnings guidance is significantly and positively associated with both the likelihood and speed of rating downgrades. In cross-sectional analyses, I find that downward guidance is especially informative in two important circumstances: (i) when a firm's current credit rating is overly optimistic compared to a model predicted rating, and (ii) when the relevance or reliability of alternative information sources is lower. In addition, I find that downward guidance is associated with lower future cash flows, as well as a higher volatility of future cash flows. Overall, the results are consistent with credit rating agencies incorporating voluntary bad news disclosures into their decisions about whether and when to downgrade a firm.
ContributorsLin, An-Ping (Author) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Hugon, Jean (Thesis advisor) / Call, Andrew (Committee member) / Dhaliwal, Dan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Description
I examine the degree to which stockholders' aggregate gain/loss frame of reference in the equity of a given firm affects their response to the firm's quarterly earnings announcements. Contrary to predictions from rational expectations models of trade (Shackelford and Verrecchia 2002), I find that abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements

I examine the degree to which stockholders' aggregate gain/loss frame of reference in the equity of a given firm affects their response to the firm's quarterly earnings announcements. Contrary to predictions from rational expectations models of trade (Shackelford and Verrecchia 2002), I find that abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements is larger (smaller) when stockholders are in an aggregate unrealized capital gain (loss) position. This relation is stronger among seller-initiated trades and weaker in December, consistent with the cognitive bias referred to as the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985). Sensitivity analysis reveals that the relation is stronger among less sophisticated investors and for firms with weaker information environments, consistent with the behavioral explanation. I also present evidence on the consequences of this disposition effect. First, stockholders' aggregate unrealized capital gain position moderates the degree to which information-related determinants of trade (e.g. unexpected earnings, firm size, and forecast dispersion) affect abnormal announcement-window trading volume. Second, stockholders' aggregate unrealized capital gains position is associated with announcement-window abnormal returns, consistent with the disposition effect reducing the market's ability to efficiently incorporate earnings news into price.
ContributorsWeisbrod, Eric (Author) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steven (Committee member) / Mikhail, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
When managers provide earnings guidance, analysts normally respond within a short time frame with their own earnings forecasts. Within this setting, I investigate whether financial analysts use publicly available information to adjust for predictable error in management guidance and, if so, the explanation for such inefficiency. I provide evidence that

When managers provide earnings guidance, analysts normally respond within a short time frame with their own earnings forecasts. Within this setting, I investigate whether financial analysts use publicly available information to adjust for predictable error in management guidance and, if so, the explanation for such inefficiency. I provide evidence that analysts do not fully adjust for predictable guidance error when revising forecasts. The analyst inefficiency is attributed to analysts' attempts to advance relationship with the managers, analysts' compensation not tie to forecast accuracy, and their forecasting ability. Finally, the stock market acts as if it does not fully realize that analysts respond inefficiently to the guidance, introducing mispricing. This mispricing is not fully corrected upon earnings announcement.
ContributorsLin, Kuan-Chen (Author) / Mikhail, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Committee member) / Hugon, Jean (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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Description
This case study analyzed the internal controls of a real estate company using the widely accepted COSO framework. Testing of the internal environment and controls was completed using the COSO framework. The major internal control problem identified in the study was a lack of ethical standards in the control environment.

This case study analyzed the internal controls of a real estate company using the widely accepted COSO framework. Testing of the internal environment and controls was completed using the COSO framework. The major internal control problem identified in the study was a lack of ethical standards in the control environment. In addition to this main problem, inadequate documentation, no separation of duties, and unqualified employees were also identified as violations of effective internal controls. The department of real estate ordered a "cease and desist" on August 8, 2013 due to illegal company activities. The company participated in illegal actions regarding: the trust account and company documentation and procedures. Material weaknesses were found in the company's internal controls; therefore the result of this study was an adverse opinion on internal controls.
ContributorsFrederick, Nicole Lorraine (Author) / Munshi, Perseus (Thesis director) / Benali, Kayla (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor)
Created2013-12
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Description
Cognitive technology has been at the forefront of the minds of many technology, government, and business leaders, because of its potential to completely revolutionize their fields. Furthermore, individuals in financial statement auditor roles are especially focused on the impact of cognitive technology because of its potential to eliminate many of

