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Description
A Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is the leader of a company’s internal audit function. Because there is no mandated disclosure requirement for the internal audit structure, little is understood about the influence of a CAE on a company. Following the logic that a CAE disclosed in SEC filings is more

A Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is the leader of a company’s internal audit function. Because there is no mandated disclosure requirement for the internal audit structure, little is understood about the influence of a CAE on a company. Following the logic that a CAE disclosed in SEC filings is more influential in a company’s oversight function, I identify an influential CAE using the disclosure of the role. I then examine the association between an influential CAE and monitoring outcomes. Using data hand collected from SEC filings for S&P 1500 companies from 2004 to 2015, I find companies that have an influential CAE are generally larger, older, and have a larger corporate board. More importantly, I find that an influential CAE in NYSE-listed companies is associated with higher internal control quality. This association is stronger for companies that reference a CAE’s direct interaction with the audit committee. This study provides an initial investigation into a common, but little understood position in corporate oversight.
ContributorsZhang, Wei (Author) / Lamoreaux, Phillip (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Li, Yinghua (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
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Description
This study investigates the relation between credit supply competition among banks and their clients’ conditional accounting conservatism (i.e., asymmetric timely loss recognition). The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 permits banks and bank holding companies to expand their business across state lines, introducing a positive shock to

This study investigates the relation between credit supply competition among banks and their clients’ conditional accounting conservatism (i.e., asymmetric timely loss recognition). The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 permits banks and bank holding companies to expand their business across state lines, introducing a positive shock to credit supply competition in the banking industry. The increase in credit supply competition weakens banks’ bargaining power in the negotiation process, which in turn may weaken their ability to demand conservative financial reporting from borrowers. Consistent with this prediction, results show that firms report less conservatively after the IBBEA is passed in their headquartered states. The effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism is particularly stronger for firms in states with a greater increase in competition among banks, firms whose operations are more concentrated in their headquarter states, firms with greater financial constraints, and firms subject to less external monitoring. Robustness tests confirm that the observed decline in conditional conservatism is causally related to the passage of IBBEA. Overall, this study highlights the impact of credit supply competition on financial reporting practices.
ContributorsHuang, Wei (Author) / Li, Yinghua (Thesis advisor) / Huang, Xiaochuan (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
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Description
Executive compensation is broken into two parts: one fixed and one variable. The fixed component of executive compensation is the annual salary and the variable components are performance-based incentives. Clawback provisions of executive compensation are designed to require executives to return performance-based, variable compensation that was erroneously awarded in the

Executive compensation is broken into two parts: one fixed and one variable. The fixed component of executive compensation is the annual salary and the variable components are performance-based incentives. Clawback provisions of executive compensation are designed to require executives to return performance-based, variable compensation that was erroneously awarded in the year of a misstatement. This research shows the need for the use of a new clawback provision that combines aspects of the two currently in regulation. In our current federal regulation, there are two clawback provisions in play: Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley and section 954 of The Dodd\u2014Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This paper argues for the use of an optimal clawback provision that combines aspects of both the current SOX provision and the Dodd-Frank provision, by integrating the principles of loss aversion and narcissism. These two factors are important to consider when designing a clawback provision, as it is generally accepted that average individuals are loss averse and executives are becoming increasingly narcissistic. Therefore, when attempting to mitigate the risk of a leader keeping erroneously awarded executive compensation, the decision making factors of narcissism and loss aversion must be taken into account. Additionally, this paper predicts how compensation structures will shift post-implementation. Through a survey analyzing the level of both loss- aversion and narcissism in respondents, the research question justifies the principle that people are loss averse and that a subset of the population show narcissistic tendencies. Both loss aversion and narcissism drove the results to suggest there are benefits to both clawback provisions and that a new provision that combines elements of both is most beneficial in mitigating the risk of executives receiving erroneously awarded compensation. I concluded the most optimal clawback provision is mandatory for all public companies (Dodd-Frank), targets all executives (Dodd-Frank), and requires the recuperation of the entire bonus, not just that which was in excess of what should have been received (SOX).
ContributorsLarscheid, Elizabeth (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
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Description
Given its impact on the accounting profession and public corporations, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(SOX) is a widely researched regulation among accounting scholars. Research typically focuses on the impact it has had on corporations, executives and auditors, however, there is limited research that illustrates the impact SOX may have on average

Given its impact on the accounting profession and public corporations, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(SOX) is a widely researched regulation among accounting scholars. Research typically focuses on the impact it has had on corporations, executives and auditors, however, there is limited research that illustrates the impact SOX may have on average Americans. There were several US criminal code sections that resulted from the passing of SOX. Statute 1519, which is often referred to as the "anti-shredding provision", penalizes anyone who "knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to" obstruct a current or foreseeable federal investigation. This statute, although intended to punish behavior similar to that which occurred in the early 2000s by corporations and auditors, has been used to charge people beyond its original intent. Several issues with the crafting of the statute cause its broad application and some litigation even reached the Supreme Court due to its vague wording. Not only is the statute being applied beyond the intent, there are other issues that legal scholars have critiqued it for. This statute is far from being the only law facing these issues as the same issues and critiques are found in the 14th amendment. Rewriting the statute seems to be the most effective way to address the concerns of judges, lawyers and defendants regarding the statute. In addition, Congress could have passed this statute outside of SOX to avoid being seen as overreaching if obstruction of justice related to documents was actually an issue outside of corporate fraud.
ContributorsGonzalez, Joana (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Lowe, Jordan (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
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Description
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation contracts entails the use of peer performance to filter out exogenous shocks and reduce exposure to risk. Theory predicts that high-quality peers can effectively filter out noise from performance measurement, yet prior empirical studies do not examine how differences in

