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Description
This study investigates the impact of portfolio disclosure on hedge fund performance. Using a regression discontinuity design, I investigate the effect of the disclosure requirements that take effect when an investment company's assets exceed $100 million; when that occurs, a fund is required by the SEC to submit form 13F disclosing its portfolio holdings. Consistent with the argument that portfolio disclosure reveals "trade secrets" and also raises front running costs thus harms the funds that disclose, I find that there is a drop in fund performance (about 4% annually) after a fund begins filing form 13F, as well as an increase in return correlations with other hedge funds in the same investment style. The drop in performance cannot be explained by a change in the assets under management or a mean reversion in returns. Consistent with the idea that funds with illiquid holdings tend to employ sequential trading strategies, which increase the likelihood of being taken advantage of by free riders and front runners, the drop in performance is more dramatic for funds that have more illiquid holdings. In addition, I find that the incentive fees paid to fund managers are 1% higher when portfolio disclosure is required, which supports the hypothesis that investors' monitoring of portfolio holdings disciplines adverse risk-taking by fund managers and allows for higher convexity in the optimal compensation structure. Finally, there is a drop in flows into funds that file 13F, which suggests that hedge fund investors negatively value 13F disclosure. Overall, this study suggests that the cost of portfolio disclosure is economically large. It contributes to the policy debate over what constitutes optimal disclosure.
ContributorsShi, Zhen (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Aragon, Georges (Thesis advisor) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
This dissertation analyzes the reliability of reported employee stock option (ESO) expense, the determination of expected life of ESOs, motivations to manipulate ESO expense, and the impact of noise in ESO expense on subsequent stock price returns. Based on unique data, this is the first paper to measure average historical ESO life for all employees of a broad set of firms. I find average life has a mean of 4.12 years. Average life is reduced by 0.38 years per 10 percentage point increase in volatility, and industry effects explain an additional 7% of the variation. Reported expected life increases 0.37 years per year of historical life and an additional 0.16 years per year of age of the outstanding options. Deviations of reported volatility and life from benchmarks have positive correlations with deviations from own reporting history. Using stated assumptions rather than benchmark assumptions drops (increases) ESO expense by 8.3% (17.6%) for the 25th (75th) percentile firm. The change in earnings per share decreases (increases) by $0.019 ($0.007) for the 25th (75th) percentile firm. Tests for motivations to manipulate stock option expense downward have mixed results. Absolute values of deviations from benchmarks have a positive relationship with subsequent stock price volatility suggesting noise in reported stock option expense results in stock price noise. Deviations from benchmarks and subsequent cumulative abnormal returns have statistically significant results but are difficult to interpret.
ContributorsYoung, Brian (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
In this dissertation, I examine the source of some of the anomalous capital market outcomes that have been documented for firms with high accruals. Chapter 2 develops and implements a methodology that decomposes a firm's discretionary accruals into a firm-specific and an industry-specific component. I use this decomposition to investigate which component drives the subsequent negative returns associated with firms with high discretionary accruals. My results suggest that these abnormal returns are driven by the firm-specific component of discretionary accruals. Moreover, although industry-specific discretionary accruals do not directly contribute towards this anomaly, I find that it is precisely when industry-specific discretionary accruals are high that firms with high firm-specific discretionary accruals subsequently earn these negative returns. While consistent with irrational mispricing or a rational risk premium associated with high discretionary accruals, these findings also support a transactions-cost based explanation for the accruals anomaly whereby search costs associated with distinguishing between value-relevant and manipulative discretionary accruals can induce investors to overlook potential earnings manipulation. Chapter 3 extends the decomposition to examine the role of firm-specific and industry-specific discretionary accruals in explaining the subsequent market underperformance and negative analysts' forecast errors documented for firms issuing equity. I examine the post-issue market returns and analysts' forecast errors for a sample of seasoned equity issues between 1975 and 2004 and find that offering-year firm-specific discretionary accruals can partially explain these anomalous capital market outcomes. Nonetheless, I find this predictive power of firm-specific accruals to be more pronounced for issues that occur during 1975 - 1989 compared to issues taking place between 1990 and 2004. Additionally, I find no evidence that investors and analysts are more overoptimistic about the prospects of issuers that have both high firm-specific and industry-specific discretionary accruals (compared to firms with high discretionary accruals in general). The results indicate no role for industry-specific discretionary accruals in explaining overoptimistic expectations from seasoned equity issues and suggest the importance of firm-specific factors in inducing earnings manipulation surrounding equity issues.
ContributorsIkram, Atif (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
One necessary condition for the two-pass risk premium estimator to be consistent and asymptotically normal is that the rank of the beta matrix in a proposed linear asset pricing model is full column. I first investigate the asymptotic properties of the risk premium estimators and the related t-test and Wald test statistics when the full rank condition fails. I show that the beta risk of useless factors or multiple proxy factors for a true factor are priced more often than they should be at the nominal size in the asset pricing models omitting some true factors. While under the null hypothesis that the risk premiums of the true factors are equal to zero, the beta risk of the true factors are priced less often than the nominal size. The simulation results are consistent with the theoretical findings. Hence, the factor selection in a proposed factor model should not be made solely based on their estimated risk premiums. In response to this problem, I propose an alternative estimation of the underlying factor structure. Specifically, I propose to use the linear combination of factors weighted by the eigenvectors of the inner product of estimated beta matrix. I further propose a new method to estimate the rank of the beta matrix in a factor model. For this method, the idiosyncratic components of asset returns are allowed to be correlated both over different cross-sectional units and over different time periods. The estimator I propose is easy to use because it is computed with the eigenvalues of the inner product of an estimated beta matrix. Simulation results show that the proposed method works well even in small samples. The analysis of US individual stock returns suggests that there are six common risk factors in US individual stock returns among the thirteen factor candidates used. The analysis of portfolio returns reveals that the estimated number of common factors changes depending on how the portfolios are constructed. The number of risk sources found from the analysis of portfolio returns is generally smaller than the number found in individual stock returns.
ContributorsWang, Na (Author) / Ahn, Seung C. (Thesis advisor) / Kallberg, Jarl G. (Committee member) / Liu, Crocker H. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012