Matching Items (12)
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- All Subjects: Accounting
- All Subjects: SOX
- Creators: Samuelson, Melissa
- Resource Type: Text
Description
In this study, I examine the extent to which firms rely on relative performance evaluation (RPE) when setting executive compensation. In particular, I examine whether firms use information about peer performance to determine compensation at the end of the year, i.e. after both firm and peer performance are observed. I find that RPE is most pronounced for firms that allow little or no scope for ex post subjective adjustments to annual bonuses. Conversely, firms that rely mainly on subjectivity in determining bonus exhibit little use of RPE. These findings suggest that information about peer performance is not used at the end of the year. Instead, peer performance seems to be incorporated in performance targets at the beginning of the year, at least among firms primarily using objective performance measurements. In addition, I provide new evidence on the determinants of the use of subjectivity.
ContributorsTsui, Stephanie (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steven (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
I examine the degree to which stockholders' aggregate gain/loss frame of reference in the equity of a given firm affects their response to the firm's quarterly earnings announcements. Contrary to predictions from rational expectations models of trade (Shackelford and Verrecchia 2002), I find that abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements is larger (smaller) when stockholders are in an aggregate unrealized capital gain (loss) position. This relation is stronger among seller-initiated trades and weaker in December, consistent with the cognitive bias referred to as the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985). Sensitivity analysis reveals that the relation is stronger among less sophisticated investors and for firms with weaker information environments, consistent with the behavioral explanation. I also present evidence on the consequences of this disposition effect. First, stockholders' aggregate unrealized capital gain position moderates the degree to which information-related determinants of trade (e.g. unexpected earnings, firm size, and forecast dispersion) affect abnormal announcement-window trading volume. Second, stockholders' aggregate unrealized capital gains position is associated with announcement-window abnormal returns, consistent with the disposition effect reducing the market's ability to efficiently incorporate earnings news into price.
ContributorsWeisbrod, Eric (Author) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steven (Committee member) / Mikhail, Michael (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
Description
Financial statements are one of the most important, if not the most important, documents for investors. These statements are prepared quarterly and yearly by the company accounting department, and are then audited in detail by a large external accounting firm. Investors use these documents to determine the value of the company, and trust that the company was truthful in its statements, and the auditing firm correctly audited the company's financial statements for any mistakes in their books and balances. Mistakes on a company's financial statements can be costly. However, financial fraud on the statements can be outright disastrous. Penalties for accounting fraud can include individual lifetime prison sentences, as well as company fines for billions of dollars. As students in the accounting major, it is our responsibility to ensure that financial statements are accurate and truthful to protect ourselves, other stakeholders, and the companies we work for. This ethics game takes the stories of Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers and uses them to help students identify financial fraud and how it can be prevented, as well as the consequences behind unethical decisions in financial reporting. The Enron scandal involved CEO Kenneth Lay and his predecessor Jeffery Skilling hiding losses in their financial statements with the help of their auditing firm, Arthur Andersen. Enron collapsed in 2002, and Lay was sentenced to 45 years in prison with his conspirator Skilling sentenced to 24 years in prison. In the WorldCom scandal, CEO Bernard "Bernie" Ebbers booked line costs as capital expenses (overstating WorldCom's assets), and created fraudulent accounts to inflate revenue and WorldCom's profit. Ebbers was sentenced to 25 years in prison and lost his title as WorldCom's Chief Executive Officer. Lehman Brothers took advantage of a loophole in accounting procedure Repo 105, that let the firm hide $50 billion in profits. No one at Lehman Brothers was sentenced to jail since the transaction was technically considered legal, but Lehman was the largest investment bank to fail and the only large financial institution that was not bailed out by the U.S. government.
