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Description
Economists, political philosophers, and others have often characterized social preferences regarding inequality by imagining a hypothetical choice of distributions behind "a veil of ignorance". Recent behavioral economics work has shown that subjects care about equality of outcomes, and are willing to sacrifice, in experimental contexts, some amount of personal gain in order to achieve greater equality. We review some of this literature and then conduct an experiment of our own, comparing subjects' choices in two risky situations, one being a choice for a purely individualized lottery for themselves, and the other a choice among possible distributions to members of a randomly selected group. We find that choosing in the group situation makes subjects significantly more risk averse than when choosing an individual lottery. This supports the hypothesis that an additional preference for equality exists alongside ordinary risk aversion, and that in a hypothetical "veil of ignorance" scenario, such preferences may make subjects significantly more averse to unequal distributions of rewards than can be explained by risk aversion alone.
ContributorsTheisen, Alexander Scott (Co-author) / McMullin, Caitlin (Co-author) / Li, Marilyn (Co-author) / DeSerpa, Allan (Thesis director) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Baldwin, Marjorie (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
One decision procedure dominates a given one if it performs well on the entire class of problems the given decision procedure performs well on, and then goes on to perform well on other problems that the given decision procedure does badly on. Performing well will be defined as generating higher expected utility before entering a problem. In this paper it will be argued that the timeless decision procedure dominates the causal
and evidential decision procedures. It will also be argued in turn that the updateless decision procedure dominates the timeless decision procedure. The difficulties of formalizing a modern variant of the ”smoking gene” problem will then be briefly examined.
and evidential decision procedures. It will also be argued in turn that the updateless decision procedure dominates the timeless decision procedure. The difficulties of formalizing a modern variant of the ”smoking gene” problem will then be briefly examined.
ContributorsHintze, Daniel Edward (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Thesis director) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / DeSerpa, Allan (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
The European Union has increasingly integrated since World War II to the point where most European countries now share a currency and have freedom of movement for travelers and workers. This has created asymmetries in the European economy because of reports and studies that have found a low labor mobility, which is a requirement of a common currency area. This paper uses an econometric model and the theory of optimum currency areas to look at whether what language grouping a migrant is from affects his or her migration decision. The paper also looks at what an inflexible labor market may mean for European Central Bank policymakers and the macroeconomic outlook of the eurozone.
ContributorsHagler, Andrew Jon (Author) / Mendez, Jose (Thesis director) / Hill, John (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
The NBA operates under a unique system with both forms of the salary cap. The league has a team salary cap that sets a limit that teams can spend on their entire roster. The NBA has a soft cap and a luxury tax system, meaning if teams spend over a determined amount, they are taxed for the salaries in excess. The league also has a player salary cap. The 1999 NBA collective bargaining agreement first introduced the individual player salary cap in the league. This cap sets a limit on what the best players can earn, otherwise known as the maximum contract. In an economic system with a soft team cap, the introduction of the player salary cap has important implications. The stated outcome of such a salary cap is to improve competitive balance and better distribute star players throughout the league. This study evaluated the 1990-2015 regular seasons to measure the impact of the player salary cap on competitive balance, the distribution of team payrolls, and the dispersion of star players. In accordance with the Rottenberg's invariance hypothesis, the player salary cap has hurt the players and benefited the owners by redistributing income from one party to the other, without impacting the distribution of talent in the league. The rule change has not affected competitive balance, while team payrolls have converged and star players have become more dispersed throughout the league. These changes hurt the league overall, preventing the maximization of revenues. Despite this inefficiency, the chance of the league moving to eliminate the player salary cap is low.
ContributorsWelu, Brian Andrew (Author) / Marburger, Daniel (Thesis director) / Goegan, Brian (Committee member) / Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-12
Description
I began this thesis because I was confused about economics. I wondered why there were so many different models. I didn't understand how they fit together. I was also confused by the assumptions being made. For instance, the assumption that humans are rational utility-maximizers did not seem to agree with my own experiences. With my director Dr. Edward Schlee's help, my thesis has become an inquiry into the state of economic methodology, both in theory and in practice. The questions that drive this paper are: How do economists choose between theories? What is the purpose of economic theory? What is the role of empirical data in assessing models? What role do assumptions play in theory evaluation, and should assumptions make sense? Part I: Methodology is the theoretical portion of the paper. I summarize the essential arguments of the two main schools of thought in economic methodology, and argue for an updated methodology. In Part II: A case study: The expected utility hypothesis, I examine methodology in practice by assessing a handful of studies that seek to test the expected utility hypothesis. Interestingly, I find that there is a different between what economists say they are doing, and what they actually seem to be doing. Throughout this paper, I restrict my analysis to microeconomic theory, simply because this is the area with which I am more familiar. I intend this paper to be a guide for my fellow students and rising economists, as well as for already practicing economists. I hope it helps the reader better understand methodology and improve her own practice.