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation contracts entails the use of peer performance to filter out exogenous shocks and reduce exposure to risk. Theory predicts that high-quality peers can effectively filter out noise from performance measurement, yet prior empirical studies do not examine how differences in peer quality affect the use of RPE in practice. In this study, I propose a model to select peers with the highest capacity to filter out noise and introduce a novel measure of peer quality. Consistent with the theory, I find that firms with high quality peers rely on RPE to a greater extent than firms with few good peers available. I also examine the extent to which peers disclosed in proxy statements overlap with the best peers predicted by my model. I find that the overlap is positively associated with institutional ownership, use of top 5 compensation consultants, and compensation committee competence.
ContributorsCho, Jeh-Hyun (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
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Description
This study examines how short selling threats affect firms’ non-generally accepted accounting principles (non-GAAP) reporting quality. From 2005 to 2007, the SEC implemented a Pilot Program under Regulation SHO, in which one-third of the Russell 3000 index stocks were randomly chosen as pilot stocks and exempted from short-sale price tests.

This study examines how short selling threats affect firms’ non-generally accepted accounting principles (non-GAAP) reporting quality. From 2005 to 2007, the SEC implemented a Pilot Program under Regulation SHO, in which one-third of the Russell 3000 index stocks were randomly chosen as pilot stocks and exempted from short-sale price tests. As a result, short selling threats increased considerably for pilot stocks. Using difference-in-differences tests, I find that pilot firms respond to the increased short selling threats by reducing the use of low-quality non-GAAP exclusions, resulting in an improvement in the quality of overall non-GAAP exclusions. Further tests show that this effect of short selling threats is more pronounced for smaller firms, firms with lower institutional ownership, firms with lower analyst coverage, and firms with lower ratios of fundamental value to market value. These findings suggest short sellers play an important monitoring role in disciplining managers, as evidenced by the non-GAAP reporting choices of managers.
ContributorsLiu, Junjun (Author) / Faurel, Lucile (Thesis advisor) / Li, Yinghua (Committee member) / Rykaczewski, Maria (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
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Description
This study presents the first evidence that mutual fund liquidity management affects both stock liquidity and information disclosure of portfolio firms. Using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits a proposal by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an exogenous shock to mutual fund liquidity management, I find causal evidence

This study presents the first evidence that mutual fund liquidity management affects both stock liquidity and information disclosure of portfolio firms. Using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits a proposal by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an exogenous shock to mutual fund liquidity management, I find causal evidence that mutual fund liquidity management improves liquidity of underlying stocks. The liquidity improvement is more pronounced when mutual funds have stronger incentives to improve portfolio liquidity and more resources to influence firms, and when portfolio firms have lower stock liquidity and higher information asymmetry prior to the SEC proposal. I further show that mutual funds may exert pressure on portfolio firms to improve their disclosure as a channel to improve stock liquidity. Overall, the results indicate that liquidity management at the fund level has important implications for stock liquidity and information disclosure of portfolio firms.
ContributorsWeng, Liwei (Author) / Hillegeist, Stephen (Thesis advisor) / Huang, Shawn X. (Thesis advisor) / Li, Yinghua (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
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Description
This study examines the effect of outside wealth on executives’ risk-taking in financial reporting. To investigate this question, I hand-collect data on Chief Financial Officers’ (CFO) real estate assets and use housing returns as a proxy for CFOs’ outside wealth changes. I find that CFOs who experience a large negative

This study examines the effect of outside wealth on executives’ risk-taking in financial reporting. To investigate this question, I hand-collect data on Chief Financial Officers’ (CFO) real estate assets and use housing returns as a proxy for CFOs’ outside wealth changes. I find that CFOs who experience a large negative housing return become less aggressive in financial reporting, as evidenced by a lower likelihood of restatement. Additional tests show that this effect is driven by CFOs who have less diversified wealth portfolios, by younger CFOs, and by CFOs with more leveraged houses, suggesting that the reduced risk-taking behavior of CFOs stems from decreased diversification of personal wealth and increased career concerns after a negative shock to outside wealth. These findings highlight the important role of executive outside wealth in explaining their risk-taking behaviors.
ContributorsLiu, Summer Z. (Author) / Huang, Shawn (Thesis advisor) / Lamoreaux, Phillip (Thesis advisor) / Hugon, Artur (Committee member) / Li, Yinghua (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023