Cognitive technology has been at the forefront of the minds of many technology, government, and business leaders, because of its potential to completely revolutionize their fields. Furthermore, individuals in financial statement auditor roles are especially focused on the impact of cognitive technology because of its potential to eliminate many of the tedious, repetitive tasks involved in their profession. Adopting new technologies that can autonomously collect more data from a broader range of sources, turn the data into business intelligence, and even make decisions based on that data begs the question of whether human roles in accounting will be completely replaced. A partial answer: If the ramifications of past technological advances are any indicator, cognitive technology will replace some human audit operations and grow some new and higher order roles for humans. It will shift the focus of accounting professionals to more complex judgment and analysis.
The next question: What do these changes in the roles and responsibilities look like for the auditors of the future? Cognitive technology will assuredly present new issues for which humans will have to find solutions.
• How will humans be able to test the accuracy and completeness of the decisions derived by cognitive systems?
• If cognitive computing systems rely on supervised learning, what is the most effective way to train systems?
• How will cognitive computing fair in an industry that experiences ever-changing industry regulations?
• Will cognitive technology enhance the quality of audits?
In order to answer these questions and many more, I plan on examining how cognitive technologies evolved into their use today. Based on this historic trajectory, stakeholder interviews, and industry research, I will forecast what auditing jobs may look like in the near future taking into account rapid advances in cognitive computing.
The conclusions forecast a future in auditing that is much more accurate, timely, and pleasant. Cognitive technologies allow auditors to test entire populations of transactions, to tackle audit issues on a more continuous basis, to alleviate the overload of work that occurs after fiscal year-end, and to focus on client interaction.
ContributorsWitkop, David (Author) / Dawson, Gregory (Thesis director) / Munshi, Perseus (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
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Description
Insider trading potentially reveals proprietary information, allowing rivals to compete more effectively against the insiders' firm. This paper examines whether proprietary costs are associated with insiders' trading decisions and the profitability of their trades. Using a variety of approaches to identify proprietary information risk, I find proprietary costs significantly deter

Insider trading potentially reveals proprietary information, allowing rivals to compete more effectively against the insiders' firm. This paper examines whether proprietary costs are associated with insiders' trading decisions and the profitability of their trades. Using a variety of approaches to identify proprietary information risk, I find proprietary costs significantly deter insiders' trading activities. The deterrence effect is more pronounced when insider trading is likely to be more informative to rivals. Specifically, trades by top executives, non-routine trades, and trades at low complexity firms are curbed to a greater extent by proprietary costs. Examining the mechanisms of this deterrence effect, I find firms with higher proprietary costs are more likely to impose insider trading restrictions, and insiders' trading decisions are more sensitive to proprietary costs when they have higher share ownership of the company. These results suggest insiders reduce trading activities not only due to firm policies, but also due to incentive alignment. Finally, when insiders trade despite higher proprietary costs, they earn significantly higher abnormal profits from their purchase transactions. Overall, this study suggests product market considerations are an important factor associated with insiders' trading decisions and profitability of their trades. These findings are likely to be of interest to regulators and corporate boards in setting insider trading policies, and help investors make investment decisions using insider trading signals.
ContributorsChoi, Lyungmae (Author) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Faurel, Lucile (Thesis advisor) / Hugon, Jean (Committee member) / Huang, Xiaochuan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Description
Given that lobbying activity by audit firms constitutes a potential advocacy threat to auditor independence, this paper seeks to provide an economic rationale for audit firm lobbying behavior. Specifically, I examine whether federal lobbying activity by audit firms contributes to their ability to retain existing clients and attract new clients.

Given that lobbying activity by audit firms constitutes a potential advocacy threat to auditor independence, this paper seeks to provide an economic rationale for audit firm lobbying behavior. Specifically, I examine whether federal lobbying activity by audit firms contributes to their ability to retain existing clients and attract new clients. Consequently, I predict and find that greater lobbying activity is associated with a lower probability of auditor switching behavior as well longer auditor tenure when the client is in an industry with high interest in lobbying. I also find that, when switching audit firms, clients tend to choose audit firms with greater lobbying activity and that companies in industries with high interest in lobbying are more likely to choose an audit firm with greater lobbying activity than their previous auditor.
ContributorsKim, Margaret Hyun-Mee (Author) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Reckers, Philip (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steven (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Description
This study presents the first evidence that mutual fund liquidity management affects both stock liquidity and information disclosure of portfolio firms. Using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits a proposal by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an exogenous shock to mutual fund liquidity management, I find causal evidence

This study presents the first evidence that mutual fund liquidity management affects both stock liquidity and information disclosure of portfolio firms. Using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits a proposal by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an exogenous shock to mutual fund liquidity management, I find causal evidence that mutual fund liquidity management improves liquidity of underlying stocks. The liquidity improvement is more pronounced when mutual funds have stronger incentives to improve portfolio liquidity and more resources to influence firms, and when portfolio firms have lower stock liquidity and higher information asymmetry prior to the SEC proposal. I further show that mutual funds may exert pressure on portfolio firms to improve their disclosure as a channel to improve stock liquidity. Overall, the results indicate that liquidity management at the fund level has important implications for stock liquidity and information disclosure of portfolio firms.
ContributorsWeng, Liwei (Author) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Huang, Shawn X. (Thesis advisor) / Li, Yinghua (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020