ContributorsPanikkar, Manoj Madhuraj (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Ahmad, Altaf (Committee member) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
Executive compensation is broken into two parts: one fixed and one variable. The fixed component of executive compensation is the annual salary and the variable components are performance-based incentives. Clawback provisions of executive compensation are designed to require executives to return performance-based, variable compensation that was erroneously awarded in the year of a misstatement. This research shows the need for the use of a new clawback provision that combines aspects of the two currently in regulation. In our current federal regulation, there are two clawback provisions in play: Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley and section 954 of The Dodd\u2014Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This paper argues for the use of an optimal clawback provision that combines aspects of both the current SOX provision and the Dodd-Frank provision, by integrating the principles of loss aversion and narcissism. These two factors are important to consider when designing a clawback provision, as it is generally accepted that average individuals are loss averse and executives are becoming increasingly narcissistic. Therefore, when attempting to mitigate the risk of a leader keeping erroneously awarded executive compensation, the decision making factors of narcissism and loss aversion must be taken into account. Additionally, this paper predicts how compensation structures will shift post-implementation. Through a survey analyzing the level of both loss- aversion and narcissism in respondents, the research question justifies the principle that people are loss averse and that a subset of the population show narcissistic tendencies. Both loss aversion and narcissism drove the results to suggest there are benefits to both clawback provisions and that a new provision that combines elements of both is most beneficial in mitigating the risk of executives receiving erroneously awarded compensation. I concluded the most optimal clawback provision is mandatory for all public companies (Dodd-Frank), targets all executives (Dodd-Frank), and requires the recuperation of the entire bonus, not just that which was in excess of what should have been received (SOX).
ContributorsLarscheid, Elizabeth (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
Blockchain is a sophisticated and complex technology that will have a massive impact on the public accounting industry. Currently there is concern surrounding how blockchain may impact the industry as a whole. Auditors and accountants are worried that this technology has the potential to replace the responsibilities they fulfill. However, blockchain technology will not replace accountants and will enhance their daily activities by eliminating menial tasks, providing increased transparency, and allowing time to be spent in areas that require more consideration. This will change the role of accountants and professionals, requiring them to be more technologically proficient and analytically minded. This paper is organized as follows. There will be an initial explanation of the technology to inform the reader of what blockchain is and how it works. Then there will be a discussion regarding how blockchain technology relates to, and can be utilized by, public accounting firms as well as the implications of blockchain on the public accounting industry. These implications will be discussed followed by why they are extraneous, and how to combat them in both the assurance and advisory practices. In conclusion, recommendations will be provided for public accounting firms on how to effectively utilize the technology to their benefit.
ContributorsLomsdalen, Stephen A (Co-author) / Charen, Stephanie (Co-author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Garverick, Michael (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
Description
This thesis analyzes the connection between introversion and success in public accounting by looking at traits introverts need to develop in order to do well in this field. The paper begins by giving a background on both public accounting and introversion and why the relationship between these two needs to be studied. It discusses how introversion is not the norm in business, but how the traits outlined in the paper give introverts a strong opportunity for success. The first trait looked at is one-on-one skills and how the ability to communicate well in small groups helps introverts in public accounting to build solid relationships with their clients and coworkers. Next, the paper talks about public speaking and how introverts need to lean into their ability to prepare thoroughly in order to avoid speaking anxiety, which likely plagues them. After that, the paper looks at networking and how an introvert's ability to create deep connections outweighs some natural setbacks they may face in this endeavor. The final trait analyzed is creativity and how introverts possess a unique aptitude in this area because of the differences in how they think and process information. For public accounting, this is a useful skill, especially when it comes to problem solving. The last section of this thesis examines the importance of self-awareness for introverts to understand themselves and be understood by others while working on teams. The conclusion of this paper outlines the main ideas on how introverts can succeed in public accounting by leaning into these traits, owning who they are, and contributing from their unique perspective.
