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In this paper, I investigate whether participation in employee stock option exchange programs contains private information about future stock returns. High participation in employee stock option exchange programs is associated with negative future abnormal returns over the ensuing 12-month period. This association is moderated by the transparency of the firm's

In this paper, I investigate whether participation in employee stock option exchange programs contains private information about future stock returns. High participation in employee stock option exchange programs is associated with negative future abnormal returns over the ensuing 12-month period. This association is moderated by the transparency of the firm's information environment: high institutional ownership and high financial statement informativeness weaken the negative relation between participation and abnormal returns. Controlling for transparency of the firms' information environment, the association between participation and future returns arises primarily from firms that allow the CEO to participate.
ContributorsMakridis, Vanessa Radick (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steven E (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Description
In this study, I examine the extent to which firms rely on relative performance evaluation (RPE) when setting executive compensation. In particular, I examine whether firms use information about peer performance to determine compensation at the end of the year, i.e. after both firm and peer performance are observed. I

In this study, I examine the extent to which firms rely on relative performance evaluation (RPE) when setting executive compensation. In particular, I examine whether firms use information about peer performance to determine compensation at the end of the year, i.e. after both firm and peer performance are observed. I find that RPE is most pronounced for firms that allow little or no scope for ex post subjective adjustments to annual bonuses. Conversely, firms that rely mainly on subjectivity in determining bonus exhibit little use of RPE. These findings suggest that information about peer performance is not used at the end of the year. Instead, peer performance seems to be incorporated in performance targets at the beginning of the year, at least among firms primarily using objective performance measurements. In addition, I provide new evidence on the determinants of the use of subjectivity.
ContributorsTsui, Stephanie (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steven (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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Description
This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on firms' long-term versus short-term objectives. To empirically operationalize performance evaluation horizon, I

This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on firms' long-term versus short-term objectives. To empirically operationalize performance evaluation horizon, I measure the length of the performance evaluation period in CEO stock awards, the use of stock-based measures, and the use of peer-based measures. I collect data on 419 dual-class firms and match them with a control group of single-class firms. I find that market-based metrics are less likely to be used by dual-class firms relative to single-class firms. In addition, I find that peer-based measures are much less common for dual-class than single-class firms. These findings suggest that dual-class firms shield their executives from short-term market pressures and design stock compensation contracts that deemphasize volatile stock prices.
ContributorsLi, Ji (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Hwang, Yuhchang (Committee member) / Reckers, Philip (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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Description
The main goal of this study was to understand the awareness of small business owners regarding occupational fraud, meaning fraud committed from within an organization. A survey/questionnaire was used to gather insight into the knowledge and perceptions of small business owners, while also obtaining information about the history of fraud

The main goal of this study was to understand the awareness of small business owners regarding occupational fraud, meaning fraud committed from within an organization. A survey/questionnaire was used to gather insight into the knowledge and perceptions of small business owners, while also obtaining information about the history of fraud and the internal controls within their business. Twenty-four owners of businesses with less than 100 employees participated in the study. The results suggest that small business owners overestimate their knowledge regarding internal controls and occupational fraud, while also underestimating the risk of fraud within their own business. In fact, 92% of participants were not at all familiar with the popular Internal Control \u2014 Integrated Framework published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. The results also show that small business owners tend to overestimate the protection provided by their currently implemented controls in regard to their risk of fraud. Overall, through continued knowledge of internal controls and occupational fraud, business owners can better protect their businesses from the risk of occupational fraud by increasing their awareness of fraud.
ContributorsDennis, Lauren Nicole (Author) / Orpurt, Steven (Thesis director) / Munshi, Perseus (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor)
Created2014-05
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Description
Within this paper I summarize the key features, and results, of research conducted to support the development, design, and implementation of an internal control system at a startup small business. These efforts were conducted for an Honors Thesis/Creative Project for Barrett, the Honors College at Arizona State University. The research

Within this paper I summarize the key features, and results, of research conducted to support the development, design, and implementation of an internal control system at a startup small business. These efforts were conducted for an Honors Thesis/Creative Project for Barrett, the Honors College at Arizona State University. The research revolved around deciding which financial policies, procedures, and safeguards could be useful in creating an internal control system for small businesses. In addition to academic research, I developed an “Internal Control Questionnaire” for use as a ‘jumping off point’ in conversations about a business’ existing accounting system. This questionnaire is applicable across many industries, covering the major topics which every small business/startup should consider.

