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Executive compensation is broken into two parts: one fixed and one variable. The fixed component of executive compensation is the annual salary and the variable components are performance-based incentives. Clawback provisions of executive compensation are designed to require executives to return performance-based, variable compensation that was erroneously awarded in the

Executive compensation is broken into two parts: one fixed and one variable. The fixed component of executive compensation is the annual salary and the variable components are performance-based incentives. Clawback provisions of executive compensation are designed to require executives to return performance-based, variable compensation that was erroneously awarded in the year of a misstatement. This research shows the need for the use of a new clawback provision that combines aspects of the two currently in regulation. In our current federal regulation, there are two clawback provisions in play: Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley and section 954 of The Dodd\u2014Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This paper argues for the use of an optimal clawback provision that combines aspects of both the current SOX provision and the Dodd-Frank provision, by integrating the principles of loss aversion and narcissism. These two factors are important to consider when designing a clawback provision, as it is generally accepted that average individuals are loss averse and executives are becoming increasingly narcissistic. Therefore, when attempting to mitigate the risk of a leader keeping erroneously awarded executive compensation, the decision making factors of narcissism and loss aversion must be taken into account. Additionally, this paper predicts how compensation structures will shift post-implementation. Through a survey analyzing the level of both loss- aversion and narcissism in respondents, the research question justifies the principle that people are loss averse and that a subset of the population show narcissistic tendencies. Both loss aversion and narcissism drove the results to suggest there are benefits to both clawback provisions and that a new provision that combines elements of both is most beneficial in mitigating the risk of executives receiving erroneously awarded compensation. I concluded the most optimal clawback provision is mandatory for all public companies (Dodd-Frank), targets all executives (Dodd-Frank), and requires the recuperation of the entire bonus, not just that which was in excess of what should have been received (SOX).
ContributorsLarscheid, Elizabeth (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
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Description
Blockchain is a sophisticated and complex technology that will have a massive impact on the public accounting industry. Currently there is concern surrounding how blockchain may impact the industry as a whole. Auditors and accountants are worried that this technology has the potential to replace the responsibilities they fulfill. However,

Blockchain is a sophisticated and complex technology that will have a massive impact on the public accounting industry. Currently there is concern surrounding how blockchain may impact the industry as a whole. Auditors and accountants are worried that this technology has the potential to replace the responsibilities they fulfill. However, blockchain technology will not replace accountants and will enhance their daily activities by eliminating menial tasks, providing increased transparency, and allowing time to be spent in areas that require more consideration. This will change the role of accountants and professionals, requiring them to be more technologically proficient and analytically minded. This paper is organized as follows. There will be an initial explanation of the technology to inform the reader of what blockchain is and how it works. Then there will be a discussion regarding how blockchain technology relates to, and can be utilized by, public accounting firms as well as the implications of blockchain on the public accounting industry. These implications will be discussed followed by why they are extraneous, and how to combat them in both the assurance and advisory practices. In conclusion, recommendations will be provided for public accounting firms on how to effectively utilize the technology to their benefit.
ContributorsLomsdalen, Stephen A (Co-author) / Charen, Stephanie (Co-author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Garverick, Michael (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-12
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Description

This thesis discusses accounting fraud in the workplace today, using the recent Wirecard scandal as a jumping off point. The thesis goes into the common causes of accounting fraud (organized by the three components of the fraud triangle), effective methods for countering fraud, and lessons that can be learned from

This thesis discusses accounting fraud in the workplace today, using the recent Wirecard scandal as a jumping off point. The thesis goes into the common causes of accounting fraud (organized by the three components of the fraud triangle), effective methods for countering fraud, and lessons that can be learned from the 2020 Wirecard scandal

ContributorsLudwig, William August (Author) / Garverick, Michael (Thesis director, Committee member) / Wolfe, Mindy (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2021-05
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Description
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation contracts entails the use of peer performance to filter out exogenous shocks and reduce exposure to risk. Theory predicts that high-quality peers can effectively filter out noise from performance measurement, yet prior empirical studies do not examine how differences in

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation contracts entails the use of peer performance to filter out exogenous shocks and reduce exposure to risk. Theory predicts that high-quality peers can effectively filter out noise from performance measurement, yet prior empirical studies do not examine how differences in peer quality affect the use of RPE in practice. In this study, I propose a model to select peers with the highest capacity to filter out noise and introduce a novel measure of peer quality. Consistent with the theory, I find that firms with high quality peers rely on RPE to a greater extent than firms with few good peers available. I also examine the extent to which peers disclosed in proxy statements overlap with the best peers predicted by my model. I find that the overlap is positively associated with institutional ownership, use of top 5 compensation consultants, and compensation committee competence.
ContributorsCho, Jeh-Hyun (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
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Description

Through findings from interviews, a survey, and personally learning automation software we think automation will continue to grow in the accounting industry in the coming years. Accountants see software as something that makes them more efficient and firms are doing a good job training their employees on how to use

Through findings from interviews, a survey, and personally learning automation software we think automation will continue to grow in the accounting industry in the coming years. Accountants see software as something that makes them more efficient and firms are doing a good job training their employees on how to use these new software tools. Our interviewed accountants say that automation saves them time that can be used to work on other things. By learning Alteryx, an automation tool, we saw these time savings firsthand.

ContributorsShillingburg, Alec (Author) / DiNuto, Michael (Co-author) / Dawson, Greg (Thesis director) / Garverick, Michael (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor)
Created2022-05
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Description

Through findings from interviews, a survey, and personally learning automation software we think automation will continue to grow in the accounting industry in the coming years. Accountants see software as something that makes them more efficient and firms are doing a good job training their employees on how to use

Through findings from interviews, a survey, and personally learning automation software we think automation will continue to grow in the accounting industry in the coming years. Accountants see software as something that makes them more efficient and firms are doing a good job training their employees on how to use these new software tools. Our interviewed accountants say that automation saves them time that can be used to work on other things. By learning Alteryx, an automation tool, we saw these time savings firsthand.

ContributorsDiNuto, Michael (Author) / Shillingburg, Alec (Co-author) / Dawson, Greg (Thesis director) / Garverick, Michael (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor)
Created2022-05