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- All Subjects: risk
- Creators: Economics Program in CLAS
Description
Based upon personal involvement from August 2010 to July 2014 as a Marine Option Midshipman within the ASU Naval Reserves Officer Training Corps (NROTC), being a student of leadership training within my degree plan, and gender difference research I conducted, this creative project addresses potential issues that reside within the ASU NROTC and the ways in which the program overall can be changed for the Marine Options in order to bring about proper success and organization. In order to officially become a Marine within the Unites States Marine Corps, it is necessary for Marine Option students to fulfill Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Quantico, Virginia. As the first female to go through OCS as a midshipman from the ASU NROTC, I found that there is an inadequate amount of preparation and training given in regards to the gender differences and what is to be expected for successful completion. I will offer a brief history regarding the NROTC across the Unites States and the ASU NROTC itself. These subjects will cover the program layouts as well as the leadership training that is required and provided within it and the ways in which this is conducted. I will then compare and contrast this to the leadership training given to me within my study of Leadership and Ethics regarding the transformational leadership, gender-based leadership, and coercive leadership. Finally, I end my thesis with a reflection of personal experiences taken away from these avenues and offer recommendations to better equip the ASU NROTC program in having successful retention and success of the female Marine Option midshipman.
ContributorsCamarena, Leonor Jimenez (Author) / Lucio, Joanna (Thesis director) / Warnicke, Margaretha (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Public Affairs (Contributor)
Created2014-12
Description
This thesis studies the world governing body of soccer, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), by investigating its recent controversial past as a world-leading international non-profit organization. Through examining the organization's beginnings as well as its growth into a nonprofit goliath, this thesis assesses FIFA's actions compared to both the relatively relaxed legal standards in its home country of Switzerland as well as an established set of moral guidelines to analyze the organization's validity in today's complicated global environment. Topics include concerns surrounding FIFA's vast financial reserves, the organization's development programs, its treatment of minorities, and its efforts to prevent organizational transparency that may lead to legitimacy questions in the near future. In the end, assessments of FIFA's validity conclude that the organization falls somewhere between being completely credible and definitively fraudulent, as its actions seemingly are satisfactory legally according to Swiss laws and regulations on paper but questionable morally.
ContributorsJacobe, Joseph John (Author) / Thomas, George (Thesis director) / Kittilson, Miki (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
Economists, political philosophers, and others have often characterized social preferences regarding inequality by imagining a hypothetical choice of distributions behind "a veil of ignorance". Recent behavioral economics work has shown that subjects care about equality of outcomes, and are willing to sacrifice, in experimental contexts, some amount of personal gain in order to achieve greater equality. We review some of this literature and then conduct an experiment of our own, comparing subjects' choices in two risky situations, one being a choice for a purely individualized lottery for themselves, and the other a choice among possible distributions to members of a randomly selected group. We find that choosing in the group situation makes subjects significantly more risk averse than when choosing an individual lottery. This supports the hypothesis that an additional preference for equality exists alongside ordinary risk aversion, and that in a hypothetical "veil of ignorance" scenario, such preferences may make subjects significantly more averse to unequal distributions of rewards than can be explained by risk aversion alone.
ContributorsTheisen, Alexander Scott (Co-author) / McMullin, Caitlin (Co-author) / Li, Marilyn (Co-author) / DeSerpa, Allan (Thesis director) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Baldwin, Marjorie (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
This paper examines the qualitative and quantitative effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the current landscape of the investment banking industry. We begin by reviewing what occurred during the financial crisis, including which banks took TARP money, which banks became bank holding companies, and significant mergers and acquisitions. We then examine the new regulations that were created in reaction to the crisis, including the Dodd-Frank Act. In particular, we focus on the Volcker Rule, which is a section of the act that prohibits proprietary trading and other risky activities at banks. Then we shift into a quantitative analysis of the changes that banks made from the years 2005-2016. To do this, we chose four banks to be representative of the industry: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, and Bank of America. We then analyze four metrics for each bank: revenue mix, value at risk, tangible common equity ratio, and debt to equity ratio. These provide methods for analyzing how banks have shifted their revenue centers to accommodate new regulations, as well as how these shifts have affected banks' risk levels and leverage. Our data show that all four banks that we observed shifted their revenue centers to flatter revenue areas, such as investment management, wealth management, and consumer banking operations. This was paired with fairly flat investment banking revenues across the board when controlling for overall market changes in the investment banking sector. Additionally, trading-focused banks significantly shifted their operations away from proprietary trading and higher risk activities. These changes resulted in lower value at risk measures for Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley with very minor increases for J.P. Morgan and Bank of America, although these two banks had low levels of absolute value at risk when compared to Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. All banks' tangible common equity ratios increased and debt to equity ratios decreased, indicating a safer investment for shareholders and lower leverage. We conclude by offering a forecast of our expectations for the future, particularly in light of a Trump presidency. We expect less regulation going forward and the potential reversal of the Volcker Rule. We believe that these changes would result in more revenue coming from trading and riskier strategies, increasing value at risk, decreasing tangible common equity ratios, and increasing debt to equity ratios. While we do expect less regulation and higher risk, we do not expect these banks to reach pre-crisis levels due to the significant amount of regulations that would be particularly difficult for the Trump administration to reverse.
ContributorsPatel, Aashay (Co-author) / Goulder, Gregory (Co-author) / Simonson, Mark (Thesis director) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-05
Description
This paper examines infrastructure spending in a model economy. Infrastructure is subdivided into two types: one that makes future production more efficient, and another that decreases the risk of devastation to the future economy. We call the first type base infrastructure, and the second type risk-reducing infrastructure. Our model assumes that a single representative individual makes all the decisions within a society and optimizes their own total utility over the present and future. We then calibrate an aggregate economic, two-period model to identify the optimal allocation of today’s output into consumption, base infrastructure, and risk-reducing infrastructure. This model finds that many governments can make substantive improvements to the happiness of their citizens by investing significantly more into risk-reducing infrastructure.
ContributorsFink, Justin (Co-author) / Fuller, John "Jack" (Co-author) / Prescott, Edward (Thesis director) / Millington, Matthew (Committee member) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor, Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2021-05