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One of the salient challenges of sustainability is the Tragedy of the Commons, where individuals acting independently and rationally deplete a common resource despite their understanding that it is not in the group's long term best interest to do so. Hardin presents this dilemma as nearly intractable and solvable only

One of the salient challenges of sustainability is the Tragedy of the Commons, where individuals acting independently and rationally deplete a common resource despite their understanding that it is not in the group's long term best interest to do so. Hardin presents this dilemma as nearly intractable and solvable only by drastic, government-mandated social reforms, while Ostrom's empirical work demonstrates that community-scale collaboration can circumvent tragedy without any elaborate outside intervention. Though more optimistic, Ostrom's work provides scant insight into larger-scale dilemmas such as climate change. Consequently, it remains unclear if the sustainable management of global resources is possible without significant government mediation. To investigate, we conducted two game theoretic experiments that challenged students in different countries to collaborate digitally and manage a hypothetical common resource. One experiment involved students attending Arizona State University and the Rochester Institute of Technology in the US and Mountains of the Moon University in Uganda, while the other included students at Arizona State and the Management Development Institute in India. In both experiments, students were randomly assigned to one of three production roles: Luxury, Intermediate, and Subsistence. Students then made individual decisions about how many units of goods they wished to produce up to a set maximum per production class. Luxury players gain the most profit (i.e. grade points) per unit produced, but they also emit the most externalities, or social costs, which directly subtract from the profit of everybody else in the game; Intermediate players produce a medium amount of profit and externalities per unit, and Subsistence players produce a low amount of profit and externalities per unit. Variables influencing and/or inhibiting collaboration were studied using pre- and post-game surveys. This research sought to answer three questions: 1) Are international groups capable of self-organizing in a way that promotes sustainable resource management?, 2) What are the key factors that inhibit or foster collective action among international groups?, and 3) How well do Hardin's theories and Ostrom's empirical models predict the observed behavior of students in the game? The results of gameplay suggest that international cooperation is possible, though likely sub-optimal. Statistical analysis of survey data revealed that heterogeneity and levels of trust significantly influenced game behavior. Specific traits of heterogeneity among students found to be significant were income, education, assigned production role, number of people in one's household, college class, college major, and military service. Additionally, it was found that Ostrom's collective action framework was a better predictor of game outcome than Hardin's theories. Overall, this research lends credence to the plausibility of international cooperation in tragedy of the commons scenarios such as climate change, though much work remains to be done.
ContributorsStanton, Albert Grayson (Author) / Clark, Susan Spierre (Thesis director) / Seager, Thomas (Committee member) / Civil, Environmental and Sustainable Engineering Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2014-12
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Employing an interdisciplinary approach with a grounding in new institutional economics, this dissertation investigates how institutions, as shared rules, norms, and strategies, mediate social-ecological outcomes in a system exposed to a novel threat in the form of a rapidly growing and especially destructive invasive plant, Mikania micrantha (Mikania). I explore

Employing an interdisciplinary approach with a grounding in new institutional economics, this dissertation investigates how institutions, as shared rules, norms, and strategies, mediate social-ecological outcomes in a system exposed to a novel threat in the form of a rapidly growing and especially destructive invasive plant, Mikania micrantha (Mikania). I explore whether and how communities (largely part of community forest user groups in the buffer zone of Chitwan National Park in Chitwan, Nepal) collectively act in the face of Mikania invasion. Collective action is vital to successful natural resource governance in a variety of contexts and systems globally. Understanding collective action and the role of institutions is especially important in the face of continued and amplifying global environmental changes impacting social-ecological systems, such as climate change and invasive species. Contributing to efforts to bolster knowledge of the role of collective action and institutions in social-ecological systems, this research first establishes that community forest governance and institutional arrangements are heterogeneous. I subsequently utilize content and institutional analyses to identify and address themes and norms related to Mikania management. The content analysis contributes an empirical study of the influence of trust in collective natural resource management efforts. Using two complementary econometric analyses of survey data from 1235 households, I additionally assess equity in access to community forest resources, an understudied area in the institutional literature, and the factors affecting collective action related to Mikania removal. Finally, an agent-based model of institutional change facilitates the comparison of two perspectives, rational choice and cultural diffusion, of how shared norms and strategies for Mikania management change over time, providing insight into institutional change generally. Results highlight the importance of trust and understanding the de facto, or on-the-ground institutions; the influence of perception on collective action; that integrating equity into institutional analyses may strengthen sustainable resource management efforts; and that rational choice is an unlikely mechanism of institutional change. The mixed-methods approach contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of institutions and collective action in invasive species management and broadly to the scientific understanding of the role of institutions in mediating global environmental changes.
ContributorsSullivan, Abigail (Author) / York, Abigail M (Thesis advisor) / An, Li (Committee member) / Yabiku, Scott T (Committee member) / Hall, Sharon J (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016