ContributorsSanders, Mikayla Ann (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Huston, Ryan (Committee member) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-12
Description
The Olympus case gives students an opportunity to analyze the factors and unique cultural environment that led to the accounting fraud in whistle blower Michael Woodford's perspective. It also provides students insights into a traditionally- structured Japanese company to identify the operation style and leadership distinctions from a U.S. structured company. The case is presented from the comprehensive public record and the book How I Went from CEO to Whistleblower, written by Michael Woodford, all surrounding the Olympus fraud and insider whistleblowing. A primary question that arose when the news of the fraud emerged in the media was: Did the accounting fraud solely result from the failure of Japanese executives' leadership style? Some people think that the Olympus president Tsuyoshi Kikukawa who owned ultimate power over the company is supposed to bear the most responsibility for this issue. However, this case argues that the answer to the previous question is no. What's more important than the corrupt executives is Olympus' operational system that indulged those executives' ambition. Therefore, the case focuses on an analysis of the operating system in regard to leadership, culture, internal controls, external controls and the board of directors. This analysis addresses the failure of Olympus comprehensively rather than placing blame on a single individual. It is an opportunity for students to understand and discuss the multiple aspects of a corporate system that should have the practicable controls and functions to prevent the abuse of decision-making power as well as the illegal activity from occurring.
ContributorsFan, Haiyi (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Pany, Kurt (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
Given its impact on the accounting profession and public corporations, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(SOX) is a widely researched regulation among accounting scholars. Research typically focuses on the impact it has had on corporations, executives and auditors, however, there is limited research that illustrates the impact SOX may have on average Americans. There were several US criminal code sections that resulted from the passing of SOX. Statute 1519, which is often referred to as the "anti-shredding provision", penalizes anyone who "knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to" obstruct a current or foreseeable federal investigation. This statute, although intended to punish behavior similar to that which occurred in the early 2000s by corporations and auditors, has been used to charge people beyond its original intent. Several issues with the crafting of the statute cause its broad application and some litigation even reached the Supreme Court due to its vague wording. Not only is the statute being applied beyond the intent, there are other issues that legal scholars have critiqued it for. This statute is far from being the only law facing these issues as the same issues and critiques are found in the 14th amendment. Rewriting the statute seems to be the most effective way to address the concerns of judges, lawyers and defendants regarding the statute. In addition, Congress could have passed this statute outside of SOX to avoid being seen as overreaching if obstruction of justice related to documents was actually an issue outside of corporate fraud.
ContributorsGonzalez, Joana (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Lowe, Jordan (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
Given that lobbying activity by audit firms constitutes a potential advocacy threat to auditor independence, this paper seeks to provide an economic rationale for audit firm lobbying behavior. Specifically, I examine whether federal lobbying activity by audit firms contributes to their ability to retain existing clients and attract new clients. Consequently, I predict and find that greater lobbying activity is associated with a lower probability of auditor switching behavior as well longer auditor tenure when the client is in an industry with high interest in lobbying. I also find that, when switching audit firms, clients tend to choose audit firms with greater lobbying activity and that companies in industries with high interest in lobbying are more likely to choose an audit firm with greater lobbying activity than their previous auditor.
ContributorsKim, Margaret Hyun-Mee (Author) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Reckers, Philip (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steven (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
An audit increases the credibility of financial reports by reducing the uncertainty in financial information. A change of auditor will prompt investors to reevaluate this uncertainty. I examine the association between auditor changes and the pricing of information risk using the Fama-French asset pricing model augmented with accounting- based information risk factors. On average, I find that the pricing of information risk decreases after an auditor change, suggesting that investors are less concerned about information risk after an auditor change. However, for auditor changes that involve auditor resignations, disagreements, and movements away from a Big 4 auditor, I find an increase in the pricing of information risk, implying that these changes are associated with a weakened information environment. I also show that market returns surrounding the change announcement are correlated with the future change in perceived information risk. My study contributes to the debate surrounding mandatory auditor rotation and auditor tenure by suggesting that not all auditor changes are perceived the same way by investors.
ContributorsMyers, Noah (Author) / Lamoreaux, Phillip (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steven (Thesis advisor) / Baugh, Matthew (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021