ContributorsKang, Dominique (Author) / Schlee, Edward (Thesis director) / Schoellman, Todd (Committee member) / Boerner, Rochus (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
An integral part of the financial system, the evolutionary history of commercial banking remains largely uncharted and is often grouped into banking development as a whole. Previous research on banking has primarily relied on economic analysis or has placed banking in a larger social context. This work aims to bridge the two by classifying commercial banking growth into four cycles of expansion, application, and decline. Drawing from historical accounts and growth cycle theory, this framework for classification is developed to better synthesize its progress and the fundamental innovations that changed the banking system. Beginning in 1150 with the foundation for deposit banking, the next three cycles of 1500, 1750, and 1933 mark periods of great innovation and a push toward the regulatory environment, technology, and globalization that define modern commercial banking. Paralleling the economic, financial, and political development of the Western World, its evolution is guided by three themes: the increased accumulation and flow of capital, regulation, and market expansion.
ContributorsSinger, Andrea Cayli (Author) / Licon, Wendell (Thesis director) / Hoffmeister, Ron (Committee member) / Brooks, Dan (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
We examine the bias resulting from temporal and spatial aggregation of weather variables in environmental economics. In order to include temporally and/or spatially continuous environmental variables (such as temperature and precipitation), many studies discritize them. The finer the scale of discrization chosen, the more difficult it can be to obtain a complete and reliable data set. Studies performed at very fine scales often find tighter and more dramatic relationships between variables such as temperature and income per capita. We examine this question by repeating the same empirical study at various temporal and spatial scales and comparing the resulting parameter estimates.
ContributorsOber-Reynolds, Daniel Steven (Author) / Hanemann, Michael W. (Thesis director) / Kuminoff, Nicolai V. (Committee member) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
Description
I study split-pie bargaining problems between two agents. In chapter two, the types of both agents determine the value of outside options -- I refer to these as interdependent outside options. Since a direct mechanism stipulates outcomes as functions of agents' types, a player can update beliefs about another player’s type upon receiving a recommended outcome. I term this phenomenon as information leakage. I discuss binding arbitration, where players must stay with a recommended outcome, and non-binding arbitration, where players are not obliged to stay with an allocation. The total pie is reduced if the outcome is an outside option. With respect to efficiency, I derive a necessary and sufficient condition for first best mechanisms. These are mechanisms that assign zero probability to outside options for every report received. The condition describes balanced forces in conflict (outside options) and is the same in the cases of binding and non-binding arbitration. I also show a strong link between conflict and information: when conflict exists, information leakage occurs. Hence, non-binding arbitration may seem more restrictive than binding arbitration. To analyze why this is the case, I solve for second best mechanisms with binding arbitration and find a condition under which they can be implemented under non-binding arbitration. Thus, I show that non-binding arbitration can be as effective as binding arbitration in terms of efficiency. I also examine whether the equivalence between binding and non-binding arbitration can cease to hold, and provide analysis of why this happens. In chapter three, the bargaining problem entails no uncertainty but rather envy. Players can feel envy about the allocation of the other player. The Nash Bargaining solution is obtained in this context and some comparative statics are shown. The introduction of envy makes the more envious party a tougher negotiator.
ContributorsGonzalez Sanchez, Eric Patricio (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
Description
Prior research on consumer behavior in health insurance markets has primarily focused on individual decision making while relying on strong parametric assumptions about preferences. The aim of this dissertation is to improve the traditional approach in both dimensions. First, I consider the importance of joint decision-making in individual insurance markets by studying how married couples coordinate their choices in these markets. Second, I investigate the robustness of prior studies by developing a non-parametric method to assess decision-making in health insurance markets. To study how married couples make choices in individual insurance markets I estimate a stochastic choice model of household demand that takes into account spouses' risk aversion, spouses' expenditure risk, risk sharing, and switching costs. I use the model estimates to study how coordination within couples and interaction between couples and singles affects the way that markets adjust to policies designed to nudge consumers toward choosing higher value plans, particularly with respect to adverse selection.
Finally, to assess consumer decision-making beyond standard parametric assumptions about preferences, I use second--order stochastic dominance rankings. Moreover, I show how to extend this method to construct bounds on the welfare implications of choosing dominated plans.
Finally, to assess consumer decision-making beyond standard parametric assumptions about preferences, I use second--order stochastic dominance rankings. Moreover, I show how to extend this method to construct bounds on the welfare implications of choosing dominated plans.
ContributorsSanguinetti, Tomas (Author) / Kuminoff, Nicolai V. (Thesis advisor) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Ketcham, Jonathan (Committee member) / Silverman, Daniel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020