This thesis seeks to investigate the use of Artificial Intelligence when reviewing STEM job applications and the human biases that are present in AI system training datasets. Further, it proposes to gender neutralize training dataset terms to evaluate job applications based on merit and qualifications, promoting the inclusivity of women in STEM jobs and seeking to eliminate job application system bias from a Utilitarian perspective.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
I define love as a composite attitude whose elements are benevolence, consideration, perception of moment (importance or significance), and receptivity. I define receptivity as the ability to be with someone without imposing careless or compulsive expectations. I argue that receptivity curbs the excesses and supplements the defects of the other elements. Love as an ideal is often understood as universal love.
However, there are three problems with universal love: it could be too demanding, it could prevent intimacy and special relationships, and it could require a person to love their abuser. I argue that love can be extended to all human beings without posing unacceptable risks, once love is correctly defined and the ideal correctly understood.
Because of the revelations of ecology and the ongoing transformation of sensibilities about the value of the nonhuman, love should be extended to the nonhuman. I argue that love can be given to the nonhuman in the same way it is to the human, with appropriate variations. But how much of the nonhuman would an ideal direct one to love? I argue for two limits to universal love: it does not make sense to extend it to nonliving things, and it can be extended to all living things. I show that loving all living things does not depend on whether they can reciprocate, and I argue that it would not prevent one from living a recognizably human life.
This project focuses on the effects of partisanship and electoral contestation on the likelihood of state legislators to adopt an independent ethics commission. Existing literature suggests that ethics reform is a function of public perception and the need to assuage public outrage in the face of scandal. Additionally, many legislators view ethics laws as suggestions of their own ineptitude and thus resist reform. However, this existing view fails to consider the unique nature of the enabling legislation of ethics commissions and often conflates external, public drivers of reform with internal drivers personal to the individual legislators. Using logistic regression and time series analysis, this project finds that increased durations of single-party control in state legislatures decreases the chances of that legislature having an independent commission, suggesting that legislators use the partisan ethics committees as political weapons when they are in power. When the dominant party does not face the risk of becoming the minority, there is little in place to motivate ethics reform, thus the lack of commissions. This research identifies the need to develop more focused measures of inter-legislator partisanship and suggests that the effects of different types of ethics laws, specifically those pertaining to ethics commissions, should more often be studied in isolation, rather than as one single category.