The questionnaire was then used in conjunction with two interviews of small business owners. The interviews covered both the overall financial status of their business and their business’ pre-existing accounting system. The feedback received during these interviews was subsequently used to provide the business owners with eleven recommendations ranging from the implementation of new policies to verification of existing internal controls.

Finally, I summarize my findings, both academic and real-world, conveying that many small business owners do not implement formal internal control systems. I also discuss why the business owners, in this specific circumstance, did not yet implement the aforementioned eleven suggestions.
ContributorsDuncan, Spencer James (Author) / Garverick, Michael (Thesis director) / Casas Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05
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Description
The relative performance evaluation (RPE) hypothesis holds that executive compensation should not depend on uncontrollable exogenous shocks. Nevertheless, prior studies often find limited empirical support for this hypothesis in part because it is difficult to identify peers exposed to the same exogenous shocks. I propose a new way to identify

The relative performance evaluation (RPE) hypothesis holds that executive compensation should not depend on uncontrollable exogenous shocks. Nevertheless, prior studies often find limited empirical support for this hypothesis in part because it is difficult to identify peers exposed to the same exogenous shocks. I propose a new way to identify peers and to test the RPE hypothesis in the context of a specific shock. In particular, I select peers based on the sensitivity of their stock returns to exchange rate fluctuations. I find evidence that firms respond to large exchange rate movements by ex post adjusting their peer selection to include peers with similar exchange rate risk exposure. Moreover, after allowing for ex post peer group adjustments, I find a much stronger support for the RPE hypothesis than most of prior work.
ContributorsChen, Bing (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Casas Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
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Description
Prior studies examine how the use of earnings for valuation purposes is related to the use of earnings in contracting. I extend this literature by examining the value relevance of internal earnings relative to targets, a performance measure widely used in annual bonus contracts. Internal earnings relative to targets could

Prior studies examine how the use of earnings for valuation purposes is related to the use of earnings in contracting. I extend this literature by examining the value relevance of internal earnings relative to targets, a performance measure widely used in annual bonus contracts. Internal earnings relative to targets could be value relevant because they reflect board’s private information or the quality of firm’s management control systems. However, any internal performance measure could also be manipulated by the board or management, which would undermine its reliability and relevance to capital market participants. Using hand-collected data on internal earnings and annual bonus targets in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) cash bonus plans, I find that internal earnings relative to targets strongly predict annual stock returns. This effect is incremental to that of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and street earnings surprises, as well as management earnings guidance surprises. Moreover, this effect is stronger for firms with more detailed disclosure about compensation contracts and with better governance. Buttressing the stock return results, I further show that internal earnings relative to targets predict future cash flows. This evidence suggests that the value of internal earnings relative to targets extends beyond its traditional role in contracting.
ContributorsLee, Eugie (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Hugon, Artur (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
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Description
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation contracts entails the use of peer performance to filter out exogenous shocks and reduce exposure to risk. Theory predicts that high-quality peers can effectively filter out noise from performance measurement, yet prior empirical studies do not examine how differences in

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation contracts entails the use of peer performance to filter out exogenous shocks and reduce exposure to risk. Theory predicts that high-quality peers can effectively filter out noise from performance measurement, yet prior empirical studies do not examine how differences in peer quality affect the use of RPE in practice. In this study, I propose a model to select peers with the highest capacity to filter out noise and introduce a novel measure of peer quality. Consistent with the theory, I find that firms with high quality peers rely on RPE to a greater extent than firms with few good peers available. I also examine the extent to which peers disclosed in proxy statements overlap with the best peers predicted by my model. I find that the overlap is positively associated with institutional ownership, use of top 5 compensation consultants, and compensation committee competence.
ContributorsCho, Jeh-Hyun (Author) / Matejka, Michal (Thesis advisor) / Kaplan, Steve (Committee member) / Casas-Arce, Pablo (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020