Matching Items (5)
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- All Subjects: Economics
- Genre: Doctoral Dissertation
- Creators: Tserlukevich, Yuri
Description
Schennach (2007) has shown that the Empirical Likelihood (EL) estimator may not be asymptotically normal when a misspecified model is estimated. This problem occurs because the empirical probabilities of individual observations are restricted to be positive. I find that even the EL estimator computed without the restriction can fail to be asymptotically normal for misspecified models if the sample moments weighted by unrestricted empirical probabilities do not have finite population moments. As a remedy for this problem, I propose a group of alternative estimators which I refer to as modified EL (MEL) estimators. For correctly specified models, these estimators have the same higher order asymptotic properties as the EL estimator. The MEL estimators are obtained by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) applied to an exactly identified model. The simulation results provide promising evidence for these estimators. In the second chapter, I introduce an alternative group of estimators to the Generalized Empirical Likelihood (GEL) family. The new group is constructed by employing demeaned moment functions in the objective function while using the original moment functions in the constraints. This designation modifies the higher-order properties of estimators. I refer to these new estimators as Demeaned Generalized Empirical Likelihood (DGEL) estimators. Although Newey and Smith (2004) show that the EL estimator in the GEL family has fewer sources of bias and is higher-order efficient after bias-correction, the demeaned exponential tilting (DET) estimator in the DGEL group has those superior properties. In addition, if data are symmetrically distributed, every estimator in the DGEL family shares the same higher-order properties as the best member.
ContributorsXiang, Jin (Author) / Ahn, Seung (Thesis advisor) / Wahal, Sunil (Thesis advisor) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Mehra, Rajnish (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large, limited substitutability between the factors of production may call for fixed capital investment. Hence, firms with lower substitutability are more likely to invest in both factors together and have larger sensitivities of fixed capital investment to cash flow. By building a frictionless capital markets model that allows firms to optimize over fixed capital and inventories as substitutable factors, I establish the significance of the substitutability channel in explaining cross-sectional differences in cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, incorporating variable capital into firms' investment decisions helps explain the sharp decrease in cash flow sensitivities over the past decades. Empirical evidence confirms the model's predictions.
ContributorsKim, Kirak (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
Description
By matching a CEO's place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO's family wealth and study the link between the CEO's endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on average, CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into wealthy families, as measured by a variety of proxies for firm performance. There is no evidence of higher risk-taking by the CEOs from low social status backgrounds. Further, CEOs from less privileged families perform better in firms with high R&D spending but they underperform CEOs from wealthy families when firms operate in a more uncertain environment. Taken together, my results show that endowed family wealth of a CEO is useful in identifying his or her managerial ability.
ContributorsDu, Fangfang (Author) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Wang, Jessie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2018
Description
This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate policy. The first chapter analyzes whether being labeled a “growth” firm or a “value” firm affects the firm’s dividend policy. I focus on the dividend policy because of its discretionary nature and the link to investor demand. To address endogeneity concerns, I use regression discontinuity design around the threshold to assign firms to each category. The results show that “value” firms have a significantly higher dividend payout - about four percentage points - than growth firms. This approach establishes a causal link between firm “growth/value” labels and dividend policy.
The second chapter develops investment policy model which associated with du- ration of cash flow. Firms are doing their business by operating a portfolio of projects that have various duration, and the duration of the project portfolio generates dif- ferent duration of cash flow stream. By assuming the duration of cash flow as a firm specific characteristic, this paper analyzes how the duration of cash flow affects firms’ investment decision. I develop a model of investment, external finance, and savings to characterize how firms’ decision is affected by the duration of cash flow. Firms maximize total value of cash flow, while they have to maintain their solvency by paying a fixed cost for the operation. I empirically confirm the positive correlation between duration of cash flow and investment with theoretical support. Financial constraint suffocates the firm when they face solvency issue, so that model with financial constraint shows that the correlation between duration of cash flow and investment is stronger than low financial constraint case.
The second chapter develops investment policy model which associated with du- ration of cash flow. Firms are doing their business by operating a portfolio of projects that have various duration, and the duration of the project portfolio generates dif- ferent duration of cash flow stream. By assuming the duration of cash flow as a firm specific characteristic, this paper analyzes how the duration of cash flow affects firms’ investment decision. I develop a model of investment, external finance, and savings to characterize how firms’ decision is affected by the duration of cash flow. Firms maximize total value of cash flow, while they have to maintain their solvency by paying a fixed cost for the operation. I empirically confirm the positive correlation between duration of cash flow and investment with theoretical support. Financial constraint suffocates the firm when they face solvency issue, so that model with financial constraint shows that the correlation between duration of cash flow and investment is stronger than low financial constraint case.
ContributorsLee, Tae Eui (Author) / Mehra, Rajnish (Thesis advisor) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Thesis advisor) / Custodio, Claudia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
This dissertation consists of two essays related to dynamic debt contracting and financial economics. The first chapter studies key determinants of inclusion of a financial covenant in corporate loans from theoretical and empirical angles. Using a novel manually collected loan dataset of small to medium-sized publicly-listed U.S. firms, I find that firms that issue loans without financial covenants tend to have (i) lower accounting quality, (ii) lower assets, and (iii) are experiencing faster growth in profitability relative to firms that issue loans with financial covenants. I build a theoretical model of project financing in which there is noisy public information about the project’s profitability, and the lender can privately monitor to improve the information quality. I show that if the signal precision without monitoring is sufficiently low (high), the equilibrium contract does not include (includes) a covenant. Covenant inclusion plays a key role in providing incentives to the lender to monitor. I show that the lender monitors less often relative to the first best. Insufficient monitoring leads to “excessive risk-taking,” namely, bad quality firms continuing with the project too often. Relatedly, I also show that covenants are used less often in equilibrium relative to the first best. The second chapter examines equilibrium consequences of litigation by holdout creditors in sovereign debt renegotiation. I show that given a sufficiently high probability of winning the litigation case against the borrowing country and/or a high enough defaulted sovereign debt, the presence of the holdout creditors increases the expected debt recovery rate, which makes the default option less attractive, and decreases the country’s default probability and the interest rate on the country’s debt. The country responds by borrowing more but defaults less often along the equilibrium path as it wants to avoid default and facing holdout creditors. Having a non-zero probability of successful litigation is welfare improving for the country as it sustains higher debt and defaults less frequently.
ContributorsKim, Yong (Author) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Thesis advisor) / Mehra, Rajnish (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021